In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional developments, a European studies curriculum that puts the interplay of culture, society and politics in Europe at the heart of the curriculum. Among other topics, the programme focused on how Europe and European integration could be contextualised and what these concepts meant to European citizens. In June 2018, Euroculture celebrated its twentieth anniversary with a conference to discuss not only the changes within the MA Euroculture itself, but also to reflect upon the changes in the field of European studies over the last two decades writ large. This volume brings together the main findings of this conference.

Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a space for cooperation between more mainstream-oriented research on the one hand and a variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial perspectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextualise the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in relation to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Its methodology, that treats theoretical and analytical work, classroom teaching and engaged practice as integral parts of critical inquiry, has significantly contributed to its ability to continuously enhance scholarly discussions.

The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dialogues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embedded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no less than two decades.
European Studies and Europe: Twenty Years of Euroculture

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Introduction: Twenty Years of European Studies and of Euroculture

Janny de Jong, Marek Neuman, Senka Neuman Stanivuković and Margriet van der Waal

1 Introduction

In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional developments, a European studies curriculum that put the interplay of culture, society and politics in Europe at the heart of the matter. How could Europe and European integration be contextualised and what did these concepts mean to European citizens?

In hindsight, what is perhaps most remarkable is the optimism with which the programme was conceived, and which reflected the spirit of the time. The end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the downfall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, all triggered hope, next to creating expectations that European collaboration in politics, economics, social and cultural matters would only intensify from now on. Such hopes and expectations were also reflected in developments in the Higher Education sphere as part of a broader re-orientation of the European project towards the citizen. The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999 that kick-started the so-called Bologna process, explicitly mentions European citizenship and the competences that were seen as necessary to create such a citizen:
‘A Europe of Knowledge is now widely recognised as an irreplaceable factor for social and human growth and as an indispensable component to consolidate and enrich the European citizenship, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space.’

Euroculture fitted and continues to fit very well with the aims that were expressed in this document with regard to curricular development, mobility and integrated programmes of study, training and research.

Yet, over the past two decades, some – at times modest – changes occurred to both the academic field of European studies and the Euroculture MA programme. Scholarly preoccupation with questions related to why and how European institutions emerge and endure – often framed as a debate between the intergovernmentalist focus on state interests and neofunctionalist emphasis of private and sector interest – has partially side-lined broader socio-political, historical and cultural contexts in which the integration process unfolds. This had two key consequences for the development of European studies. First, the field was often conflated with narrower attempts to theorise and empirically address the process and outcomes of EU integration. Put simply, European studies were reduced to EU studies. Second, but related, dissenting and critical voices that challenge the established positions about the nature of European integration were marginalised and diffused across many colloquial debates. Accordingly, the implicit consensus on the conceptual (Europe as EU institutions) and analytical (in-between of IR and political science) boundaries of European studies contributed to its normalisation as a “proper field.” At the same time, this came at the expense of theoretical and methodological pluralism in general and interdisciplinarity in particular. Mainstream scholarship either remained untouched by or appeared late to many of the trending discussions across the humanities and social sciences including the affective-turn, the practice-turn or assemblage thinking. The ongoing deliberations about the meaning and consequences of the multiple European crises is telling. “Events” such as anti-austerity protests amid the Eurozone crisis, the externalisation and diffusion of governance to third countries and third actors in the context of the EU’s migration management or increasingly visible patterns of differentiated integration in view of (not only) Brexit has prompted some debate on the future of European studies. The scholarship has recognised the problematic effects of the pro-integration bias in the field, but the focus remains on tweaking rather than recon-

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sidering the existing meta-positions and theoretical and methodological tools to account for “novel” phenomena. European studies are not (yet) fully prepared to overcome the established disciplinary borders and open its positions and ideals to the scrutiny of plural and critical voices.

Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a space for cooperation between more mainstream research on the one hand and a variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial perspectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextualise the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in relation to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Euroculture can be understood as a critique of any form of disciplinary orthodoxy, and as such it continues to challenge mainstream European studies with novel questions and modes of inquiry. Euroculture’s unique methodology, that treats theoretical and analytical work, classroom teaching and engaged practice as integral parts of critical inquiry, has significantly contributed to its ability to continuously enhance the scholarly discussions.

In that sense, the set-up, composition and content of the Euroculture MA programme can be viewed as tools to question and enhance European studies, as becomes clear in the second section of this edited volume (see, particularly, the chapter by Wagenaar). More specifically, over time, the number of consortium partners – in both the academic and non-academic field – grew, as did the length of the programme, from 60 to 90 to 120 ECTS. Furthermore, the increase in voices that participate in the design and implementation of the programme, both in number and diversity (in terms of disciplinary training and location), has added to different modes of knowledge that Euroculture today produces and circulates. The topics dealt with in teaching and research have developed into fields that explicitly address current problems and challenges, especially those that are related to understanding the complexity of current social divisions. The Europe of today is markedly different from the Europe twenty years ago, the optimism mentioned above having given in to feelings of uncertainty about Europe’s future among large parts of the European population. Whereas the Europe of the late 1990s was celebrating the disappearance of dividing lines on the continent, most notably in the form of the looming EU enlargement to the East, European integration of the late 2010s is hampered by discussion about the re-introduction of (internal) borders in the aftermath of the migration “crisis” and other crises in the European Union’s vicinity, whether in Ukraine or in the context of the Arab uprisings. As a result,

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5 For the trend concerning the European Union population’s feelings about the future of the European Union, please consult the EU’s Eurobarometer surveys at European Commission, “Eurobarometer Interactive,” http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/43/groupKy/211.
the shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space⁶ that the Bologna Declaration referred to, have come under pressure. Safeguarding democracy and civic values has become even more important. It is these changes in Europe that continue informing the continuously developing curriculum of Euroculture.

Yet, one element has stayed the same: Euroculture’s focus on the interplay between culture, society and politics. From the outset, Euroculture has asked different questions from mainstream European studies approaches. This was directly related to its focus on what Europe and European integration means to citizens. It has also developed different analytical lenses (because of the nexus of politics, culture and society) through which to look at these processes of societal transformation. From the start, its aim was to bring different disciplinary perspectives together as a powerful tool to create new ways of looking at the existing situation and thereby come to new knowledge of the situation. Euroculture’s own understanding of these analytical lenses/dimensions has matured, enabling its staff and students to better grasp and explain the emerging challenges and changes of and to Europe.

To mark Euroculture’s twentieth anniversary, in June 2018, we organised a conference to reflect upon both some of the major changes the field of European studies and the Euroculture MA programme underwent in the past twenty years. This offered us the opportunity to take stock of the above-mentioned changes and developments, both in terms of the processes and objects that we study, as well as in the ways and means through which we do so. This edited volume at hand contains a selection of the many interesting contributions presented.

2 Structure of the Edited Volume

The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dialogues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embedded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no less than two decades.

2.1 Part I: Reflecting upon the Field of European Studies over the Last Twenty Years

The first part offers insight into some of the empirical areas the field of European studies has increasingly ventured into over the last two decades, next to showcasing how the field has become conceptually and methodologically rich as a result of borrowing from (closely linked) academic fields, such as cultural studies (see particularly the chapters by Rodríguez and Fernández, and by Fink et al.), sociology and social movement studies (Volk), or social theory (Matsevich-Dukhan). Reflecting upon where and what Europe is, Vicherat Mattar takes us on a journey discussing Europe as the “familiar stranger,” only to conclude that we may have been asking the wrong questions all along and that we should really be asking the Europe for what purpose question.

Subsequent chapters take Vicherat Mattar’s discussion of how Europe was repurposed to fit various academic and non-academic contexts more explicitly into the field of European studies. With the broader question of what contemporary European studies are and how to practice these in mind, they either discuss how the field has changed as a result of extra-disciplinary concepts, theories, or methodologies making inroads into the field of European studies, or how a particular concept can be re-evaluated when read from a European studies perspective. Consequently, Fink et al. ask to what extent the concept of culture – broadly defined – has become mainstream in European studies, arguing that there seems to be a vast discrepancy between culture as inherent to the academic field and European studies MA programmes. Whereas culture remains methodologically underdetermined and within the margins of scholarly discussions, MA programmes often treat culture as the cornerstone of their curriculum. Rodríguez and Fernández, in their contribution discussing Catalan and Basque nationalism, illustrate how European studies has been enriched by methodologically drawing on other fields – in their case, film studies. The two following chapters, by Volk and by Bartolomé and Coromina respectively, show how more sociological and anthropological accounts of Europe – which adopt the perspective of a society and daily experiences of citizens – are gaining prominence within European studies. These topics are gaining much scholarly attention, whereas they seemed to be less visible two decades ago. First, Volk takes up the contentious question of how the meaning of Europe is renegotiated through border politics and discursive practices of social movements positioned at the political extreme left and extreme right. Second, Bartolomé and Coromina present a comparative study of four European countries (the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Sweden) in terms of their citizens’ attitude towards European values and their disregard for these, focusing on how and why citizens justify fraudulent behaviour.

Matsevich-Dukhan, in her concluding chapter to this part, illustrates how novel theoretical discussions that draw from social theory can help expand the problematisations of Europe beyond the policy and institutional analysis. More specifi-
cally, she evaluates creative society as a paradigm that can critically address the discontents of the EU’s cultural policy and the Creative Europe programme.

2.2 Part II: Reflecting upon the Euroculture MA Programme over the Last Twenty Years

The second part offers a reflection upon the last twenty years of the Euroculture MA programme, particularly focusing on the changes and continuities the programme experienced in both content and didactic methods. Taking us back to the late 1990s, Wagenaar discusses not only the rationale and motivation behind establishing Euroculture, but also allows a glimpse into the institutional pitfalls of launching such a transnational and interdisciplinary educational programme. Furthermore, he well establishes that Euroculture cannot be read in isolation from broader societal changes occurring in Europe and elsewhere, nor can it be seen as separated from the scholarly field of European studies.

In their respective contributions, de Jong and Megens and Neuman and Neuman Stanivuković, reflect upon two foundational courses of the Euroculture curriculum; “Cultural History: Domains of European Identity” and “Political Construction of Europe,” respectively. De Jong and Megens show how over time and despite the many changes the course underwent – in terms of increasing its weight in the overall programme’s curriculum and of being taught by multiple lecturers at different times – the essential idea behind the course has remained the same. As such, students are still encouraged to study how Europe was conceived in the past and to critically discuss the importance of this historical context for our understanding of typically “European” concepts and challenges. On their part, Neuman and Neuman Stanivuković assess how, both from a content- and a didactics-perspective, the “Political Construction of Europe” course can serve the purpose of teaching European studies in complex and critical times. Attention is also paid to the vast diversity present in a Euroculture classroom, both in terms of nationality and disciplinary background of students; here, such diversity is then treated as simultaneously a challenge and an opportunity to transcend disciplinary boundaries, which is seen as a critical skill in answering complex challenges currently facing Europe. Both chapters further illustrate the importance of developing engaging didactic methods, which become the more crucial as a result of the earlier mentioned diversity inherent to the Euroculture programme. On this note, Ampleman and Shaw outline how following the so-called CARE – competences, accompaniment, retention, engagement – model could further enhance students’ learning environment.

The second part to this edited volume is concluded by an outlook into further developing the Euroculture programme. More specifically, observing the strong institutional foundations of the Euroculture network, by now spanning eight European and four non-European partner universities, and acknowledging the ever-present embeddedness of the Euroculture programme within the field of Europe-
an studies, Goering proposes specific venues for establishing interdisciplinary re-
search within a Euroculture Research Collaborative. Such a collaborative would
then be able to produce innovative research at the intersection of many fields,
thereby, in turn, feeding into the ever-developing European studies field.

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Part One

Reflecting upon the Field of European Studies over the Last Twenty Years
Europe: The Familiar Stranger

Daniela Vicherat Mattar

1 Introduction

Thinking about Europe is challenging because the object is elusive: what is this entity we like to call Europe? How can it be meaningfully bounded and defined if the aim is to examine and understand it in its complexity?

In what follows I would like to argue that it is possible, and a rather urgent political task today, to think of Europe not only in historical or geopolitical terms, but also conceptually, by problematising our familiar understandings of it. I argue that thinking about Europe today is necessarily an exercise of imagining it as a “familiar stranger”.

Any examination of Europe departs from the basic question: where is Europe? In this contribution, I intend to address this question from the perspective of the three key words used in the title. Assuming the multiple facets and imbricated histories of Europe, it is possible to argue that Europe is “manywhere.” But, I think the qualification “many” is misleading here, because in fact Europe is not in “many” places. Today, as the notion of “fortress Europe” implies, Europe is a highly protected and clearly demarcated territory. Well after the coming down of the borders that defined the European space since the Schengen Agreement (1985), Amnesty International estimated the EU spent almost €2bn between 2007 and 2013 on the securitisation and militarisation of the external frontiers, basically
on fences, surveillance systems and patrols on land and the sea.\textsuperscript{1} This amount of resources has been spent to define and demarcate the external borders of Europe.

Klaus Eder describes how fortress Europe is protected by hard and soft borders: hard borders being those displayed not only at Europe’s perimeters, like the walls in Ceuta, Melilla and Hungary, but also those institutionalised in legal texts and procedures that control immigration and asylum, like the Dublin regulations in its multiple iterations, which define who has the right to be and occupy a place in the European territory. Soft borders, in turn, are described by Eder as those encoded in the many pre-institutional ideas, explicit as well as implicit, about what Europe is and who the rightful Europeans are. So, Eder argues, ‘soft borders are part of the “hardness” of borders in the sense that the symbolic power inherent in soft borders helps to “naturalize” hard borders, to produce the effect of taking borders for granted.’\textsuperscript{2} Borders are understood here not simply as demarcating lines on a map, but as a system of ordering and categorising populations, a form of surveillance, from the perimeter of the landscape to the heart of the European peoples.

Borders and boundaries are a crucial component of the question “where is Europe?” They are also central to the three key words included in the title of this contribution. Each of the terms will provide an anchor for the argument I am developing here: in the first section I start by discussing how Europe has been studied both as a region and as an idea, two not necessarily compatible and straightforward endeavors. Subsequently, I address the issue of the familiar understood with reference to a genuine, unproblematic and authentic unity. The familiar is here understood as a point of reference that is original, and ideally univocal, an idea very much present today especially in nationalist (populist) discourses about nativism and authenticity. In the third section I discuss the notion of the stranger, a prevalent figure of contemporary political and popular discourses especially since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/2016. Already in the early 1900s, Georg Simmel identified the stranger as a key social type of modern societies.\textsuperscript{3} The stranger is not conceived here as a distant “other,” but a constitutive figure, one that is actively present in our midst, one that is often feared, criminalised or demonised, but one that is also celebrated in its diversity. In either case, the stranger remains othered from the sense of familiar self, provoking increasing tensions and contradictions with it.

Before I delve into each of these three sections more in detail, let me position myself in relation to these ideas. For that I would like to make a short biographical


note, an heuristic exercise to start unravelling the question “where is Europe?”: I am writing as a non-European European. Having been born in Chile, I circumvented the hard border of nationality by inheriting Italian citizenship by matriarchal bloodline, a nationality that was activated only when I decided to continue with my graduate studies in Europe in my mid-twenties. Before that, I had neither set a foot on this side of the Atlantic, nor had I spoken anything else than Spanish. Both the European landmass and the languages spoken here were strange to me (aside of the colonial Spanish, but that is another aspect I shall return to later in more analytical terms). I was able to match my Italian nationality with the language much later, by the hazardous opportunity to live and do my PhD in Italy. However, my skin color, the way I dress, the fact that I am able to speak Italian fluently now, has helped me to circumvent the soft-borders of “presence” and allows me to be recognised as Italian without provoking any type of cognitive dissonance with whatever audience I encounter (even including native Italians, most of the times). In my experience, hard and soft borders, like nationality or language, became un-bordered by means of an estranged assimilation that made me a familiar stranger.4

Clearly, one’s ethnicity, religion and cultural background may have implications for the clothes we wear (turbans, hijab, jeans) or the diet we follow (omnivore, vegan or vegetarian, kosher or halal). Through the softness of these ordinary practices and their everydayness, the hard practices of inclusion and exclusion are materialised and naturalised in collective identity categories. While obviously the accident of birth conditions our life choices, it might not be at all obviously determinant to our sense of self-identity, nor definitive regarding where we think we belong, or even where we want to belong. The analytical exercise of estranging oneself is useful to try to enlarge our understanding of the rights and responsibilities we have, and towards whom we have them, that is our sense of citizenship. Seyla Benhabib, a Turkish-Sephardic-American philosopher, has described how contemporary democratic nation-states have been built in the illusion of the homogeneity of its peoples and territorial self-sufficiency.5 Various initiatives can easily debunk the former,6 while the political and normative debates about open borders for commodities and information exchange, but closed borders for peoples’ mobility, illustrate the controversies surrounding the latter illusion.

The little reflection based on my own position as a non-European European, or a familiar stranger, is merely anecdotal. In what follows, I aim to connect it to the concrete materiality defining Europe as a world region, and the challenges

4 The idea of the “familiar stranger” is from Stuart Hall’s beautiful memoirs. I am borrowing it here as an analytical perspective not only to think about the life trajectory of migrants, but also to think about regional areas like Europe. See Stuart Hall, Familiar Stranger: A Life between Two Islands (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2017).


faced today by the question of migration. Let’s examine in turns the three key ideas presented in the title of this contribution.

2 Europe: A Region of Borders and a Border Region

“Where is Europe?” appears to be a geographical question, which implies demarcations. To demarcate, as the geographer David Newman argues, is the process through which borders are constructed and the categories of difference or separation created. Demarcation is the process defining which criteria of inclusion/exclusion are relevant for a given political community, be it national citizenship, property regimes, religious affiliation, the color of your skin, etc. The question is, of course, what motives define, promote, socialise and naturalise specific criteria of demarcation; and who has the power to do so (and with which purpose).

Geographically, even pan-Europeanists like Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi argued back in 1922, ‘there is no European continent [to demarcate]; there is only a European peninsula of the Eurasian continent’. So where, or rather what, is Europe?

While maps can serve the purpose to examine the where question, the criteria and justifications that underpin how demarcations are done is an eloquent form to understand the what question. According to Walter Mignolo the first representations of Europe as a whole distinctive unity date from the eighth century medieval orbis terrarum or T/O maps, where Europe is depicted as one of the three regions of the world, each one of them corresponding to one of the three sons of Noah: Asia (Shem), Africa (Ham) and Europe (Jopeth). In this representation of the world the center is not defined geographically, but ideologically. This means that the answer to the question of where Europe is, is given by what it is, i.e. Christian. With the Atlantic explorations, imperial maps, granted to Europe a cartographic and geopolitical centrality, from the Mediterranean basin to the domination of various regions well beyond the European landmass. How did this shift in representation happen? After the “invention” of the Americas, Europe’s representations in maps account for its dominant position as imperial power in social, economic, political and cultural terms. The imperial expansion placed Europe in the top center-left position of the world map representations. According to Mignolo, an especially dominant position in the context of a culture defined by an alphabetic

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10 An idea put forward by the Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman in 1958, that has been expanded analytically by authors like Mignolo and Enrique Dussel, among others.
writing, where reading proceeds from left to right and from top to bottom. Here again, what Europe was (i.e. an imperial power) defined where it was placed in the maps (i.e. its cartographic representation).

Even when looking at the territoriality of Europe within the Eurasia region and European peninsula, the history of what counts as European is not univocal: Europe has a long history of shifting soft-borders, selectively used by various dominant actors to define the hard-borders of what counts as European. Evidently, what we name as “Europe” has never been a fully fixed and uncontested geographical area:

“The center of gravity of “Europe” has shifted repeatedly. “Europe” has been generated not just by north-western and south-western Europeans, but also by inhabitants of the Balkans, east-central Europeans, Russians, Ukrainians, Ottoman Turks and Moors. Over time, many countries have laid claims of being at the “heart of Europe”, for example, Poland, Hungary, the Czech lands, Austria and France.”

Hence, what counts for Europe as a territory is the result of specific historical struggles to demarcate specific ideas about what Europe is and who the true Europeans are. The work of the historian Peter Burke also suggests Europe is to be better understood as ‘an idea’. In fact, he goes as far as to argue that the modern idea of Europe did not exist before the historical experiences of the 1700s, particularly those articulated along three key processes that granted an apparent unicity to the European imagination: (i) the fear of invasion (the fear to the Ottoman expansion), (ii) the invasion of others (the discovery of the Americas), and the (iii) internal struggles between radical ideological projects within the European political space (liberalism, fascism, communism). These processes consolidated how, as an idea, Europe is necessarily defined by oppositions: the result of a binary tension between inclusion and exclusion based on who and what is defined as properly European (Christians/pagans; west/east; civilised/uncivilised; white/black; developed/underdeveloped, illiberal/liberal, etc.). The where of Europe is a question subordinated to the what and who questions.

In contemporary times, even the EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn, in a speech delivered to civil society in Belgrade in 2005, noted that ‘the map of Europe is defined in the minds of Europeans’. The struggle then is to control those minds, those imaginations, in order to define the demarcation criteria that would create Europe as a region. The whole debate and discussions of European enlargement is illustrative of this, for the enlargement requires a number of procedural

11 Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance.
12 Eder, “Europe’s Borders.”
13 Lee and Bideleux, “Europe”, 164.
conditions, but also the alignment with fundamental “European values” as established in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. These are values of liberty, solidarity, tolerance, the defense of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The question is, of course, whether these values are conditioned by national-citizenship, religious affiliation, skin color, wealth, literacy levels, cultural traditions, language, etc. These are all conditions that affect the applicability of aspiring members to the Union, and how individual migrant/refugee applications are assessed by the member states.

Like Klaus Eder, Ansi Paasi discusses how the idea of Europe as a region has been created by a number of political, cultural, economic, and religious discourses and practices that are not necessarily bound to a specific location. Paasi, together with many others like Peter Wagner and Gerard Delanty, suggests that it is better to understand Europe as a specific set of experiences in need of interpretation, the development of institutional arrangements, structural bodies and everyday practices that give shape to the “spatial imaginary” we call Europe.

So, the question “where is Europe?” is more complex than identifying the correct demarcating lines on a map. The answer is rather dependent on the question about what is Europe and who represents it. Necessarily, to answer the what question leads to the challenge of multiple interpretations, as Wagner suggests. Especially, because there is no univocal interpretation on the foundational experiences that would afford the unicity and wholeness of Europe: the north-south dichotomy, as Eder reminds us, offers different interpretations to these experiences based on dominant narratives that strengthen the specificity of each part, either in terms of cultural exclusivity (when defined from the south, especially with reference to the Renaissance period) or modern welfare and progress (when defined from the northern European perspective). In the same way, Eastern, central and Western interpretations of Europe position and promote different imaginaries about where Europe is and who are strange to it. In fact, there is an invariable and ongoing exercise of othering the next “eastern” state, or in other words, a progressive “westernisation” of Europe.

An alternative approach to this question is given by scholars like Gurminder Bhambra, who contest the particularity and exclusivity of foundational European

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18 Wagner, “Modernity as Experience and Interpretation.”
19 Eder, “Europe’s Borders.”
experiences and their aligned set of interpretations. She ‘contests the “fact” of the “specialness of Europe” – both in terms of its culture and its events; the “fact” of the autonomous development of events, concepts and paradigms; and ultimately, the “fact” of Europe itself as a coherent, bounded entity giving form to the above’. Bhambra argues against the idea of the specificity of the European experiences, like the Renaissance, the French Revolution and the industrialisation processes. According to her these processes are neither geographically delimited to Europe nor can they be separated or disconnected from processes taking place in the rest of the colonised world.

Parallel to these conceptual and theoretical debates about how to conceptually understand Europe, today we witness an increasing protection of fragmentary identities within the European political landscape, a progressive regionalisation (like in the Catalan separatist case; see also the contribution by Rodriguez and Fernandez in this publication) and the rise of populist nationalist discourses appealing to ancestral identities grounded in cultural and religious or secular daily practices (like in Austria, Italy, Hungary and Poland; see in this case the contribution by Volk). This brings us to the discussion of the second idea in the title of this contribution, the question about what is familiar to Europe.

3 The Lure of Autochthony: Defending what is Familiar

To summarise the previous discussion about “where is Europe?”, I suggest the answer rather depends on what form Europe takes in the minds of those who identify themselves as Europeans. The question now is, of course, “who are the Europeans?”

To question who is to pose a question about identity. Paasi argues that ‘[i]dentity is not merely an individual or social category, but also – crucially – a spatial category, since ideas of territory, self and “us” require symbolic, sociocultural and/or physical dividing lines with the Other.’ He defends, like many other theorists of identity, that identity is always relational and hence, to some extent, always defined collectively. Identity is necessarily a process of becoming that cannot be contained only in a single individual self. Even personal identity is defined by the collective constituencies with which the “I” identifies and who might (or not) recognise it (operating at various scales, from intimate to public relations). Identity always requires others to exist.

Put differently, to confess one particular identity is to trace a difference, to define a boundary that demarcates that difference. Identity demands to belong to

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23 Ibid., 5.
24 Ibid., 10.
that difference that separates self from other. In the words of William Connolly, ‘[i]dentity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty’. This is the paradox of identity: self-certainty is asserted against differences on which it depends, an “otherness” that is always partly constitutive to the sense of self.

‘Identity, always identity’, wrote Edward Said, ‘over and above knowing and thinking about others’. Despite being the necessary result of our relationship with others, identity is normally described solely in relation to itself: as a reference to what is essential, authentic, the genuine nature of the self. Autochthony is one of the words used to refer to that genuine sense of identity. Literally autochthony means “to be born from the soil”. It is place, in its concrete territorial and local manifestations, that fosters a self-evident reference to what is an authentic identity. Considering this, who are the authentic Europeans?

All cultures are, in one way or another, ethnocentric. The primacy of autochthony is not exclusive to Europeans. What is exclusive to modern European ethnocentrism is to construct itself with a claim of abstract universality. Enrique Dussel argues ‘[European] modernity’s Eurocentrism lies in the confusion between abstract universality and the concrete world hegemony derived from Europe’s position as center’. A centrality granted by the imperial expansion and collateral experiences that have shaped the world as we know it today, from the fifteenth century onwards. This abstract universality, according to Dussel, mobilised two historical narratives that have justified the centrality and exclusiveness of Europe: one narrative promotes a unilineal ideological modern construction between Greece-Rome-western Europe, erasing the presence and importance of the Arabs and Islam in the connection of these lineal developments. This narrative “naturally” implies Europe is the result of a process of progressive rationalisation that connects classic cultures with the Enlightenment project and the French Revolution, excluding those non-Europeans who mediated in the process. The second historical narrative is based on a world system approach that grants a natural centrality to Europe based on the imperial experiences (with the center shifting from Spain and Portugal between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, to Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries). This narrative ignores the importance and relevance of non-European peoples and goods for the construction of Imperial Europe.

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In both cases, as Bhambra has argued, the connections that have made Europe possible remain obscure. Both narratives ignore the fact that “Europe” embodies within itself both, ‘the west and the rest’. These narratives ignore that the modern secular Europe we know today is the result of western Judeo-Christianity, Orthodox Christianity and Islamic historical trajectories — ignoring that ‘Christianity, Islam and Judaism originated in the same part of the world and have more commonalities than differences’. They also ignore the fact that the mass migratory movements of the slave trade during the imperial period not only transformed the former European colonies, but radically changed the habits, practices and customs of Europeans themselves. It follows that the west can be conceived as a univocal and homogenous unity only ideologically. The definition of the exclusivity of Europe is not, and has not, only been constituted from within, but in fact it has largely depended on those who afford being “othered” from Europe. In other words, how “the rest” has been determinant to define Europe. These “others” are both determinant, but also excluded, from the definition of what is and who is European. And yet, these “others” are constitutive of what is European: can you imagine Italy without tomatoes, Ireland without potatoes, the Netherlands without Delft blue?

Similarly, in contemporary Europe, the elimination of internal borders has necessarily gone hand in hand with the progressive securitisation of the external frontiers as I described at the beginning. Various scholars, from different disciplinary angles, argue this process has been justified by European peoples in defending their own freedom, while at the same time supporting the infringement on the freedom of others, “strangers” who are more often than not defined as such based on ethnic, racial, religious and class bases. The currently popularised nationalist slogan “Europe for the Europeans” is not new. As a nineteenth century rhetoric, it served the development of modern nation-states. States have been crucial in naturalising the connection between peoples and land. Nation-states developed alongside their citizenries: citizenship laws were set to define the terms of belonging to the nation-state (jus soli/jus sanguinis), the models that would demarcate and hence create national identity. The state, through the mechanism of citizenship, has fetishised the idea of the autochthonous origin of its constituencies as unique and rightful criteria of belonging. Yet, in today’s globalising societies, ‘how could it be that political membership, something which is so crucial for our identity, for

30 See Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity.
31 Lee and Bideleux, “Europe,” 166.
32 Ibid., 166.
our rights, for our political voice and for our life opportunities, is distributed based on the accident of birth?\footnote{Isin, “Citizens Without Nations,” 451.}

Assuming itself as container of society, states operate under the assumption of an unproblematic and fixed sovereign claim over the territory sustained by a binary distinction between insiders and outsiders (citizens and non-citizens).\footnote{John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory,” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53-80.} What John Agnew has described as the territorial trap, can be clearly identified in current debates regarding the Brexit vote and policies of hostile environment towards migrants. Both are good examples of how persistent and pervasive the ideas of the homogeneity and familiarity between peoples and territory are in the current European political scene. Yet, as we saw in the previous section, the “idea of Europe”, Europe as a historical and socio-cultural entity, cannot be reduced to the enclosed familiarity the systems of borders and demarcations in place intend.

Earlier in this piece I referred to the constitutive myths of liberal democracies examined by Benhabib — the homogeneity of the people and the territorial self-sufficiency of the state. Both are heavily dependent on reproducing citizenship as mechanism of inclusion and exclusion at the same time. They work because “what each citizen holds are not a private entitlement to a tangible thing, but a relationship to other members and to a particular (nationally defined) government that creates enforceable rights and duties”;\footnote{Shachar and Hirschl, “Citizenship as Inherited Property,” 261 (emphasis in original).} that is a relationship of rights and duties that is exclusively defined among fellow citizens. This relationship naturalises a sense of identification and familiarity with the political community. It is with them, and towards them, that the rights and duties of the citizen are in theory established. This fiction ignores that we live in a world where virtually everything we depend upon (ranging from economic to environmental interdependencies) connects us, more often than not, to others who are strange, and remain tenaciously estranged, in popular and political discourses about caring and defending the familiar.

As reported by Trilling, already in 2015 the UN special rapporteur on migration proposed two responses to alleviate the migration crisis in Europe: a mass international resettlement of refugees from Syria and temporary work visa scheme to all economic migrants. European governments and the UN Security Council refused to act upon the advice.\footnote{Daniel Trilling, “Five Myths about the Refugee Crisis,” The Guardian, 5 June 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis.} The reason: it will put even stronger strains into the already precarious status of national citizenship in contexts of austerity and shrinking welfare policies.\footnote{See, among others, Matthew Gibney, “The Deprivation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom: A Brief History,” Journal of Immigration Asylum and Nationality Law 28, no. 4 (2014): 326-335 or Bryan S. Turner “We are All Denizens Now: On the Erosion of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 20, no. 6-7 (2016): 679-692.} Shifting the criteria and the boundaries of citizenship is, and has always been, a struggle (it was for feminist suffragists and for civil rights
advocators; as it is today for anyone who advocates for another marker that does not depend on nationality, such as carbon footprints, urban residence, labour, human rights, etc). Changing the logic underpinning the status of citizenship would automatically shift the composition, and hence the borders and boundaries of each political community. 41 If this happens, what is familiar would become necessarily strange.

4 The Stranger: A Constitutive Outsider

What is the lure of the familiar then? To maintain the illusion of autochthony, the myth of an unproblematic genuine and pure whole, a community, a unity that is self-contained, coherent and consistent with itself. As if the history of humanity would not be a history of movement, mixing and (ex)changing of populations. Despite being defined procedurally in exclusionary national terms, citizenship is experienced as a rather multilayered category of belonging. 42 ‘Everyone is positioned and affected by multiple senses of citizenship—substantive, legal, within different spaces, affected by a range of institutions and powerful agents operating above and below the level of the state—that means citizenship is always a fragmented status’. 43 Even among those who share the same status of membership to the political community, gender, class, race, religious differences and socio-economic inequalities are just some of the markers that signify how fragmented the status of equal national citizenship can be.

If citizenship is a fragmented status, this means we all live under the latent risk of becoming “othered”, potential strangers. Interestingly, according to Simmel the figure of the stranger is not completely disconnected from the group, despite not being a member of it. In fact, the stranger is

‘by his very nature no owner of land […]. Because he is not bound by roots to the particular constituents and partisan dispositions of the group, he confronts all of these with distinctly “objective” attitude.’ 44

The stranger is the one who does not belong to the state, the one who does not have the same nationality, who eats different food, speaks a different language, prays to a different god. The stranger exists, in Derrida’s formulation, as a ‘constitutive outsider’. 45 In contemporary societies the figure of the migrant is the one that concentrates all our attention when we think about the stranger. In fact,

41 Étienne Balibar, We, the People of Europe?: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 2004).
excluding the height of the slave trade in the nineteenth century, the mass movement of peoples in the latter half of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first is greater than it has ever been. It is a movement of workers, intellectuals, refugees, and immigrants, crossing oceans and continent, through customs offices or in flimsy boats, speaking multiple languages of trade, of political intervention, of persecution, war, violence and poverty.\textsuperscript{46}

The migrant is the “constitutive outsider” of societies living in the presumed stability of liberal democracies. The migrant is necessarily a stranger, one made responsible for the changes experienced in Europe: from post-World War II guest worker programmes (in Germany and the Netherlands), to extensive citizenship arrangement derived from Imperial expansion (as in Britain and France among others), to the generations of people who, after being colonised, and because of this experience, claim the right to move to those countries that have colonised them (for instance the movement from Indonesia to the Netherlands, Ecuador to Spain, or Angola to Portugal), to the current peoples fleeing war, climate disaster and/or famine (current refugees from too many places to count). All these types of migrants have become “constitutive outsiders” of the European landscape. Their presence in Europe transforms the familiar landscape of European cities, establishing new hierarchies of belonging and their associated (lack of) citizenship status.\textsuperscript{47} These “others” in the European midst pose a political risk regarding who counts in definition of the European demos and the extent to which those residing in the European territory have the power to reshape citizenship, transforming the familiar contours of the European polity and its respective national communities.\textsuperscript{48}

The power migration has to change citizenship depends to a large extent on how states and their citizens perceive and define the experience of migration at home. Migration is always seen through the lenses of particular national conceptions of citizenship, the perception of migrants thus feeds back into ideas about citizenship, as Bauböck suggests, necessarily affecting the myth of the homogeneity of the national peoplehoods, either by reinforcing or by questioning it.\textsuperscript{49} By definition, migrants are ‘not among those who decide upon the rules of exclusion and inclusion – citizens will have to decide who will have the vote and who will not.’\textsuperscript{50} It is a paradoxical historical conjuncture, because while migrants as strangers are those who hold the key to unleash the potentials of expanding citi-

\textsuperscript{46} Tony Morrison, \textit{The Origin of Others} (Harvard University Press, 2017), 93.


zenship, as mechanism of recognition of rights and responsibilities, strangers are no citizens.

One of Toni Morrison’s lectures on *The Origin of Others* is called ‘Being or becoming a stranger’. She poses it as an open question. A question that cannot be answered by the stranger him/her-self. In fact, it is a question that according to her is always and inevitably answered from within what is being defined as familiar, a question that has the power to demarcate “otherness”. Morrison’s exploration is on the always racialised bodies of these others. She asks, ‘[w]hat would we be or do or become as a society if there were no ranking or theory of blackness?51 One could play with this question and stretch it in relation to Europe: what would be of European societies if there were no migrants? What would be of the world, as we know it, if there were no movement and mixing of peoples?

5 Conclusions: The Key Question is about Purpose

In *Familiar Stranger*, Stuart Hall reflects about his life between Jamaica and the UK, eloquently illustrating how identity, as he states, is a never-ending conversation. In this piece I have tried to expand the terms of that conversation about personal identity to the terms in which we think about a region like Europe. My goal was to invite scholars and students engaged in the task of thinking about Europe to do so not with a focus on where Europe is or what it claims to be, but on that what remains silenced from it and those who afford being “othered” by it. The reason: Europe cannot be understood isolated from the networks of connections, of peoples and goods that have contributed to its current shape.

Toni Morrison explains the intimidation this level of diffusion and interdependence provoke in terms of the overt risk to sympathise with the stranger: the risk is in the possibility of becoming one with the stranger, losing one’s taken for granted rank (based on racialised, religious, socio-economic categorisations), losing one’s own presumed uniqueness and enshrined difference. Hence the sharp reaction to close borders, erect walls and protect what is deemed to be whole, protecting the familiar from the stranger, to prevent becoming ‘strangers to ourselves’.52

How to move towards a narrative about Europe that does not focus on demonstrating its exceptionalism, shifting the question from the defense of authenticity to the acknowledgement of its contingent and interdependent nature? How to think about Europe without aiming to offer a univocal master narrative about the past and who the authentic Europeans are? Both the anthropologist Michel-Rolph Truillot and the historian Toni Judt have demonstrated that there is no authentic relation to the past, only present interpretations resulting from the

struggles about the past. In other words, ‘[i]t is only in our present relation to the past that we can be true or false to the past we acknowledge, for the meaning of history is also in its purpose.’

In light of this understanding of history, I suggest it might be interesting to shift the questions placed at the beginning of this piece, from “where is Europe?” and “who are the Europeans?” to questions that explicitly address “what is the purpose of Europe?” It is a historical fact that Europe has been, and is, “many-where”, transcending the geographical location around the Mediterranean basin of its peninsula. At the same time, Europe is also “no-where”, because it has always depended on what ideas about Europe underpinned its materialisation on maps and the erection of its borders and boundaries, in hard and soft versions. The question “what is the purpose of Europe?” (and for whom?) is part of an urgent conversation regarding the future of whatever form the European project takes at this historical conjuncture. What is at stake here, as Balibar suggests, is ‘the definition of the modes of inclusion and exclusion in the European sphere, as “public sphere” of bureaucracy and of relations of force but also of communication and cooperation between peoples’. One that can be disengaged from the myths of national identity and (regional) authenticity that so far underpin the status of citizenship.

The various peoples living in Europe today, or heading towards the European landmass, might not share a similar narrative about their past, and might never agree upon it, yet they, we, are doomed to share the same future in this rapidly and constantly changing world. To adapt and navigate these changes, European studies play a crucial role debunking the myths of unicity and authenticity proliferating in the European political sphere, demonstrating how Europe is, and has always been, a familiar stranger.

6 Bibliography


55 Balibar, *We, The People of Europet*, 3.

56 In a recent interview for Open Democracy, Balibar argues that ‘a “European” notion of the citizen could be broader than the notion attached to the “equation” of citizenship and nationality, excluding as much as possible “multiple citizenship” and granting permanent foreign residents (who are also workers, artists contributing to the common good, and taxpayers) more than a “passive” form of citizenship’. See Étienne Balibar and Caterina Di Fazio in conversation, “Borderland Europe,” Open Democracy, 12 April 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/borderland-europe-%C3%A9tienne-balibar-and-caterina-di-fazio-in-conversation/.


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https://www.momondo.co.uk/letsopenourworld.


Where is the Culture in European Studies Research and Teaching? An Analysis of Publications and Study Programmes

Simon Fink, Lisa Gutt, Lars Klein, Maryam Nobakht, Moritz Nuszpl and Marc Arwed Rutke

1 Introduction

The last 20 years have been interesting times for European studies. The academic field had to re-define itself – and still is in the process of re-defining itself. The reason is that long-held – and sometimes implicit – assumptions about the inevitability of European integration have been shattered in the wake of the array of crises that have hit the European Union (EU).

If we look back at the past 20 years of European studies, there have been two major trends. First, in academia, the big debates about the causes of integration – neofunctionalism vs. intergovernmentalism1 – have given way to a governance/comparative politics perspective that sees the EU as a kind of political system.2 Thus, most research perspectives analyse the working of the EU as a “given”

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political system: its lawmaking processes, the working of its legislative assembly, its internal bargaining processes, its bureaucracy, its judicial system, its impact on policymaking, and its compliance problems. All these analyses more or less assume that we have a political entity that is “there”, that may evolve over time, but that is unlikely to break down.

However, this perspective is currently being reconsidered (see also the contribution by Neuman and Neuman Stanivuković in this publication). A ‘perfect storm of crises’ has hit the EU, and exposed the fragility of the assumption that we have a “given” political system. Brexit, the strains to European solidarity that showed during the financial crisis and the refugee crisis, and the rise of populism in many member states demonstrate that the EU is built on a technocratic and economic compromise, but not supported by a strong European identity.

Thus, a second major trend in European studies starts with the diagnosis that the “permissive consensus” that has long governed European integration, has broken down. For a long time, European integration was an elite project, not much politicised in domestic debates. This has changed – for good, as many ana-

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lysts argue. Empirical analyses point out that in many European countries cultural issues now form the most salient cleavage. Today, questions of European integration, often framed as “European integration vs. national identity and national sovereignty” dominate many domestic debates.

Our contribution tries to elucidate how these major developments have been reflected in the use of the notion of “culture” in European studies research and teaching. It seems plausible to surmise that as the battlefield of political conflict shifts from economic to cultural issues, European studies also make this shift. Thus it seems fruitful to trace how this concept has been used in research and teaching in the last 20 years. Culture is a concept central to the Euroculture programme, an Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence programme that is hosted at eight European universities: Deusto, Göttingen, Groningen, Krakow, Olomouc, Strasbourg, Udine, and Uppsala. As the programme’s name already suggests, the idea is to explore modern European society through a combination of cultural studies, history, political science, law, and sociology.

First, we analyse the use of the term “culture” in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS), one of the leading publication outlets for European studies. We confine our analysis first to a simple keyword search – looking for “culture” in the abstracts, and then try to inductively synthesise the different uses of the term. The result is that for this journal, which can claim to represent mainstream European studies, the EU is a project of political and economic harmonisation, built upon a culturally very heterogeneous continent. Thus, culture is mostly portrayed as residing in national societies, a transcendent idea of a European culture is not often found. Hence, if culture is mentioned in the abstracts, it is often mentioned in a negative way. For instance, a relatively large number of articles connect cultural factors to Euroscepticism residing in national societies. This indicates that national cultures are mostly seen as an impediment to further integration.

Second, we contrast our findings about the use of culture in research with an analysis of the use of culture in established study programmes with a focus on Europe. Is culture a central notion in these programmes, or is it a mere auxiliary notion? The result here shows that a large number of European studies programmes has culture as a central component, and moreover, culture is seen very differently to the research tradition: if we take the self-descriptions of the pro-

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grammes at face value, many programmes use terms like “European culture” – not cultures.

In sum, our main argument is that there is a discrepancy between European studies’ social science research, and European studies’ teaching. Mainstream research in political science is little concerned with culture, and if so, with culture as a national phenomenon hindering European integration. This focus may be a problem for mainstream political science research, and has recently been challenged. Empirically, the focus on national identities may be a correct diagnosis of the crises that have hit Europe in the last 20 years. Teaching, however, emphasises the unity of European culture. Prescriptively, this may be the correct medicine to shape the next 20 years.

The paper is structured as follows: the second section comprises the analysis of the use of “culture” in JCMS. The third section analyses the structure of current European studies study programmes and curricula. The fourth section synthesises the results of the two analyses and draws some broad conclusions about the inter-relation between research and teaching in the field of European studies.

2 Where Is the Culture in European Studies Research?

We try to assess the role of culture in European studies by tracing the use of the term in the publications in the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS) in the last 20 years (1997-2018) – the timeframe following the title and ambition of this edited volume. The JCMS is published 6 times a year with about 9 articles per issue by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), and – according to its mission statement – ‘welcomes a plurality of methodological and theoretical approaches within the social sciences especially, international relations, politics, political economy, economics, law and sociology’. Thus, as stated earlier, in terms of disciplinary background, we may regard it as a mainstream journal for a social science approach to European studies. Its ISI journal citation report of 2016 ranks the journal at 12/86 for international relations, 26/165 for political science and 55/347 for economics. In a survey among political scientists from Canada, the UK and the US, the JCMS was ranked #42 in the overall ranking, but

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17 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Towards a Practice Turn in EU Studies: The Everyday of European Integration,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 1 (2016): 87-103; Manners and Rosamond, “A Different Europe is Possible.”
Where is the Culture in European Studies Research and Training?

#15 among UK scientists, indicating that its reception is stronger in Europe than beyond Europe’s borders.20

As the *JCMS* is not exclusively dedicated to cultural issues, we may see it as a hard case to trace the concept of “culture” in social science debates – if a cultural approach has made it into the *JCMS*, we may view it as having reached mainstream European studies. Furthermore, we chose to analyze only those articles in which the term “culture” figures in the abstract, that is, culture is important enough to merit a mention in the short description of the article. Hence, we take a birds-eye view to find out how the term “culture” has diffused into the scholarship published in the *JCMS*. On the downside, this does not allow us to see cultural concepts that do not use the term “culture.” We could also have coded for terms like beliefs, norms, identities etc., but that would have required a deeper interpretation, for example, whether the term “belief” is used in its cultural or in its rational-choice connotation. Thus, on the upside, our analysis is replicable, intersubjective and simple.

Thus, it is not surprising to find, first of all, that culture is not frequently mentioned in the abstracts of *JCMS* articles (Figure 1). All in all, we found 38 articles, on the average 2 articles per year, contain the term “culture” in the abstract.

Concerning the time frame, there is no big trend discernible over the last 20 years. There is a spike in 2011, but it only means that 5 articles per year mention “culture” in the abstract, hardly the herald of a major trend.

![Figure 1: Number of articles in the *JCMS* with “culture” in the abstract per year.](image)

Source: Own research

From an inductive clustering of the abstracts, several interesting features emerge. *First*, there is a distinct use of the term “culture” in “strategic culture” or “security culture”. Four out of 38 articles (10%) deal with this rather specialised notion. In line with many established discussions on convergence or divergence of European policies and cultures, the main question here is whether the EU has a culture of organising and deploying military force that is distinct from either the USA or from its member states. A recurring point that is discussed is whether the EU has a military culture at all, having emerged from an economic project and trying to find its role in a post-Cold War world.

A distinct second cluster of studies is about cultural policy. Eight articles (21%) deal with issues of cultural policy. Within this cluster, an overarching theme is how European institutions – predominantly the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) – try to promote and shape a “European” culture that gives legitimacy to the EU. A smaller part of the literature then engages with the question how these cultural policies – e.g. the cultural heritage policy – are then implemented at the national level, or how the EU tries to preserve its cultural heritage in trade agreements with third countries. Thus, it seems that a major issue of culture in EU studies is the question of “cultural engineering,” of purposeful attempts to forge cultural cohesion of a diverse continent.

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23 Biava, Drent, and Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture”; Rogers, “From ‘Civilian Power’ to ‘Global Power’.”


27 Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering.”
The third lesson emerges if we look at the EU institutions in which culture is thought to reside. By far the most articles (7, or 19%) analyze the role of the European Commission in relation to culture, either its role in cultural policy or security policy (see above), or its role in funding civil society organizations, or its role in risk regulation. The latter discussion is interesting in its own right. Similarly to the question of a distinct European security culture, there is the question whether the EU – and particularly the actor tasked with carrying out most of its regulatory tasks, the Commission – has a regulatory culture distinct from the US regulatory culture, and how these cultures clash in international negotiations. The second institution analysed in terms of its culture is the Council of the European Union (4, or 10%). This literature overlaps with the strategic culture literature, as the Common Foreign and Security Policy to a large part is drafted by the Council, and the empirical material used is the same. However, another important debate sees a special “consensus culture” in the Council and its auxiliary bodies such as the COREPER. Here, culture is the conceptual antipode to the often-used bargaining models that see the Council as an arena of rational calculation and hard bargaining. The EP is mentioned in connection with culture only in 2 articles (5%), seeing it either as an actor active in cultural policy, or a carrier of the EU regulatory culture. Last but not least, the European Court of Justice (2 articles/5%) is seen as having a distinct legal culture, possibly at odds with national legal cultures.

Fourth, we may ask whether culture is the dependent variable or the independent variable, that is, is culture a phenomenon in need of explanation, or the explanans for other phenomena? Here, the pattern is clear: 11 articles (29%) conceptualise culture as the dependent variable, 29 articles (76%) see culture as an inde-

30 Biava, Drent, and Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture.”
33 Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering.”
34 Skogstad, “Contested Accountability Claims.”
ependent variable. Of those that conceptualise culture as a dependent variable, many articles can also be subsumed under the category of “cultural policy” – the usual research question is whether EU cultural policies have managed to transform national cultures. Of those that see culture as an independent variable, a large number is about the role of culture in shaping citizen’s views about the EU in general, mostly in the form of Euroscepticism, or the politicisation of European issues in the public sphere, attitudes towards immigrants, or interpersonal trust. Another often-studied topic is the role of culture in major policy decisions such as the accession of Turkey, or accession referenda in Switzerland or Norway. In all of these studies, culture is seen shaping citizen’s attitudes, which in turn determine politicians’ preferences. Other studies see organisational or political culture as factors hindering or promoting the national implementation of EU policies.

In line with these results, the fifth result is that culture is for the large part seen as a national phenomenon. A stunning 27 articles (71%) conceptualise culture as a national phenomenon and see culture as residing in national societies. Many of the numbers do not add up to 100% as some articles postulate a culture–culture relationship and thus conceptualize culture as both independent variable and dependent variable, e.g. when analyzing the ideational roots of the culture of “Englishness” and British attitudes towards the EU (Kenny, 2015) or the postcolonial roots of European identity (Kinnvall, 2016).

39 Hutter and Grande, “Politicizing Europe in the National Electoral Arena.”
these articles (22) also see culture as an independent variable, affecting national attitudes, or impacting national implementation of EU policies.

Thus, if we want to condense one message from our mapping of the literature, it is that culture is for the most part seen as a distinctly national phenomenon. For the scholarship published in the JCMS, European culture is “the cultures of Europe”, only very seldom a “common European culture”. To some extent, this may be due to the focus of the journal (and a possible sign of methodological nationalism): the EU is often analysed in its own right, and not in comparison to other world regions (in which a “European culture” might be more readily discerned). However, painting with a very broad brush, for mainstream European studies, the EU is a project of political and economic harmonisation, built upon a culturally very heterogeneous continent. As the relatively large number of articles connecting cultural factors to Euroscepticism and EU-Turkey relations indicates, these national cultures are mostly seen as an impediment to further integration and enlargement.

This diagnosis dovetails with the major changes that have taken place in Europe and in European studies during the last 20 years. As outlined in this article’s introduction, the permissive consensus that has allowed European integration to go on without much domestic debate for a long time, has broken down. More and more, different national “cultures” are politicised, often to the detriment of European integration. From the perspective of EU studies – that have an integrationist bias since their inception – culture is thus something that has only recently been put on the table as a major force threatening European integration.

3 Where Is the Culture in European Studies Teaching?

We try to assess the relevance of culture in European studies teaching by searching the term in the curricula of different established study programmes with a focus on Europe. This strategy corresponds to our “superficial” strategy in mapping the literature. We are not interpreting curricula and courses and instead rely on the self-description of the programmes. The same caveats as for our literature mapping apply: we get a somewhat superficial birds-eye view, but our analysis is simple and reproducible. Most European studies programmes only have their current curricula online, so we cannot conduct a comparison over time. Thus, we can say little about the changes in European studies programmes and teaching. However, we can report the status quo in 2018, with the suspicion that little has changed in teaching European studies. There are two arguments to back this claim.

46 De Wilde and Zurn, “Can the Politicisation of European Integration be Reversed?”; Grande and Hutter, “Beyond Authority Transfer”; Hooghe and Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration.”


up: first, universities are slow-moving large-scale bureaucracies, in which changes are not easily implemented. Second, even in the discipline there is the nagging suspicion that there is too little debate about the changes in teaching that the current EU crises need to trigger. The special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* about “The EU in crisis: EU studies in crisis” by Rittberger and Blauberger (2018) called for all kinds of reflections on post-crisis EU studies, but did not receive any contributions on teaching.\(^{49}\) Thus, there seems to be a lack of debate on changes in teaching about the EU.\(^{50}\)

With this caveat in mind, we found 55 Master programmes in the fields of social sciences and cultural studies with a focus on European issues offered by European universities, thus programmes that are comparable to Euroculture. In 31 out of these 55 programmes “culture” is an integral part of the curricula. Out of those 31 programmes, 24 belong to the area of social sciences, whereas the other 7 programmes belong to the fields of cultural studies (see Table 1).

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<td>Sociology and the spanning fields of culture, social structure, politics, integration, and transformation</td>
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\(^{50}\) But see Stefania Baroncelli et al. (eds), *Teaching and Learning the European Union: Traditional and Innovative Methods* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014).
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Thus, as a \textit{first} result, we can conclude that there is an interesting misfit. For one of the leading social sciences journals on European integration, culture is not a big issue. In terms of teaching, however, more than half of the European studies programmes under consideration contain culture as a central element, as can be discerned from their self-descriptions on their websites. If we take these self-descriptions as summaries of the core missions of these programmes, then culture seems to be an integral part with which they present themselves and compete on
the market for MA students. Again, the same caveat as with the literature mapping applies: we judge research by the abstracts, and study programmes by their self-description. Thus, in both cases, we only look at the shop window, and do not enter the shop itself.

Looking a bit deeper into the programmes and their self-description, we find the second misfit. Most of the Masters programmes have an outlook that clearly focuses on a joint European culture. For example, the Ruhr-Universität Bochum offers a Master called “European Culture and Economy” that sees Europe ‘as a cultural space’. Similarly, the Master of European Culture at Kent University ‘makes it possible to study the history, literature, and political philosophies of the continent’ and has modules like “The idea of Europe”. The Master in Cultural History of Modern Europe at Utrecht University conceptualises European history as one shared cultural history. The Erasmus Mundus Master in European Literary Cultures at Bologna has a unit “European history and civilization” (not civilisations) and one of the programme’s main educational goals is that a graduate ‘know[s] the history and culture of Europe in order to contextualise the literary production in the broader context of European cultural history’ (not cultures). A similar learning outcome can be found for the Master in European studies at Lund University, where students learn to ‘understand notions of European culture and history as well as collective identity dynamics’ and to ‘focus on the European Union’s culture and communication policies and their related areas’.

The Master programme Interdisziplinäre Europastudien (Interdisciplinary European studies) at the University of Augsburg serves as a last example to support our argument. As elective part students can choose the track “European cultural history” which includes seminars like “Europa. Idee und Geschichte eines Kulturraums” (Europe. Idea and History of a Cultural Space).

In conclusion, there is a discrepancy between how European studies is presented as a research endeavour, and how it is taught. In research, culture is seen as

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51 Our own programme was included in the above list for the sake of the overview, but will not be included in the analysis for the sake of neutrality.


55 University of Bologna, “Didactic Units,” https://cle2.unibo.it/page/77/Didactic%20Units.


57 Lund University, “European Studies – Master of Arts,” https://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/lubas/i-uoh-lu-HAEUH.

a national phenomenon that impedes political and economic integration. In teaching, however, culture is seen as a unifying phenomenon, integrating the European continent. To some extent, this result may be due to research still being a monodisciplinary endeavour, while teaching and the design of study programmes are more interdisciplinary. To some extent, this result may also be due to our choice of the *JCMS* as the flagship journal for European studies.

### 4 Discussion and Conclusion: Research and Teaching as Two Sides of the Same Coin?

If we summarise our findings with relation to the developments within European studies in the last 20 years, we can conclude that the research perspective – different domestic cultures as a problem for integration – seems to have some diagnostic power to explain what has happened in the last 20 years. The array of crises that have hit the EU and its reaction to them – or rather the different national reactions to them – have demonstrated that we indeed lack a European identity or norms of European solidarity. Thus, *the research perspective may to some extent explain why Europe is in crisis*, and why political and economic integration at once seems so fragile, given the lack of a cohesive culture. *The perspective taken in teaching, on the other hand, may be better suited to show us a way out of the crises and to shape the next 20 years.* A more cohesive European identity might indeed be the precondition for a more stable and crisis-proof European political project.

However, we might also conclude that both the research and the teaching perspective we found have some important blind spots. “Culture” entered both research and study programmes on Europe, “culture” understood both as factor in European politics and a subject to deal with in terms of “European culture.” What is striking is that neither research nor study programmes discuss culture in an international context or really take into account different, transnational perspectives on Europe. If the perspective of the national state(s) is transcended, it is done so in order to include partner universities (like Kent’s Paris School of Arts and Culture with a special emphasis on the role of Paris in intellectual history), not to change or even challenge perspectives.

The research at hand did not look into research and study programmes and their teachings in more detail. We have to concede that promoting a programme and trying to win potential students over might be done in different terms than the actual teaching. What we can hold on the basis of the data that was easily accessible is that “culture” is relevant in the sense that (i) it is used to explain political positions and policies, (ii) it is understood as a factor to understand and reckon with when promoting positions and policies, (iii) it is used to formulate and critically examine common identities and heritages, if not ideas of a “European civilisation”, (iv) it is understood as a body of texts and artefacts that make up “European culture,” (v) it is used to formulate a European self-understanding, and (vi) it is
necessary to understand in order to enable “intercultural communication.” Culture as found here is, in most cases, presented as a given or at least an entity that can be fixed, analysed and understood. That is not to say that we necessarily found tendencies to essentialise European culture. We can hold, however, that in our case studies, understanding “culture” means to look for orientation and self-assurance.

A different understanding of “culture” can be found in theoretical approaches problematising the use of the term. In a classic text by Terry Eagleton, we read, for example, that ‘the word “culture”, which is supposed to designate a kind of society, is in fact a normative way of imagining that society’.

We can argue with Eagleton that in a time of constant crisis, culture becomes relevant in different ways, namely as ‘utopian critique, culture as way of life and culture as artistic creation’. “Culture” can thus be used for “decentering consciousness” rather than stabilising traditional ideas and beliefs. While such an approach is rather common in cultural studies, it is uncommon in mainstream European studies, which seems to rest on approaches informed by political sciences.

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Where is the Culture in European Studies Research and Training?


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Transformations and Modulations of Spanish, Basque, and Catalan Nationalism in the Last Two Decades

María Pilar Rodríguez and Rogelio Fernández

1 Introduction

1.1 On European Nationalism

Nationalism has been, without a doubt, one of the most salient political, social, and cultural forces within Europe since the late 18th century. It has been a central concern at the European, national and regional level while providing the basis for a rich and continuous passionate debate among academics, researchers, citizens, intellectuals, and artists. Frequently, the concept of nationalism is imagined as an immovable and constant force of identification over time; however, this article uses the transformations and modulations of Spanish, Catalan and Basque nationalisms in the last two decades as an example of the radical and unpredictable changes that have taken place in the development of national identities. These profound alterations in the feelings of the population have allowed for a significant evolution in academic studies on nationalism emerging from different areas such as history, political science and sociology, but also from the arts and humanities, and often in interdisciplinary approaches and combined analyses.

As the notion of nationalism and its developments in different European countries acquired different formulations, the research similarly experienced remarkable oscillations in the defining criteria and characterising features. This arti-
cle is inscribed in the new tendency described by Michael Skey as a shift in focus as research began to switch from more macro-scale theorising on nationalism to more empirical studies ‘that focused on issues of representation, contestation and localized meaning-making as well as more contextualized case studies.’ Popular support for independence and terrorist actions and the role of civil society associations are analysed to see the power of citizens to act as determining agents for social and political change. Our knowledge and understanding of the world are always mediated, and cinema conveys and simultaneously creates relevant images of socio-political transformations. This paper explores shifts in the popular support for ETA (Basque Land and Freedom) that Basque society has experienced in recent times, examines changes in the radicalisation of Catalan nationalism, and offers an example of film analysis as an exploration of Basque national practices. Films define and reinforce the core values and social structures of countries and reinterpret the national values through a cultural and visual lens; therefore, they provide an excellent tool for analysis of nationalism.

The first section provides an overview of the development of the theoretical concept of nationalism; section two offers a brief account on the transformations of Basque and Catalan nationalism over the past twenty years; and section three suggests a reading of the evolution of Basque cinema centred on nationalism and terrorism along the last two decades.

1.2 Nationalism. A Brief Overview of the Concept in Academic Literature in the Late Twentieth Century.

According to the definition recently provided by Derek Hastings,

‘Nationalism, put in simple terms, is a form of group identity rooted in a powerful sense of belonging, a sense so compelling that, when fully articulated, it overrides all (or almost all) individual attachments and markers of identification.’

He describes the object of that sense of belonging, the nation, as the mental and emotional projection of its members, who see their individual fates within the collective image of their perceived fellow members.

The following four authors made a significant contribution to conceptual and theoretical work on nationalism in the last part of the twentieth century. The 1980s mark an important step with the publication of, among other noteworthy books, Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na-

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3 Ibid., 3.
transformism and Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism*. Anderson’s depiction of the ubiquitous formulation of an “imagined community” underscores the cultural and psychological aspects of a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. Members of a community might never meet directly, yet in their minds a common sentiment of belonging is experienced. According to Anderson, the nation is always conceived as a “deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”

Adding to the citizens’ projection of belonging the need to consider the relevance of structures and institutions, Gellner notes that nationalism emerged in the transition from agrarian to industrial societies. Some of the central notions in Gellner’s thought include a shared educational system, extensive bureaucratic political and administrative control, linguistic homogeneity, and national identification.

In the following decade, Eric Hobsbawm published *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. He departs from Gellner’s reminder that political and national units should be consistent, and agrees that there are certain political, technical, administrative and economic conditions necessary for the emergence of the nation, such as the existence of administrative and educational infrastructures. However, he emphasises the changing, evolving, and even volatile nature of nationalism. Three phases are the most common in the development of nationalism, from a preliminary stage in which the idea of the nation is purely cultural, passing through a pioneering phase where awareness and mobilisation by political leaders is essential, to the third stage when national movements acquire mass support. He underscores the economic driving force behind nationalism as a relevant addition to the national projection or imagined community and to the political, cultural, and social structures described by his predecessors. Craig Calhoun argues in his book, *Nationalism*, that nationalism is a discursive entity. Calhoun agrees with Anderson on the constructive nature of nationalism and departs from Gellner’s assertion that modernity is a necessary condition for its creation. His major contribution is the discussion on original distinctions between nationality, ethnicity, and kinship, which focuses on the debate between primordialist and constructivist positions. Particularly chapter 3, entitled “Nationalist claims to his-

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8 Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
9 The debate on the different approaches to the nature and causes of nationalism exceeds the scope of this paper. For a clear analysis of different positions, see Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998).
tory,”¹⁰ is relevant to this article, since it claims that nationalism stems from an appeal to primordial traditions, but in order to successfully build nations it must emphasise the potential for change and progress that is latent in nation-building.

1.3 Nationalism. Developments in the Twenty-First Century

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the proliferation of theories on nationalism makes it impossible to provide a minimally representative account of the scholars who have broadened the original notion to include intersectional explorations. Such efforts include the need to address current changes and developments in the field of European studies in general through representative publications determined to focus on new accounts of transnationalism,¹¹ to emphasise gender, sexuality, and queer nationalism,¹² to advance the concept of banal nationalism,¹³ to enlarge the geographical borders to all continents through the analyses offered by diverse approaches to post-colonial nationalism, race and nationalism,¹⁴ and to include disability and ageism as areas in which further research is suggested.¹⁵ Such new ways of thinking about the nation have broadened the theoretical understanding of Europe and expanded the traditional institutional accounts of European integration by broadening the limits of the concept of nationalism and by offering novel interpretations of conventional questions.

In view of these diverse approaches to studying nationalism, the interdisciplinary dialogue between nationalism studies and the scholarship on politics of everyday life is pertinent to understand the specific dynamics and confrontations between Spanish and Basque and Catalon feelings towards national belonging. Michael Skey, Tim Edensor, and Derek Hastings defend that national belonging is very relevant for many citizens and that it should be approached from the perspective of the “everyday realm”, where most activities take place and where citizens experience and make sense of the world and those they encounter.¹⁶ The nation, according to Skey, becomes tangible and is rooted in routines of social life. Tim Edensor argues that “the national is still a powerful constituent of identity precisely

¹⁰ Ibid.
because it is grounded in the popular and the everyday.' Derek Hastings goes back to the lecture delivered by Ernest Renan on 11 March 1882 at the Sorbonne in Paris. In *What is a Nation?*, Renan has already addressed some of the key elements that scholars in this last category recuperate: ‘the nation represents a daily plebiscite, that the nation is created through a voluntary act of identification on the part of its constituents, and that historical forgetting is as important for the nation as commemoration.’

Identification with the nation on a daily basis through cultural and embedded procedures and routines is a vital component of nationalism in Spain, Catalonia and the Basque Country, as will be explored. To conclude this section, it is important to mention Hastings’ argument that nationalism can never be fully understood in isolation from the specific temporal and geographical contexts in which it manifested. When studying national practices in their daily manifestations, it is essential to consider context as traditional historical accounts of the past interact with citizens’ perspective of the everyday.

This perspective, which focuses on daily cultural, political and symbolic practices and emphasises context, was relatively absent from the work of previous theorists, who did not include these practices as a relevant aspect to understand citizens’ sense of belonging and rather perceived the nation as a previously conceived entity, which prevents us from closely analysing modulations and transformations. In the following sections, some of the categories of analysis offered by Skey, Edensor and Hastings – such as political and cultural practices, associations and affiliations, and the persistence of the nation as an important constituent of identity – will be analysed. At different times in history, what is determined as a regional border within the state is imagined as a national border, and social and political efforts are devoted to claim self-determination and independence.

## 2 Spanish, Catalan and Basque Nationalism. The Last Two Decades

Klaus Eder claims that borders can be both very hard facts and very soft facts, and states: ‘Defining who we are and who the others are creates borders between groups of people that are as volatile as the discourses about them.’ In the soft dimension of borders, meaning production becomes important and the institutional hard borders become subject to political struggle. Jan Zielonka, on his part, affirms that borders ‘represent complex institutions determining the link between

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18 Hastings, *Nationalism in Modern Europe*, 1.
19 Ibid., 2.
the territory, authority, and rights.' He shares Eder’s view that borders are not given or stable, but subject to historical change driven by historical, political, social, economic and technological developments. In this section, the hard and soft quality of the borders of Spain, the Basque Country and Catalonia are briefly examined within the time frame of the last twenty years to provide an exemplification of swifts in the conception of nationalism in both communities.

To begin with a simplified, descriptive overview of such changes, in 1998, the Basque Country was characterised by an intense separatist and independentist desire to impose hard borders between its territory (Euskal Herria or Basque Land, which includes four provinces in the Spanish state and three in the French state), and Spain. ETA was very much alive as a terrorist organisation, fighting for the independence of the Basque nation and killing a total of around 850 people between 1968 and 2010. In 1997, ETA killed 13 people; in 1998, 6 people were assassinated. In 1998, Catalonia was placidly living in a rather harmonious agreement within the Spanish state under the conditions that the Statute of Autonomy granted in 1979. For decades, the Catalan nationalists felt able to reach their ambitions without open confrontation; rather, they demanded gradual decentralisation gains within existing legal and political frameworks and by working with Spanish political actors. They aspired for Catalonia to play a leading role in Spain, in contrast to the Basque nationalists, who were fighting for separation and independence.

Twenty years later, on 2 May 2018, ETA officially announced its dissolution after the permanent ceasefire announced in January 2011. The Basque Country presently reluctantly accepts its status as an autonomous community within the Spanish state. Basque politicians have kept within the parameters of Spanish law with a more moderate agenda under current Basque regional president Iñigo Urkullu. Meanwhile, Catalonia has taken a radical turn for its independence. A referendum for independence took place on 1 October 2017 and 92% of the voters were in favour of the independence. It was approved by the Catalan parliament in a session on 6 September 2017 along with the Law of Juridical Transition and Foundation of the Republic of Catalonia the following day. The referendum was declared illegal and suspended by the Constitutional Court of Spain and, by the end of October, the Spanish government applied Article 155, dissolved Catalonia’s parliament and announced new elections. Soon after, Catalan president Carles Puigdemont fled the country to live in Brussels. Other politicians also decided to flee after the most relevant members of the Catalan parliament at the time of the


referendum have been imprisoned in different Spanish jails since November 2017. A new President, Quim Torra, was elected in May 2018, and the fight for independence continues.

The struggles between the Spanish state and these two autonomous communities have always been part of the political dynamics in the last centuries. While the Spanish state’s response to Basque and Catalan attempts to seek sovereignty has been one of open rejection in both cases, Basque and Catalan nationalist political agendas have evolved in different ways. The modulations of the fight for independence have oscillated according to different political, social, economic and affective conditions. We will mention just two single significant moments. In 2003, the Basque government proposed the Ibarretxe Plan, named after lehendakari (president) Juan José Ibarretxe. This plan advocated a status of free association for the Basque Country with Spain, a right to self-determination and independence and the categorisation of Basques as either citizens or nationals, with the former group referring to ones born in the Basque Country. The plan was rejected by the Spanish parliament in 2005 by a majority of 313 to 29 (and 2 abstentions). In 2006, a popular campaign to improve the terms of Catalonia’s 1979 Statute of Autonomy led to a new statute, approved in the Spanish parliament and by a referendum in Catalonia. Significantly, Catalonia was referred to as a “nation” in the preamble. The new statute also extended Catalonia’s privileges in terms of taxation, judicial independence, and the official use of the Catalan language.

Spanish nationalism has been confronted with Catalan and Basque nationalisms of varying intensity and fluctuating political and social strength in the last twenty years. In such episodes, the Spanish government has responded in some cases with institutional reforms to partially accommodate or provide answers to the demands. The impact of such struggles on Spanish politics is undeniable. There is a constant power struggle between the central government in Madrid and the demands by Basque and Catalan governments. The concessions that must be made to maintain the balance are often seen as a sign of betrayal to the unity of the Spanish nation by Spanish voters. Just to provide a recent example, on 11 February 2019, there was a demonstration in Madrid in which around 50000 people demonstrated against what was perceived as President Pedro Sánchez’s “betrayal” due to his acceptance of some of the demands requested by Catalan leaders to vote for the annual budget for Spain. Two days later, the budget was rejected by 191 votes to 158 by the members of the Congress, and a general election was announced for April 28.

2.1 Modulations and Transformations: Two Significant Elements

The role of nationalism and the different factors impacting on transformations of nationalism across the decades in the Basque Country and Catalonia are too complex to be examined in detail here. The changes discussed above do prove that, as Michael Skey notes, rather than thinking of nationalism in static and stable terms,
it is important ‘to theorize how “hot” nationalism may cool over time (or, indeed, vice versa) and the possible conditions that might make this possible.’

Among the reasons that modulated the transition from a desire of radical independence to the present situation of reluctant agreement with the legal terms of autonomy by the Basque government, the most significant is the weariness of the Basque population who could not condone ETA’s senseless violence, which had left over hundred people killed. From its inception, ETA claimed independence as its major reason for the attacks, but people’s support progressively waned due to the brutality of the terrorist organisation. The perception of terrorism in the public consciousness was also affected by the attacks of Islamic extremists on the World Trade Centre in 2001 and commuter trains in Madrid in 2004. In consequence, terrorism in general and ETA in particular appeared as negative forces. According to Kathryn Crameri and Andrew Dowling, in Catalonia, the advancement of the desire for independence has been motivated by changes in the Catalan political landscape since 2003, the evolution of Catalonia’s weight within Spain, problems of infrastructure, public apathy with the political process, disillusionment with the Spanish government, a rise in anti-Spanish feeling among Catalans, the effects of the global financial crisis, and the modifications in Catalonia’s new Statute of Autonomy.

Two of the most significant elements that greatly marked the changes in the last two decades are now outlined: public support for independence and mobilisation in the Basque Country, and the role of civil society associations in the independence movement in Catalonia. In both cases, the participation of citizens in demonstrations and other forms of civil associations is a powerful force permeating social and political macrostructures with far-reaching consequences. From the perception of the ways in which daily life is affected by political events, the community responds with, at times unpredicted, force when a threat to the persistence of the imagined nation is perceived. Demonstrations and civil society gatherings are forms of performance. Performativity is a complex notion, which can enhance our understanding of social movements, and as Jeffrey Juris attests, performance in social protest is a valid indicator in the forging of emotions, meanings, and identities. The public nature of demonstrations provides an example of the performative quality of social movements, as they seize upon political patterns and provide an intervention in the public space. According to Edensor, performance ‘allows us to look at the ways in which identities are enacted and reproduced, informing and

(re)constructing a sense of collectivity. The notion of performance also foregrounds identity as dynamic; as always in the process of production. Such forms of participation will be described in the proceeding section; both in the Basque Country and Catalonia, citizens were able to demonstrate their discontent at crucial moments and to promote change by means of collective action. In the case of the Basque Country, terrorism became part of the nationalist struggle, and influenced the development of social mobilisation in different ways, as will be seen.

Public Support and Mobilisation in the Basque Country

ETA as a terrorist organisation and the public support it received from a large part of the Basque population in the 1980s and 1990s played a most definitive role in the modulations of Basque and Spanish politics. In the period from 1968 until 2010, 92% of violent killings in the Basque Country were perpetrated by ETA, but only 20% of those victims were supported by street demonstrations, whereas every time that a member of ETA was killed or jailed, there was public support. Basque citizens in the 1980s and 1990s identified with a separatist project that claimed independence for the Basque nation, in part resulting from the forty years of the Franco dictatorship and the many prohibitions and restrictions that the population suffered in areas such as language, heritage, traditions, and customs. Daily life in the Basque Country was greatly altered by the imposition of Francoist ideology and politics. The transition to democracy was experienced as both an opportunity to continue the clandestine fight for independence that had been carried out previously by members in exile, and to state the position that the terms of the transition to democracy were not valid. In the 1978 referendum on the Spanish Constitution, the Basque Country had a high rate of abstentions and negations, prompted by the EAJ/PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) and the radical left-wing Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity). To this day, Basque nationalism claims that relevant sectors of the Basque population objected to the Spanish Constitution’s terms, particularly the exclusion of Navarre from the Comunidad Autónoma Vasca (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country). The Statute of Autonomy that was welcomed in other regions of Spain was thus dismissed by those who continued their campaign for independence.

The modulations of population support to the independence of the Basque Country are strongly linked to the manner in which the Basque population felt that ETA was a valid organisation to attain the ultimate goal. Such feeling changed from a firm adherence of the majority of Basques to ETA’s actions in the 1980s and 1990s to a fierce rejection in the first decades of the twenty-first century. The radical support for ETA and the consequent lack of empathy for the victims dur-

27 Edensor, National Identity, 69.
ing the 1980s and 1990s constitute historical events that were not fully explored in the historical accounts and which are only now starting to be properly addressed at political, social, and academic levels. Such siding of the Basque population with the terrorist organisation experienced a remarkable reversal after ETA’s kidnapping and killing of the young politician Miguel Ángel Blanco in 1997. In this case, performance assumed the form of massive demonstrations both in the Spanish and Basque territories with people showing their hand palms painted white to show their rejection of ETA. Progressively, citizens started to question the organisation’s procedures and lethal actions and towards the end of the century, demonstrations against ETA became habitual. A high percentage of the Basque population felt that the desire for independence could not justify the extreme violence that ETA was imposing. The motivations for such transformation are too complex to be delineated here, but as Imanol Murua explains, the announcement of the definitive end of ETA’s campaign in October 2011 was triggered by its constituency’s withdrawal of support for the armed struggle. The leadership and social base of the political movement to which ETA belongs concluded that political violence was not effective anymore and, furthermore, was damaging the Basque pro-independence movement.

Despite such transition to a moderate acceptance of the present political status, Basque nationalism is very strong; except for one four-year period, the Basque PNV has led all Basque governments since the creation of the Basque Autonomous Community in 1980. Basque people had for a long time felt an increasing distance from violence, while other forms of identification with the nation such as the promotion of the Basque language Euskara have been reinforced. As Mark Bieter notes:

‘While violence stole headlines, the vast majority of Basques had been focused on tasks like making sure their ancient language survives another century, an effort that has been relatively successful, particularly recognizing the real risks of extinction that Euskara faced during Franco’s era. There are thriving Basque language radio and television stations and most schoolchildren in the Basque Autonomous Community receive the majority of their education in Euskara.’

Therefore, the change in the perception of the real constituents of the nation for the Basque people was connected to what they perceived as the essential forces driving their desire to become a peaceful community, those linked to their language, customs, and traditions at the turn of the century. The next section studies the role of the civil societies in the independence movement in Catalonia.

30 Ibid.
The Role of Civil Society Associations in the Independence Movement in Catalonia

This section focuses on the role of civil society associations in Catalonia to show the feeling of national identity displayed and negotiated by large numbers of citizens when they perceive that their desire for an independent nation needs to be voiced and, conversely, when groups that do not identify with such a claim for independence react against such separatist demands. As Michael Skey notes, while the speeches and actions of political leaders and major institutional figures are important in articulating a wider sense of common identity, it is through everyday language and practices that identities are perceived and contemporary studies are able to explore ‘the ways in which people understand who they are, the nature of the world they live, how they relate to others and what counts as important to them.’ Demonstrations and other forms of street presence by civil society associations have become significant practices in Catalonia, to the extent that they have become part of the “hard news” and are part of the news in daily television programmes and national newspaper covers.

Kathryn Crameri provides an excellent account of the nature, composition, actions, aims, and results of civil society associations in Catalonia until 2015. Crameri departs from the definition of civil society provided by Michael Walzer: ‘[civil society] is the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fills this space,’ and concludes that civil society associations have been the principal agents at key moments in the evolution of Catalonia’s recent increase in the population’s support for secession. In 2012, 2013 and 2014, more than 1.5 million people marched each year on 11 September (Catalonia’s national day) demanding independence, but the civil contribution to pro-independence activism has also included ‘lipdubs, flashmobs, concerts, traditional cultural events, websites, videos, books and international publicity campaigns.’

The two most important civil society associations in Catalonia are the Assemblea Nacional Catalana (Catalan National Assembly, ANC), and Òmnium Cultural (OC), and both became instrumental in the recent events toward independence and the proclamation of the Catalan Republic, which took place in 2017. OC has a long tradition: it was originally created to promote the Catalan language and to spread Catalan culture in 1961 during Franco’s dictatorship. Its webpage reports that the association was launched to combat the censorship and persecution of

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35 Crameri, “Political Power,” 105.
Catalan culture and to fill the gap left by the political and civil institutions of Catalonia that were forbidden by the dictatorship.\textsuperscript{36} It has 125,000 members and it is almost fully funded by its membership, with only a small percentage of its funding coming from grants from the Government of Catalonia for specific cultural projects. Its presentation page states:

‘Since 2010 Òmnium is the group that has carried out the largest peaceful demonstrations in Europe, along with the National Assembly of Catalonia (ANC), in support of the people of Catalonia’s right to democratically decide their own political future by means of a self-determination referendum.’\textsuperscript{37}

As can be seen, peaceful demonstrations are considered performative acts of vital relevance to defend the political future of the nation, with the specific purpose of promoting the celebration of a referendum as a key step towards independence. The *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* was officially founded in March 2012. It is defined as a grassroots organisation that brings together around 80,000 people from all parts of the Catalan society to win Catalan independence in a peaceful and democratic way, and adds that ‘[t]he ANC aims at decisively contributing to the foundation of a Catalan Republic based on the principles and values of democracy, freedom and social justice.’\textsuperscript{38} It is entirely financed by membership subscriptions and private donations and is not associated with any political party.

Crameri partially contests the idea of the independence movement in Catalonia as an exclusively bottom-up phenomenon (although that is the manner in which, for example, ANC describes itself on its webpage), since the role of intellectual, cultural, and political elites has been very influential in the advancement of the nationalist project. Such elites include writers, singers, university professors, and media professionals, but the impact that anonymous people are having by aptly implementing the use of technology to advance their agenda should not be underestimated. As Crameri notes, a large number of potential participants can be reached through social media (both organisations are very active in all social media) without the obligation to make a permanent commitment to a particular organisation, and adds:

‘If they do choose to support a specific event, the satisfaction derived from participation, and the feeling of community engendered not only by the protest event but by the constant social media “chatter” that surrounds it, may predispose people to agree to take part in other events.’\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{39} Crameri, “Political Power,” 111.
What is clear is that a large number of the Catalan population has felt the need to express its dissatisfaction with the Spanish state by actively performing their feelings in form of demonstrations and other activities and events. The role of these organisations in the political developments that took place in September and October 2017 was so determining in mobilising the population that on 16 October 2017, the Spanish court ordered the heads of the ANC, Jordi Sánchez, and the OC, Jordi Cuixart, to be held without bail pending an investigation for alleged sedition. They were accused of playing central roles in orchestrating pro-independence protests. By early 2019, they were still in jail, and the requests to free them by a large number of the Catalan population that considers them “political prisoners” take the form of demonstrations, media statements, social media campaigns and other related events. In February 2019, at the time of writing this chapter, the trials are taking place at the Supreme Court in Spain, but they have not concluded yet. The desire to become an independent nation is not shared by the totality of the Catalan population. In fact, it can be said that around 50% of the population feel strongly for separation from Spain while the other half votes for political parties that are defined as constitucionalistas, since they respect the present Spanish Constitution, approved in 1978, which excludes the possibility of a referendum for independence. Societat Civil Catalana (Catalan Civil Society, SCC hereafter) was founded in 2014 to represent those Catalan people who were not in favour of the independence. According to its manifesto, they position themselves as a civil and political initiative against the independence of Catalonia and promote an improvement of the relationships between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. They define themselves on their webpage as a Catalan civil movement that promotes cohesion among Catalans and also between Catalans and the rest of Spain, and claim the following: ‘We counteract secessionist organisations and want everyone to hear the other voice of Catalonia, the one that works hard to maintain Catalonia’s presence in Spain.’ Just like the ANC it relies on memberships and donations. They have managed to organise demonstrations against independence; on 8 October 2017, SCC mobilised hundreds of thousands of people in a demonstration in Barcelona.

These associations clearly dismiss the notion of a uniform, homogeneous nation of individuals belonging to a similarly imagined community. Catalonia is differently imagined in terms of soft and hard borders with regard to its belonging to Spain; for many citizens, being Catalan excludes identifying with Spain, while for others, defining their nationality as both Catalan and Spanish provides a more accurate sense of their belonging. And the complexity of the issue is reinforced by the ideological position of political parties such as Barcelona en Comú, with a strong orientation toward municipalities. They reject a radical action towards independence, but openly criticise the Spanish government for actions against, for instance, jailed Catalan political leaders. Catalonia is differently imagined by dis-
distinct sectors of the population. This situation is described by Skey, who refers to different European nations or regions (including Catalonia) as ‘particular organisations [...] designed to serve distinct sections of the population who are (often) constituted on the basis of different, sometime conflicting, (national) identities, which may or may not be aligned with a state.’

It also contradicts the idea that modern states are basically stable and remain unchallenged over time; rather, internal tensions are translated into public practices such as demonstrations and other events.

To conclude this section, and to emphasise the tensions that are made explicit in the manifestations of conflicting visions of the nation, at the end of 2018, what could be termed “war of the yellow ribbons” took place in Catalonia. While supporters of independence wore and exhibited yellow ribbons to request freedom for the politicians who have been jailed due to their participation in the events of October and November 2017. However, those in favour of the ongoing unity of the country had removed them, in some cases in an organised and systematic manner, to avoid their public display. This created tensions, attacks, and fights among political leaders and citizens. The future of nationalist developments in Catalonia is uncertain and remains open in a political and social landscape in which change has become the norm against stability and uniformity. The following section provides a reading of a representative film to analyse the new approach to Basque nationalism through comedy.

**Basque Cinema: 8 apellidos vascos and the New Approach to Nationalism**

The connection of European cinema with nationalism has been a constant in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Stories are powerful rhetorical devices and cinema is one of the elements in the cultural dynamics of a nation that mediate in the notion of political belonging. Films can reaffirm the dominant cultural codes or challenge them to provoke a reaction in the audiences. Film analysis provides a cultural counterpoint to the social movements previously explored.

*Ama Lar* (Motherland, Néstor Basterretxea & Fernando Larruquert, 1968) was the first full-length feature made in the Basque Country since the Civil War and a major influence on the configuration of Basque nationalism. Rob Stone and María Pilar Rodríguez define this film as ‘a collage of Basque customs, landscapes and heritage,’ and affirm that it was a successful attempt to project “the desired nation” on screen. To this end, the authors state, the directors adopted the per-

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45 Ibid., 64.
formance system of the *bertsolarí*, the improvising Basque-language poet, and elaborated a symbolic visual grammar in the framing and editing of subjects that expressed equivalence with the forbidden language of Euskara. Since then, many Basque films have approached the subject of nationalism, and especially in the 1990s and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, a number of them have chosen the history, figures, and events related to ETA for their plots. Santiago de Pablo has documented in detail this filmography in his book *The Basque Nation On-Screen: Cinema, Nationalism, and Political Violence*, and Stone and Rodríguez recently explored cinematic representations of Basque terrorism in chapter 5 of their book, entitled “Broken Windows: Representations of Terrorism”. Films such as *El proceso de Burgos* (The Burgos Trial, Imanol Uribe, 1979), *Segovia Breakout*, Imanol Uribe, 1981), *La muerte de Mikel* (Mikel’s Death, Imanol Uribe, 1984), *Ander eta Yul* (Ander and Yul, Ana Díez, 1989), *Días contados* (Running out of Time, Imanol Uribe, 1995), *Yoyes* (Helena Taberna, 2000), *La pelota vasca: la piel contra la piedra* (Basque Ball, Julio Medem, 2004), *La casa de mi padre* (My Father’s House, Gorka Merchán, 2008), *Tiro en la cabeza* (Bullet in the Head, Jaime Rosales, 2008), and *Lasa eta Zabala* (Lasa and Zabala, Pablo Malo, 2014), among many others, explore political turmoil, public violence, private grief, and family conflict, in a socio-political context marked by pain, death and desolation. As Santiago de Pablo notes, ETA, after the Irish Republican Army (IRA), is the terrorist group that has provided the basis for more films, with close to 50 long-feature productions. Most of the films were shot while ETA was still active, and they portray the hardships that Basque society experienced for many decades. Comedy was remarkably absent from such portrayals of the Basque nation until the surprising release of the *Ocho apellidos vascos* (Spanish Affair, Emilio Martínez-Lázaro, 2014; literal translation is Eight Basque Surnames), which was the Spanish box office smash of 2014: within one month of its release it had attracted more spectators than any film screened in Spain before.

Carlota Larrea is right when she states that the film represents a turning point in many senses, but probably its most important feature is that “this romantic comedy about an Andalusian man and a Basque woman was widely interpreted as confirmation that the years of conflict in the Basque country were truly over.” The film portrays Rafa (Dani Rovira), a young man from Andalusia who meets Amaia (Clara Lago) in Seville and follows her to the village of Argoitia (a fictional name) in the Basque Country where he finds out that Amaia’s engagement has just been called off. Her fisherman father, the fervently nationalistic Koldo (Karra Elejalde), is returning for the wedding, and so as not to disappoint him, Amaia pleads with Rafa to pretend to be Basque for three days. A film analysis is not provided here;

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46 Ibid., 64.
rather, elements related to Basque nationalism are briefly examined to show a new approach to the traditional topics associated with tradition in previous films, related to parody and simulacrum.

First, it has to be noted that the film script, written by Borja Cobeaga and Diego San José, continues in the comic tradition created in the television sketch show *Vaya semanita*. As Carlota Larrea notes, this TV sketch uses humour by taking as its source Basque national identity:

‘One source for comedy was national identity as everyday lived experience, through sketches about cultural practices such as fashions, ways of socialising, the Basque language and unusual new names, the Basque obsession with food, and general concerns of the moment, such as the often bellicose party political landscape, problems with the education and health systems, precarious employment, the Catholic church, or the shortage of affordable housing. The other rich source for comedy was the traditionalist view of Basque identity, which romanticises the rural world and certain hackneyed features of the so-called Basque character, such as seriousness, conservatism, lack of humour, and a strong work ethic.’

This quote precisely addresses the motives, symbols of the cultural, socio-political and religious Basque tradition. The film utilises the comic genre of *Vaya semanita* and places Basque nationalism in the daily practices of their citizens, where scenes associated with strong cultural traditions such as gastronomical excess, rural heritage, and street demonstrations are abundant. Names and last names are one of the strongest markers of national identity, and even more so in cultures such as the Basque, in which the idiosyncratic nature of the Basque language makes them immediately recognizable and radically different from Spanish names and last names. The title of the film (*8 apellidos vascos*) implicitly alludes to the recommendation provided by Basque ideologist Sabino Arana (1865-1903), and father of the Basque Nationalist Party, to defend the Basque language and to trust only those citizens who could prove to have at least four Basque last names. Basque identity is, thus, embedded in the genealogical belonging to the community. In the film, Rafa changes his first name to Basque Antxon, and in one of the most celebrated scenes in the film, when asked by Amaia’s father to provide his last names, he resorts to Basque celebrities (singers, actors, politicians, soccer players, and chefs) to provide a list of not four, but eight Basque last names that will substantiate his Basque identity and belonging. In many respects, the film offers a view on nationalism close to the landscape presented by Jean Baudrillard in *Simulacra and Simulation*, in which he explores the relationships between reality, symbols, and society. Simulacra are copies that depict things that no longer have an original and simulation is

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50 Ibid., 158.
51 Sabino Arana, Obras completas (Oartzun, Guipúzcoa: Sendoa, 1980).
the imitation of a real-world process or system. Rafa, throughout the film, simulates to be Basque. He needs to change his hairstyle, his clothes, his way of walking and talking. He must seem Basque, and his alterations and modifications to simulate Basque identity (and, therefore, belonging to the imagined community of the Basque nation), when taken to the ultimate consequences of Baudrillard’s theory, reveal that the whole representation of Basque identity can be portrayed as a mere simulacrum by the protagonist. Basque national identity becomes, then, not dismissed, but rather banalised in a context in which, as Helena Miguélez-Carballeira suggests, a dehistoricising treatment of Spain’s internal national conflicts and their proposal for a political and cultural consensus is offered. In fact, the episodes that include political elements associated with ETA, are downplayed in the film or portrayed in a manner in which humour replaces any form of critical examination of the past. Basque nationalism is, therefore, presented through daily practices and simulation, and the film distances itself from previous cinematic representations of Basque identity.

3 Conclusion

Nationalism is one of the research areas in European studies, as illustrated by past and present publications and academic courses that address the topic of nationalism in the context of European history, anthropology, and cultural studies. At times, the perception of a conservative and stagnant academic area of research may arise. However, over the last two decades, highly original studies on the origins of nationalism, nation-state formation, banal nationalism, methodological nationalism and nation-building from a perspective that includes intersectional approaches and includes race, gender, sexual orientation and disability in a global perspective offer a rich landscape of theoretical contributions to the field. To explore the changes in the social and political developments of nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia, this article considers nationalism as everyday practices and performances in order to study the transformations and modulations of the (original) desire to create hard borders between the territorial spaces of the Spanish state. The nation, according to authors such as Michael Skey and Tim Edensor, becomes tangible and is rooted in routines of social life. Popular support for independence and for terrorist actions and the role of the civil society associations are analysed to see the power of citizens to act as powerful agents for social and political change. Basque national identity acquires a new form of representation in Basque cinema in the film 8 apellidos vascos, which radically departs from the previous image of Basque politics associated with the violent presence of ETA and offers humour and a postmodern approach which emphasises simulation and rejects a hard configuration of the Basque nation.

Presently, nationalism develops and materialises in a distinctive – often conflictive and problematic – manner across European nations. At times, the conceptual utility of nationalism has been contested because of its ambiguity and the lack of agreement on a definition of the concept. This article proposes a vision of the nation, which is, in the first place, about the people who identify themselves as nationals, and who express their national identity through daily practices. Even if we are aware of the epistemological, ideological, and methodological challenges of this field of study, a critical and self-conscious reflection on the new developments in both theoretical and practical approaches to nationalism will always enhance the field and provide space for fruitful analysis.

4 Bibliography


“No Borders, No Nations” or “Fortress Europe”? How European Citizens Remake European Borders

Sabine Volk

1 Introduction: The Borders of Europe?

Étienne Balibar famously claimed that the borders of Europe constituted an ‘unresolved political problem’.1 Indeed, no matter which lens – geographical, cultural, or political – applied to the notion of Europe, its external borders remain a highly inconsistent, ambiguous and contradictory matter. Since the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985 and its incorporation into the European Union (EU) legal framework in 1997, public discourse usually conflates the European external borders with the borders of the growing Schengen area. While Schengen shifted the responsibility to manage the European external borders to the most peripheral EU member states, the EU also got increasingly involved. The establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex, in Warsaw in 2004, is the most visible expression of the EU’s fledgling border regime.

While enabling the free movement of people across former national borders, it nevertheless seems that Schengen has put in place new borders and boundaries. The EU’s external border policies have become increasingly restrictive over time. Indeed, the establishment of Frontex primarily indicates the tightening of the EU’s

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These major changes in European border management have not gone unnoticed by European citizens. In fact, Europeans are today more active in the issue of the European space and its borders, challenging the current state of borders and control practices. Such engagement with the European space and its borders occurs across the political spectrum: Western European far right groups set up a human chain along the Franco-Italian border in the Alps; others send ships to the Mediterranean to push refugee boats back to the shores of North Africa. Meanwhile, left-wing activists advertise the construction of a bridge over the Mediterranean and stage public funerals for refugees who have died on their journey to Europe.

Such novel forms of contentious political protest action and performance clearly demand new theoretical lenses in European studies, moving from the study of EU institutions and decision-making processes to the impact of European integration on EU citizens. This shift of focus is demonstrated by Master’s programmes such as Euroculture, which contribute important insights into the close entanglement of politics, society and culture in contemporary Europe. Echoing the disciplinary development of European studies over the past twenty years, this chapter discards conventional institutionalist approaches to borders and citizenship in favour of recent critical perspectives. I argue that analytical lenses drawn from the fledgling disciplines of critical border and critical citizenship studies provide a useful toolkit to effectively grasp the complexity of European citizens’ involvement in the symbolic and material making and remaking of the European space and its borders. In particular, this chapter examines the processes of borderwork performed by European citizens. Aiming to further our knowledge and understanding of borderwork, it analyses two case studies of contemporary transnational protest movements: the offspring of the anarchist No Borders network based in Warsaw and the xenophobic alliance Festung Europa mainly based in Dresden and Prague. Both movements, associated with the far left and far right of the political spectrum, respectively, are conceptualised as protest movements in an attempt to stay politically neutral towards the activists’ beliefs and claims which resonate in their performances. The discussion contrasts the performance of the European physical and imaginary space by these two movements, analysed through the lens of acts of citizenship. This contribution reveals some of the many ways in which European citizens constitute themselves and others as political – that is rights-claiming – subjects, in relation to contested political authority.

2 No Borders Network & Festung Europa

The No Borders network (also: No Border network and Noborders network) was created by pro-migrant activist groups from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
“No Borders, No Nations” or “Fortress Europe”?

Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Ukraine between 1999 and 2000. Imagining ‘a democratised mobility that encompasses autonomous movements of flight, circulation, settlement, and unsettlement’, the network constituted itself as a direct response to the fledgling EU migration and asylum policies.\(^3\) Besides the general pro-migrant and pro-freedom of movement stance, political orientations of the different participating groups include anti-capitalist, anarchist, feminist and green positions. The movement became publicly known for its creative forms of political protest in the public space, in particular protest camps erected in several European cities to raise awareness for – and demand change with regard to – the issue of migration and asylum.

In line with the information provided on the group’s website and page on the online networking platform Facebook, the Warsaw branch of the No Borders network was created in the early 2000s. No Borders Warszawa identifies as an ‘anarchist/anti-capitalist collective [...] whose actions, in various forms, centre on resistance towards the EU border regime and building solidarity and mutual empowerment in the migrant movement’\(^4\). In 2012, it became known to the public due to its involvement in protest action drawing attention to the situation of migrants living in Polish detention camps. Today, No Borders Warszawa is a small group of political activists that meets weekly in an informal manner in a squat in the city centre of Warsaw.

Turning to the other side of the political spectrum, Festung Europa/Fortress Europe is an alliance of anti-Islam and anti-immigrant groups and parties from several European countries. It was founded in Prague in January 2016. According to Festung Europa’s Facebook page, the alliance is a ‘pan-European civil movement which campaigns for freedom, sovereignty and a European identity’. It was initiated by the German PEGIDA group (full name: ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident’), Germany’s first significant far right populist social movement since the end of the Second World War.\(^5\) Founded in the city of Dresden in the east of Germany in October 2014, PEGIDA gathered tens of thousands of participants in its weekly demonstrations against an alleged “Islamisation of the Occident” and the German and European political establishment. As rapidly as it became a highly mediatised phenomenon in German and European discourse, it declined due to internal conflicts and external pressure in early 2015. Nevertheless, a core PEGIDA group has survived until today. PEGIDA continues to represent one of the most controversial phenomena of German politics and it is the focus of extensive empirical research.\(^6\) Aiming to transcend regional and na-

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tional boundaries from the very inception of its existence, the founding of Festung Europa can be regarded as the culmination of the transnationalisation process occurring within Pegida’s internal structures.

3 Theorising and Studying Borders and Borderwork

Before diving into the analysis of both movements’ political protest action, I would like to focus on the theory of borders and borderwork. Echoing the seeming impossibility to pin down the borders of Europe, scholars face difficulties when trying to theorise and study borders. The ambiguity and contentiousness of borders have led to a revolution in Border Studies over the past couple of years. Scholars invested in the nascent academic discipline of Critical Border Studies increasingly challenge the conventional territorial conceptualisation of borders as solid, static and normatively legitimate entities. Reacting to the call for a more complex theory of the border, Chiara Brambilla has suggested one of the most convincing concepts in order to grasp the complexity of borders: the notion of borderscapes. Building upon the literature on bordering practices, the most important features of the borderscapes concept are: firstly, the recognition of the spatial fluidity of borders, secondly, the highlighting of practices and performances in the material and symbolic making and remaking of borders, i.e. the involvement of people, and thirdly, the sensitivity to new forms of political belonging resulting from such practices. Moreover, this reading of borders reveals that borders are not neutral demarcations between sovereign states, but exclusionary and to some extent discriminatory social constructs. Border systems define membership through the exclusion of non-members, creating an “inside” and “outside”, an “us” and “them”, citizens and non-citizens. Borderscapes, in turn, call into question every predetermined social and political order, showing the urgency to rethink the modern categorisations of political belonging by revealing their fluid and contextual character. Following Brambilla, such claims to political belonging construct either hegemonic borderscapes or counter-hegemonic borderscapes. Whereas hegemonic borderscapes reaffirm the conventional view of (nation-)state borders as normative entities, counter-hegemonic borderscapes challenge their legitimacy by conceptualising them as historically constructed and surpassable boundaries.

Chris Rumford’s notion of borderwork is useful to explain how practices and performances by individuals concretely contribute to the symbolic and material making and remaking of borders. Borderwork refers to the activities by ‘citizens (and indeed, non-citizens) in envisioning, constructing, maintaining and erasing

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The concept emphasises two important aspects. On the one hand, it highlights, like borderscapes, the spatial complexity of borders: borderwork does not only take place at state borders, but at any physical or social space of society. On the other hand, the concept pays attention to the “ordinary” actions, carried out by “ordinary” people, which contribute to the making of borders.

The theory of acts of citizenship is particularly insightful for the systematic study of borderwork as it sheds light on the meaning of borderwork for our understanding of both borders and citizenship. Against the background of increasing crossborder mobility in a globalised world, acts of citizenship scholarship examines how citizens challenge institutionalised forms of citizenship by claiming new or different rights. Going beyond traditional conceptions of citizenship as legal status, it understands citizenship as a dynamic process that is constituted in and through political action. Following Isin, an act of citizenship is a deed or performance which ‘exercises either a right that does not exist or a right that exists but which is enacted by a political subject who does not exist in the eyes of the law’. The defining feature of an act of citizenship is the element of rupture which distinguishes an “act” from other forms of political action or practice. This means that, since individuals performing acts of citizenship claim new rights that are not in line with the law, they question or even break current laws and right systems. By breaking with the “normal”, an act can introduce a new set of norms.

A particular strength of the acts of citizenship literature is its associated systematised methodology. Isin suggests events, sites, scales and durability as analytical categories. Events, the starting point of the analysis, are understood as ‘actions that become recognizable (visible, articulable) only when the site, scale and duration of these actions produce a rupture in the given order’. Sites then refer to the spatial aspect of events. They are not mere places or locations, but must be studied by taking into account a place’s strategic value. The third analytical category, scales, shifts the focus to the scope of an event. Scales describe which kinds of audiences events reach. These can be local, national or transnational audiences, but also social groups beyond these merely geographical dimensions such as a community of followers on the internet. The final category, durability, refers to the duration of an event itself and, additionally, the time of its subsequent description and interpretation by the audience(s). Building upon this scheme, Lewicki proposes a fifth category for the analysis of acts of citizenship, which she terms modali-

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11 Ibid., 3.
15 Isin, Citizens Without Frontiers, 131-135.
16 Ibid., 131.
ties of enactment.\textsuperscript{17} The category describes the manner in which acts are performed and relates to the aesthetic quality of events.

The methodology associated with acts of citizenship draws upon performative and aesthetic approaches to politics. As it is argued that all social action has a performative dimension,\textsuperscript{18} such approaches are increasingly recognised as fruitful complement to more conventional forms of political analysis.\textsuperscript{19} For instance, discourse scholars complement the study of language with the analysis of performance and aesthetics.\textsuperscript{20} Arguably, performative and aesthetic approaches to politics are particularly relevant for understanding contentious politics and hence very useful for the purpose of this study. Indeed, Eyerman points to the crucial importance of “drama” and symbolism for social movements in the quest for attention and recognition.\textsuperscript{21} In a similar vein, Della Porta describes how visual products serve identity building purposes amongst movements’ supporters, capture public attention and grant a certain recognition factor.\textsuperscript{22}

4 Far Left and Far Right Borderwork

Having discussed the concept of acts of citizenship, this section applies the associated methodology to the two identified contemporary transnational protest movements. A contextualised discourse analysis of the cases compares the material and symbolic making, remaking and imagination of the European external borders through the activist citizens’ performances and discourse. The main sources were the groups’ pages on the social media platform Facebook, websites, and the video sharing platform YouTube. This method of corpus collection seemed adequate since both networks are rather marginal protest movements with regard to participation numbers, but accord a lot of importance to their online self-presentation. On their webpages, they publish innumerable written messages, images, videos,

links to events, other Facebook pages, websites and newspaper articles. In particular, I gathered information about the events, their sites, scales and durability, as well as some modalities of enactment from the groups’ online self-presentation. Because the digital presence of both networks is relatively recent, the online pages were entirely considered. The corpus was assembled in spring 2018.

The empirical material was analysed in line with the categories suggested in the acts of citizenship literature, i.e. events (what kind of performance?), sites (where?), scales (in front of whom? reaching whom?), durability (how long?), modalities of enactment (how is the event enacted? what does the event look like?). The final category embraces aesthetic and linguistic elements, shedding light on the characteristics and qualities of an act as well as the claims it communicates.

4.1 No Borders Warszawa

Anti-Frontex Days

Protest action against EU migratory policies and Frontex in particular is at the core of the No Borders network’s political activity. Organised more or less annually since 2008, the so-called Anti-Frontex Days are the most large-scale and long-term form of protest action by the No Borders movement. Over the years, the Anti-Frontex Days have comprised protest marches and demonstrations, joint conferences with other non-governmental organisations (NGOs), press conferences, film screenings and photography exhibitions. In addition, No Borders Warszawa staged performances in which activists pretended to be dead migrants. In 2015, a particularly large event was organised due to Frontex’ tenth anniversary. The programme included a conference for refugees and migrant support networks, which addressed the legal framework concerning migrants in Europe, developed suggestions for a revised legal framework, and prepared a memorandum to the legal authorities of Poland and the EU. Simultaneously, No Border groups from all over Europe set up solidarity events.

The choice of highly symbolic settings and disruptive elements contributes to the scientific interest in analysing the Anti-Frontex Days through the lens of acts of citizenship. The main sites of the Anti-Frontex Days were prominent public places such as the Frontex headquarters in the city centre of Warsaw, the Polish Presidential Palace, as well as the exit of the Eurostar tunnel in London. In 2013 activists lay on the pavement in front of the Frontex building, hidden under large plastic rubbish bags, which only allowed their legs and feet to be seen. Next to each bag-covered body lay a piece of paper with a name, country, age, and short description of the person’s legal status and trajectory. The mise-en-scène suggested that the activists were people who had died on their journey to Europe. Behind the bodies, activists had erected a large banner saying ‘entrance only for EU citizens’ (‘wstęp tylko dla obywateli unii europejskiej’). In a similarly setting, in 2015, activ-
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ists lay on the pavement covered in white bed sheets. Next to each activist stood a characteristic red graveyard candle. Two activists carried a black makeshift coffin past the bodies. A person of colour who was not covered lay on the bare pavement next to the feet of a row of policemen.

Frontex-monsters

When studying the No Border network’s online presence from which most of the empirical material is collected, the specific aesthetics and symbolism of visual elements stand out. The No Border activists use a plethora of visual and audio-visual material such as photographs, photomontages, drawings, cartoons and videos containing both filmed scenes of people and animated writing. The theme of EU migratory policies and Frontex is mainly taken up by the many drawings, pictograms and cartoons displayed on posters and flyers. They are visually represented with fences, barbed wire and walls, whereas Frontex is represented by monstrous creatures. Many drawings on posters and flyers represent Frontex as the main character of the popular Japanese video game Pac-Man, a circular shaped creature with a widely opened mouth, which, in the video game, must “eat” as many visually animated dots as possible. On the poster advertising the Anti-Frontex Days 2015, No Borders Warsaw adapts the original Pac-Man to its own vision of Frontex. The Frontex-Pac-Man has lips out of barbed wire, while cameras and searchlights serve as its limbs. The latter allude to the searching methods employed by the European border guards to detect people who cross European borders outside of the official border crossings. A row of small pictograms of rubber boats carrying several people is placed along the margins of the poster. Suggesting an anti-clockwise movement, one can observe how the people fall off the boats one after the other. Finally, the separated human bodies flow in a steady stream into the mouth of the Pac-Man monster. This image is visually echoed in the promotional video for the Anti-Frontex Days in 2015, which displays a written list of names of migrants that steadily flows towards the top of the screen, revealing yet more names flowing from the lower part of the screen.

4.2 Festung Europa/Fortress Europe

Re-erecting Borders

Festung Europa carries out anti-EU borderwork mainly in the form of rallies or demonstrations, preferably held in several places at a time. The rallies of February 2016 took place in Dresden, Prague, Warsaw, Bratislava, Krakow, Copenhagen, Dublin, Graz, Tartu, Amsterdam, Birmingham, Montpellier and Bordeaux. Similar to the No Border network, Festung Europa carefully chooses the sites and modalities of enactment of the demonstrations, including some controversial aesthetics.
For instance, a rally at the occasion of the German Unity Day 2016 took place at a bridge over the river of Elbe. A group of activists gathered on a small rubber boat floating down the Elbe, alluding to refugees crossing the Mediterranean. Yet, the activists aimed to draw attention to their own, allegedly desperate, situation. The seven people involved wore life jackets mostly in the colours of the German flag. Also, German flags were arranged to wave in the air. A large banner set up in between the flags read: ‘And, who rescues us?’ (Und, wer rettet uns?). Another rally, this time in Prague in June 2016, culminated in the joint drowning of a straw man representing the EU. The visual impression reminds of scenes showing the murder of alleged witches in the Middle Ages. The activists referred to the larger-than-life sized straw doll as the “evil witch Eurana” and covered it with the EU flag. Several activists lifted the straw doll up into the air and subsequently threw it over the balustrade into the water.

Two thought-provoking acts challenging the EU border regime aimed at both the physical and symbolic re-erecting of intra-European borders. The first media-tised act was the joint border blockade in April 2016. The event consisted of the physical blocking of parts of the Czech-German border through the set-up of a human chain. The concrete sites of this event were two former border-crossing points on motorways connecting the Czech Republic and Germany. During the event, around three hundred participants effectively blocked the border for about ten minutes, letting no car pass through. Visually the scene was dominated by German and Czech national flags.

The second, purely symbolic cluster of acts was staged during the leading activists’ travels across Europe in 2016 and 2017. Throughout their journey, they put stickers with Festung Europa’s logo on the street signs marking the borders between European countries. The concrete sites were, amongst others, the Italian, Danish and Serbian borders. These acts were of rather low scope as they only involved two or three activists, but no passersby who witnessed the acts. The stickers were small and probably not noticeable to people driving by in a car. Yet, the stickers are likely to have remained in place. The modalities of enactment are peculiar: videos posted online show how activist Tatjana Festerling puts stickers exactly in the centre of each of the twelve yellow stars that surround the names of EU Member States.

_Migrant Hunting_

Other acts by Festung Europa activists explicitly deny rights to others. Such acts often include the psychological and physical harming of individuals, in particular individuals of migrant background and, specifically, Muslim and non-white migrants. For instance, Festung Europa participated in the activities of the Bulgarian groups Shipka Bulgarian National Movement and Bulgarian Military Veterans Union “Vasil Levski” from June 2016 onwards. Both groups send activists to stroll along the green border between Bulgaria and Turkey in order to find and stop
people who attempt to cross the border beyond regular border crossings. Journalists have referred to the groups’ activities as ‘paramilitary border patrols’ and to the movement’s leader as a ‘migrant hunter’.23 The mise-en-scène of the activities at the Bulgarian border did not leave much doubt about the intended image. The participants in the patrols wore military uniforms, masks and armlets, creating war-like aesthetics. In a similar fashion, in July 2017, the activists published photographs and videos of how they put pork lard on the fences and ground in the area of the border to “hold off” alleged Islamists.

Two more anti-Muslim or anti-Islam acts aimed to ridicule both Muslim traditions and contemporary German politics. Both reacted to widely politicised statements by German mainstream politicians. The first act was framed as a reaction to a statement by Thomas de Maizière, then national minister for the interior, in a popular German talk show. De Maizière had claimed that the call of the muezzin was acceptable in Germany as long as it would not exceed the duration of three minutes and the volume of sixty decibels.24 A few days later, in May 2016, Festung Europa activists played the characteristic call of the muezzin via megaphone in front of de Maizière’s office in Meißen, a middle-sized city in Saxony. Scope and durability of the act were rather limited. On the one hand, only around five activists were directly involved and the performance only lasted for a bit more than three minutes. According to a video of the performance available on Festerling’s YouTube channel, only two passersby took notice of it. Most importantly, the intended audience, Thomas de Maizière, did not witness the performance at all. However, as the event took place during daytime in the centre of Meißen and was rather noisy, many people must have noticed it, even if they did not interact with the activists. Similarly, the scope of the event was enlarged by the media accounts published in the following days. With regard to the modalities of enactment, the mise-en-scène was rather simple. While the muezzin’s song was played, an activist held up two posters criticising the singing as too loud: ‘Sound becomes noise/hubbub’ (‘Aus Schall wird Lär’).

The second act aiming to ridicule German and European (im-)migration politics was set up in August 2016. The act was a reaction to a statement by Ralf Jäger, then minister for the interior of North Rhine-Westphalia, in which he rejected the controversially discussed burqa ban. Jäger had argued that a burqa ban would also need to entail the ban of Santa Claus costumes.25 In reaction to that, a group of disguised Festung Europa activists, one of them wearing a black, face-covering

No Borders, No Nations” or “Fortress Europe”?

burqa, attempted to enter the Saxon state chancellery in Dresden. The others were disguised as Santa Claus or wearing witches’ costumes. To the group’s satisfaction, the activist wearing the burqa was denied access to the government building by the guards on the ground of security. Whereas the event itself lasted only for a few minutes, it reached large audiences on social media, attaining more than five thousand views on YouTube.

5 Discussion: Challenging EU Border and Citizenship Regimes

What do the empirical findings mean? I start with a comparison of No Border’s and Festung Europa’s performative acts that either contest or reproduce the borders of Europe. The comparison sheds light on the various ways in which European citizens constitute themselves as political subjects. The acts share more similarities with regard to performances, sites and modalities of enactment than one might expect given the groups’ opposed political goals. For instance, both groups stage acts mostly in the centres of larger European cities, usually in proximity to major landmarks, use demonstrations to attract attention, and publicise their activities via the internet and social media. Yet, the use of the spatial aspect is slightly different. No Borders Warszawa chooses sites that permit access to the intended audience, who is usually in a position of power, such as the employees of Frontex or the Polish political leadership. In contrast, Festung Europa more often exploits aesthetically appealing architecture or nature as stages rather than choosing sites that would indeed allow for political deliberation or confrontation. Moreover, No Borders Warszawa’s political action is more focused on the local and regional level, whereas Festung Europa activists are more mobile within Europe. In particular, Festung Europa stages many acts at European borders, both within and at the outer fringes of the EU.

With regard to scale and durability, No Borders and Festung Europa experience typical challenges which protest movements encounter in the attempt to attract public attention. Both movements opt for using the opportunities of the internet to enlarge the scales and increase durability of their acts. Whereas the physical acts are usually restricted to rather short periods of time such as a couple of hours, and confined to rather small scales due to low participation numbers and small audiences, both groups attempt to reach larger audiences through active websites and social media pages. Also, both groups use repetition of the same kind of event as a tool to enlarge the scope and prolong the durability of the acts. No Borders Warszawa does so more consistently and coherently than Festung Europa.

The parallels between some modalities of enactment are most interesting. Both groups develop creative settings such as theatrical performances and symbolic action for the messages they seek to communicate. Both interpret the theme of dying refugees in the Mediterranean, yet the interpretation of these events could
not differ more. Whereas No Border activists pretend to be dead refugees in order to demand the improvement of the latters’ desperate situation, Festung Europa exploits a similar visual imaginary to strike a parallel with German citizens confronted with increased migratory flows to Europe.

**Borders & Borderscapes**

Both No Borders Warszawa and Festung Europa engage in the material and symbolic (re)creation of European borderscapes, challenging the EU’s and EU Member States’ monopoly over the production of borders and bordering processes. The activists create borderscapes and symbolically enlarge them to countries such as Czech Republic, Germany or Poland by representing European borders within those countries. In particular, Festung Europa symbolically and materially reproduces national borders between Schengen Member States, claiming the reintroduction of intra-European borders. No Borders’ performances, in turn, allude to European external borders by symbolically performing them within Europe, thus demanding change with regard to the EU border regime.

Both groups being protest movements, the borderscapes they create are, in Brambilla’s words, counter-hegemonic. Yet, the particular interpretations of European borders and borderscapes differ to a great extent. To begin with, the issue of locating European borders is irrelevant for No Borders Warszawa. In fact, the concept of Europe itself as a geographical, cultural or political unity does not at all feature in No Borders’ imagination. In line with Lewis’ and Wigen’s writings on the metageographical construction of continents, the activists question the concept of distinct continents demarcated by natural borders.26 Hence, the group may regard the Mediterranean as the major site where borders are enacted, but does not perceive it as a natural border between Europe and its neighbourhood. Instead, the group constructs the Mediterranean as a space where global capitalism reveals its most dangerous consequences. Most importantly, the group seeks to break all borders apart. By claiming their elimination, No Borders creates a counter-hegemonic borderscape in which new forms of political belonging can be enacted. On the one hand, the creation of a European space without borders allows former non-members of the European political community to take part in the community, based on their humanness rather than citizenship status. In other words, No Borders’ political action aims at migrants gaining the right to claim rights. On the other hand, Polish and other European activists claim the right to membership not only in their home political communities such as Poland or the EU, but in a broader world community. This political goal does not remain a mere claim, but is enacted at a lower level in the group’s activities. Indeed, the organisation of events

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that bring Polish citizens and migrants of all legal statuses together intend to break boundaries between individuals.

In contrast to No Borders, the idea of clear borders and boundaries is of utmost importance to Festung Europa. The activists’ position regarding the borders of Europe is however ambiguous, revealing yet again the spatial fluidity and socially constructed character of European borders. The first ambiguity concerns the positioning of the European external borders. On the one hand, the activists articulate the borders of Europe at the borders of the Schengen zone. They understand the Schengen borders as the point of entry from which migrants can move freely between European countries, and (theoretically) without being subject to border and identity controls. On the other hand, Festung Europa constructs Europe as a cultural community whose frontiers do not coincide with the Schengen borders. Indeed, Festung Europa constructs a European cultural community by alluding, amongst others, to the ‘thousand-year history of European civilisation’ and ‘the cultural accomplishments of our ancestors’. Although they do not specify where they locate the frontiers of this imagined cultural space, the elements they exclude from Europe, notably Islam and Muslims, allow us to draw some conclusions. Primarily, this construction of Europe seems to be a religious, namely Christian one.

The second ambiguity in Festung Europa’s attitude to European borders relates to the borders within Europe. Festung Europa seeks to both eliminate and re-erect boundaries. The movement’s manifesto symbolically eliminates borders by inclusively calling upon the ‘European patriots’ to show ‘solidarity’ and associate with each other. Furthermore, the foundation of the group itself, as well as its transnational events organised in many European cities at the same time, are the best example of the elimination of national boundaries. On the other hand, Festung Europa campaigns for the physical re-erection of national borders and border controls. For instance, the group congratulates countries which have re-introduced border controls, and thus highlights concepts such as individuality, sovereignty and identity in its discourse, and both physically and symbolically engages in border blocking. Within these counter-hegemonic European borderscapes, activists themselves assume new forms of political belonging. Indeed, their discourse imagines an alternative political community that allegedly exists in parallel to the EU structures. Festung Europa activists claim not only the right to membership, but also ownership of this imagined political community of sovereign states.

**Citizenship & Political Belonging**

Both activist groups constitute themselves as right-claiming subjects through their creative and disruptive forms of political activism. The theoretical lens of critical citizenship studies employed in this research allows light to be shed on the concrete right-claiming processes and stakeholders. Firstly, as protest movements,
both groups claim rights for themselves or others that do not (yet) exist, or claim the full realisation of rights that cannot (yet) be enacted. No Border’s claims to rights are twofold. On the one hand, the activists claim civil rights for migrants who do not have the right to claim rights due to their legal status. These rights relate to free movement and settlement as well as to asylum. On the other hand, No Borders also claims rights for the activists themselves. This is the right to be part of a universal world community without borders or states and in which citizenship in the classical sense does not exist. Festung Europa’s claims to rights, in turn, are at least threefold. Firstly, the activists claim to deny rights to migrants, in particular the right to free movement, settlement and asylum. Secondly, the group claims the right to full territorial sovereignty over an imagined European space in which only European patriots are entitled to enjoy civil, economic and social rights. Thirdly, Festung Europa claims the fulfilment of allegedly failed responsibilities from the EU and its Member States. Alluding to the duty of states to provide security to their citizens as part of the mutual citizenship compact, the group claims the stricter protection of European external borders and, allegedly, the protection of Europe and its culture.

This leads to a second observation concerned with the communities of political belonging that the groups evoke and claim rights from. Interestingly, both groups claim rights from various political communities and authorities. Indeed, they appeal to local, regional, national and transnational communities, revealing the complexity of political belonging in an increasingly transnational EU space and globalised world. For instance, No Borders appeals to local and regional authorities and communities when organising solidarity action for migrants who are detained in local centres. Then, the activists appeal to the national level when setting up protest marches in front of national political institutions. Finally, they claim rights from transnational entities when rallying in front of the Frontex headquarters. Also, their call for ‘no borders, no nations’ appeals to a universal community. Festung Europa similarly claims rights from different levels of authorities and entities of political belonging. The activists appeal to the local and regional levels when organising protest marches in Dresden. The transnational level is evoked via the physical blocking of the Czech-German border, hunt of migrants in the Bulgarian-Turkish borderlands, or through their discourse on European patriots.

6 Concluding Remarks

A couple of conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing. The analysis has revealed some creative and disrupting ways in which citizens of contemporary Europe engage in material and symbolic border making. Far from accepting the institutionalised EU border regime, the protest movements continuously challenge the political definition of borders through contentious action. We can thus conclude that the activists’ creative and disruptive political action undoubtedly contributes
to the multiple contestations and potential democratisation of European borders that Balibar and others have called for. Through the studied acts, members of both the No Borders and Festung Europa movements attempt to make the European borders an object of their sovereignty. As predicted by Rumford, both groups acknowledge the power of transnational networks for citizen-driven making and remaking of borders, and therefore successfully connect with like-minded groups all over Europe to challenge the EU border regime.\textsuperscript{27}

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\textsuperscript{27} Rumford, “Introduction: Citizens and Borderwork in Europe,” 7.


1 Introduction

From its beginnings, European integration has fostered a union based on certain shared principles and values. In this sense, alongside such values as social justice or solidarity, the core principle of democracy is a cornerstone of the construction of Europe. In the framework of European studies, the last few decades were dedicated to the study of European values, analysing and explaining the main transformations of citizens’ value orientations since the end of the Second World War. Alongside the process of modernisation,\textsuperscript{1} and an unprecedented process of democratisation and economic prosperity, European values have shifted from materialism and respect for traditional authority towards post-materialist and emancipative values, respect for legal-rational authority and a stronger sense of identification with the political system and institutional trust.\textsuperscript{2}

As a consequence of these important transformations in the value systems of European citizens and generalised economic and political change, Europe has witnessed rising levels of social and institutional trust and identification with the


principles of democracy and the rule of law, which has facilitated a process of legitimacy and voluntary compliance with rules and norms. According to Tyler and Murphy, higher levels of institutional trust and support for the rule of law, support for state legitimacy and principles of democracy would – in advanced democracies – imply a generalised sense of respect for social and political norms and compliance.\(^3\) Therefore, fraudulent behaviour would be progressively reduced and less justified by European citizens. However, this pattern has not always been the case and the last decades have still witnessed significant levels of justification of fraudulent activities, which have also been of interest to studies on European values and require further analysis. At the same time, in Europe, we observe a set of dubious behaviour committed by citizens, challenging the democratic principles that have been settled during the last decades across European societies.

These values and attitudes challenging the principles of democracy and solidarity upon which the European Union has been built, appear in European societies to different degrees and for different reasons. Fraud is seen as a threat to democratic values and also to the economic integrity of any society. Such fraudulent behaviour is also known as ‘crimes of everyday life’\(^4\) or ‘the everyday crimes of the middle classes’\(^5\) and is committed by citizens who see themselves as respectable. In this sense we could speak about a law-abiding majority that is able to commit or justify fraudulent behaviour under specific circumstances.

Our main interest with this chapter is to analyse whether we can identify a common pattern of attitudes and values in Europe towards fraudulent behaviour, and whether these attitudes are purely the outcome of rational and individual judgements of their situation. Claiming a common core of European values and common understanding of citizens’ attitudes towards the state is at the foundation of the construction of Europe, and we aim at studying whether we can see important similarities in the understanding of fraud across European societies and regions. For this purpose we identify four countries from four European regions, namely Spain (Southern Europe), Poland (Central and Eastern Europe), the Netherlands (Western Europe) and Sweden (Nordic Europe). For these countries we analyse whether there is a trend towards convergence of European values in attitudes towards fraud during the last years, and which might be the elements explaining the differences existing among those countries.

There is a number of reasons why citizens may commit or justify fraudulent behaviour. Modernisation theory claims that social change is a consequence of unprecedented economic growth after the industrialisation process and value


change happened as a ‘silent revolution’\textsuperscript{6} in modern societies. Cultural theories claim that supporting fraudulent or dubious behaviour responds to a prevalence of individual values versus collectivist ones.\textsuperscript{7} Rational or economic theories would rely on short term evaluation of personal performance to explain why citizens justify and commit specific types of fraud to solve a specific situation of disadvantage. Symbolic theories rely on the general claim that justification of fraud would be determined by long-term, basic, attitudes towards the state, such as political support and social and political trust.\textsuperscript{8}

This chapter aims at answering what the main factors that could explain the levels of justification of fraudulent activities and behaviour in Europe, concretely in Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden, corresponding to different regions in Europe, are. Moreover, we look at the main differences across country-related levels of justification of fraud, and into the differences in terms of the effects of relevant factors influencing these attitudes towards fraud in the selected countries. In addition, we look at the evolution across time to analyse whether there have been significant variations on citizens’ judgements. Hence, we analyse the evaluation of the economic and political context made by the citizens and the personal sacrifices they may have needed to make and their effect on attitudes towards fraud in several European societies. Moreover, we analyse the effect of long term settled attitudes towards the state and its institutions. In this sense, for the purpose of the analysis of the factors influencing justification of fraud in European societies, we classify those factors as symbolic, rational and sociodemographic.

With this purpose in mind, we analyse data from two waves of the World Values Survey, namely 2005-2009 and 2010-2014, respectively. This way we try to track the variations on the justification of fraud with three different types of behaviour: claiming state benefits without being entitled to these, cheating on taxes, and accepting a bribe.

This chapter will be structured as follows. First, we explain the main theoretical approaches towards justification of fraud, followed by our research hypotheses and the description of data and methods used. Data analysis and discussion of results are explained later, followed by the main conclusions.

2 Main Theoretical Explanations for Justification of Fraud

When we study values and moral judgements, we need to explain these judgements from three perspectives. Firstly, value orientations and value change need to be contextualised and understood in relation to major social transformations, and

\textsuperscript{6} Inglehart, \textit{The Silent Revolution}.


historical and cultural settings, which help us understand the general historical, cultural and economic framework where those value domains are created and maintained. Secondly, we need to identify which elements in our judgements are settled on societal groundings, are created and maintained through socialisation processes and respond to stable value domains. And thirdly, we also need to identify which factors are more circumstantial, and reflect specific personal rational evaluations of concrete situations, mainly economic and situational. In this section we organise those main theoretical approaches, which contribute to the explanation of specific formations of attitudes and values.

Modernisation theory is a well-known and widely accepted macro-theoretical approach for the explanation of values and value change. It posits how the unprecedented economic growth following the industrialisation process and the Second World War had as an effect a significant social change accompanied by unprecedented value change. This value change occurred strongly linked to mass access to healthcare and an expansion of education, with a consequent improvement in citizens’ cognitive skills and their living conditions. European citizens experienced social, political and value change, on the one hand, by locating the ultimate responsibility for individuals’ living conditions no longer in the individuals, but in the state. On the other hand, citizens focused on the person as the main locus of control over life and over any decision-making process, in a more secularised and individualised context where post-materialist and self-expression values were dominant. According to Dülmer, this transformation led to a transition from a conventional level of moral judgement, where religious traditions and moral social conventions dominated, to a post-conventional level where it is the individual who defines and decides individually the standards for moral judgement according to his/her personal and internalised evaluation and moral standards. This social transformation facilitated also the differentiation between universal norms of behaviour and their cultural and contextual interpretations.

Some theories claim that justification of fraudulent behaviour can be explained by cultural codes. In this respect, Susanne Karstedt reflects on whether differences in attitudes towards crime and fraud can be explained by cultural patterns. In this respect, cultural theories locate the discussion concerning these attitudes in the

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11 Ibid.

main religious traditions and the types of ideal society emerging from their moral patterns. According to this approach, higher levels of crime can be related to a ‘failure of Western culture’ in comparison to Confucian traditions, with their emphasis on collectivist values. According to Karstedt, this approach would claim that the “advanced nation disease” would respond to a socio-cultural syndrome of individualistic and hedonistic value patterns and the erosion of social embeddedness of individuals. Values are the core element of these approaches, as they reflect the desirable behaviour and society, and in this respect, attitudes towards fraud would implicitly reveal expressions of cultural meanings.

Economic theories approach fraudulent attitudes and behaviour from the concept of anomie. In this respect, Messner and Roselfeld extended the scope of anomie theory beyond structure and culture based on structural inequalities. According to these authors, institutional anomie arises when the economic sphere is disembedded from other social institutions and when values of markets dominate other sectors and vital institutions of society such as family, education and welfare. Within this context, the new social relationship would enable individuals to challenge traditional cultural rules and values. According to Cullen, anomie would therefore be the product of an imbalance between cultural and social structure, and therefore, anomie would be not natural, but socially induced. In this sense, inequality would be understood as a source of anomie.

According to these theories, there are different views on how an economy should operate and on the legitimacy of the practices of different actors involved in the economy. The practices of firms, consumers and governments reflect the moral principles embedded in the culture that dictates reasonable courses of action. Therefore, dishonest or fraudulent behaviour would be explained by the so-called syndrome of market anomie that comprises distrust of business and governments, fear of victimisation and cynical attitudes towards the law. Anomie, as a consequence, is used here to describe the idea that social forces have failed to regulate the behaviour of individuals in a prescribed direction. As a consequence, perceptions of imbalances of society and market mechanisms turn into a syndrome of distrust, insecurity and anomie attitudes toward legal rules. Perceptions of im-

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balances include perceptions of prevailing unrestrained profit motives that put others immorally at risk\textsuperscript{20} and imbalances of power between business and consumers creating winners and losers. The main determinant, in this sense, for anomic behaviour or attitude would be the evaluation of personal performance vis-à-vis inequality in society writ large, or the perception of justice or corruption.

A distinction between rational and value theories, as a comprehensive way to classify those theoretical approaches explained, is provided by Listhaug and Miller, who explain attitudes towards fraud, in their case focusing on tax evasion, based on two major theoretical explanations.\textsuperscript{21} First, “rational” or experience-based theories claim that citizens respond with their attitudes or behaviour to objective elements of public policy. In this case, the perception of high taxation, rising prices or inequalities, alongside with personal economic and employment status would have as a consequence a higher justification of fraud. This approach would therefore give relevance to utility maximising and instrumental evaluations made by citizens. Second, the symbolic approach would claim that attitudes and behaviour are determined by long term, generic predispositions such as ideological attitudes towards public spending and the role of the state in the economy, political support, and social and political trust. The ideological component would in this case be related to the role that citizens believe the state should have in regulating economic and social interactions.\textsuperscript{22}

In this sense, social and institutional trust appear as core elements to explain attitudes towards fraudulent behaviour. The link between distrust of the government and illicit behaviour has been empirically demonstrated by Karstedt and Farrall.\textsuperscript{23} The impact of distrust of political institutions and legal permissiveness has been studied by Marien and Hooghe, who found that citizens with high levels of distrust of political institutions show, on average, higher tolerance for fraudulent practices.\textsuperscript{24}

Institutional trust may refer to legitimate institutions of representation (e.g. in the parliament), authority or incumbents (e.g. in the government) or the economy (e.g. in the mode of production). Interpersonal trust is assumed to form the basis of all other types of trust.\textsuperscript{25} If we assume that interpersonal trust facilitates social interaction, then trust in others should promote collective action. Trusting others implies creating expectations about future interactions founded on ethical princi-
ples that people endorse and believe they share with others. When these expecta-
tions are contradicted, these ethical standards which people believe and share are
violated, disapproval of others’ behaviour and distrust may follow. The same ra-
ationale may apply to groups or institutions. Distrust may arise from the violation
of expectations of good behaviour based on more or less shared ethical principles.

Economic morality is founded on culturally specific ethical principles that un-
derlie the condemnation of the behaviour of different agents in the economic
sphere. Catterberg and Moreno found that institutional trust is tied to government
performance, and it is undermined by corruption and permissiveness.26 In a sce-
nario in which low levels of trust in political institutions are evident, breaking the
law is seen as more acceptable.27 If individuals perceive others (e.g. the govern-
ment or the economic system) not to be trustworthy, they may view dishonest
practices in the civic and market arenas as more tolerable. If economic agents be-
have in illegitimate ways and/or interpersonal trust is low, trust in the economy
and in the government will be undermined. Tyler has found that citizens are more
likely to comply with the law if they respect and recognise the legitimacy of the law
and the trustworthiness of authority, rather than simply fearing punishment.28

However, if citizens realise that companies and governments act only in their
self-interest, the recognition of legitimacy of the political and economic system will
be affected and fraudulent activities that appear as legitimate and moral standards
in the economic sphere may be tolerated, which in turn impacts the moral fram-
work of society and the acceptance of such behaviour.29

3 Research Hypotheses

According to rational and symbolic theories explained above, several hypotheses
can be formulated. With the following hypotheses we aim to answer the main
research questions, namely, on what grounds do we explain justification of fraudu-
 lent behaviour in European societies. Moreover, we aim at analysing whether there
are relevant differences across European countries in terms of the levels of justif-
ication and the effect of different factors affecting this justification. Therefore, the
hypotheses are formulated as follows:

H1: Given the effect of inequality on market anomie, and in accordance with
rational theory, we expect justification of fraud to be higher in those years where
economic performance was worse and in those countries more affected by a worse
economic performance. According to this hypothesis, in those contexts where

26 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, “The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in
31.
28 Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations (Princeton: Princeton University
there have been systemic and structural inequalities, and where there is a general perception that market dynamics dominate other sectors and fundamental structures of society, there would be higher levels of justification of fraud.

H2: In line with rational theory, those worse off in terms of income, employment status and satisfaction with economic situation are likelier to justify fraud. According to this hypothesis, citizens who feel damaged by the socio-economic system, or dissatisfied with their economic situation, would tend to justify fraud more.

H3: In line with symbolic theory, those more trusting and supportive of state institutions will show lower justification of fraud. Identification with the state and democratic values learnt through the process of socialisation would tend to develop higher levels of political support and institutional trust. Consequently, these would imply lower levels of justification for fraud.

H4: A variation among European countries in terms of the relevance of symbolic and rational factors is expected. Specific contexts, with specific trajectories in terms of persistence of democratic values on the one hand, and different levels of economic and political performance on the other hand, will have as a consequence that attitudes towards fraud will rely on different factors.

4 Method, Operationalisation and Data

4.1 Method and Operationalisation

Multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA)\(^{30}\) permits not only accuracy of results, but also flexibility in estimating models, giving more accurate estimates of the relationships between the theoretically related variables (symbolic, rational and control variables) and the latent construct of interest (justification of trust), while taking into account measurement error. It is generally used for cross-cultural comparison in order to test if a latent variable of interest is comparable across groups, countries and/or years. This takes measurement invariance into account; when invariance holds, relationships and/or means of the latent constructs can be compared across groups.

Thus, in this chapter, attitudes towards fraud will be measured as a latent factor with three reflective indicators, using structural equation modelling (SEM). A specific SEM model, known as confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is used to estimate the measurement model, shown in a generalised form in Figure 1, where in this case \( y_1 = \) Claiming state benefits, \( y_2 = \) Cheating on taxes, \( y_3 = \) Someone accepting a bribe; \( \lambda_{1i}, \lambda_{2i}, \) and \( \lambda_{3i} \) are the factor loadings on the items \( y_1, y_2 \) and \( y_3 \), and \( \eta \) is the latent variable of “justification of fraud.” The selected variables are part of a battery of behaviour in the World Values Study to be judged by respondents in terms of justification. The selected variables relate to fraud by public officials and in the context of public institutions.

In this chapter these indicators are obtained from the World Values Study using a 10-point scale question: “Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between.” The specific behaviour to be analysed is the “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled,” “Cheating on taxes if you have a chance,” and “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties.” Each of these three items represents a different type of fraudulent behaviour: claiming state benefits would imply lying combined with getting benefits when citizens should not get those benefits; cheating on taxes would imply personal cheating and getting a reward to the detriment of the state; accepting a bribe would imply a certain level of personal corruption.

In order to compare whether each of the indicators that compose the latent variable show significantly different means according to country and period, one-way analysis of variance (anova) test is used. Later, these three indicators are used in the MGCFA model with “justification of fraud” as a latent variable (see Figure 1).


By establishing measurement invariance, we can draw meaningful comparisons of the latent means and detect effects that predictor variables have on the latent construct of interest, at the same time ensuring that the latent construct has the same meaning and scaling across groups (regions and/or time periods). Generally, when using MGCFA analysis, three hierarchical levels of measurement invariance - configural, metric and scalar - are tested. Thus, invariance across groups can be studied.

Figure 2 presents the main theoretical model to explain attitudes towards fraud in Europe. The figure represents that latent variable of justification of fraud as composed of state benefits, cheating on taxes and accepting a bribe, where the arrows from the latent variable to each item represent parameters, in this case factor loadings. It also shows the regression coefficients of the main factors (symbolic, rational and control or also named sociodemographic) on justification of fraud.

**Figure 2: Theoretical model**

The operationalisation of the predictive variables is shown in Table 1, where variables are presented and grouped in theoretical dimensions or control variables. All variables are taken from the World Values Survey, in two waves: the first wave of 2005-2009, corresponding to a period mainly prior to the economic crisis, and therefore, better economic situation in general terms; the second wave of 2010-2014, thus during the economic crisis coinciding with worse economic performance in some countries, for example in Spain. Table 1 also shows the specific questions and the measurement for each predictive variable in the model.

**Table 1: Theoretical dimensions and measurement of predictive variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>WVS Question</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td>Social trust</td>
<td>Generally speaking, would you say that most people can</td>
<td>Categorical variable: Yes/No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Life satisfaction</td>
<td>All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?</td>
<td>From “completely dissatisfied” (1) to “completely satisfied” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to be rich</td>
<td>It is important to this person to be rich; to have a lot of money and expensive things.</td>
<td>From “very much like me” (1) to “not at all like me” (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to behave properly</td>
<td>It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.</td>
<td>From “very much like me” (1) to “not at all like me” (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right scale</td>
<td>In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?</td>
<td>From “Left” (1) to “Right” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income more equal</td>
<td>How would you place your views on this scale?</td>
<td>From “Incomes should be made more equal” (1) to “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government vs people responsibility for welfare</td>
<td>How would you place your views on this scale?</td>
<td>From “The Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for” (1) to “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People rich expense others vs income equal</td>
<td>How would you place your views on this scale?</td>
<td>From “People can only get rich at the expense of others” (1) to “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy: government tax the rich and subsidise poor</td>
<td>Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy.</td>
<td>From “Not an essential characteristic of democracy” (1) to “An essential characteristic of democracy” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance democracy</td>
<td>How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?</td>
<td>Numerical variable: from “not at all important” (1) to “absolutely important” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Parliament</td>
<td>Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the Parliament?</td>
<td>From “A great deal” (1), “Quite a lot” (2), “Not very much”(3), “None at all” (4). These codes have reversed for a higher simplicity in interpretation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Civil service</td>
<td>Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the Civil service?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Government</td>
<td>Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the Government?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control over life</td>
<td>Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. How much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out?</td>
<td>From “No choice at all” (1) to “A great deal of choice” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with financial situation</td>
<td>How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?</td>
<td>From “Completely dissatisfied” (1) to “Completely satisfied” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Are you employed now or not?</td>
<td>Yes / No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scale of income</td>
<td>On this card, we would like to know in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in.</td>
<td>From “Lowest income decile” (1) to “Highest income decile” (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>What is the highest educational level that you have attained?</td>
<td>From “No formal education” (1) to “University-level education” (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Code respondent’s sex</td>
<td>Male/Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>You are ___ years old</td>
<td>Write in age in two digits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis for each of the four countries studied (Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden) and period (2005-2009 and 2010-2014) will be carried out in order to test which of the variables included in the model (symbolic/values, rational and control) is a stronger predictor for citizens’ justification of fraudulent behaviour. The justification of trust has been explained taking into consideration symbolic and rational variables, however, in order to determine if these variables of such theories influence justification of fraud, it is important to test whether the control variables (level of education, gen-
der and age) also influence on the justification of fraud and could diminish the explanation of the symbolic and rational theories.

4.2 Data

Table 2 shows the sample size for the four countries in both periods; all countries provide a sample size of around 1000 cases, which will be used for the different analyses. The countries have been selected for the purpose of covering different geographic regions in Europe, namely, Southern Europe, Western Europe, Central Europe and Nordic Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1003</td>
<td>1206</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Results

The three indicators for justification of fraud (claiming state benefits, cheating on taxes, and someone accepting a bribe) have been compared with one-way anova and the results are shown in Table 3. The means for the different indicators in the periods are significantly different for all three indicators. In the case of justification of claiming government benefits, the Netherlands and Sweden show the lowest levels of justification in the earlier period, whereas Poland and Spain show the highest levels of justification, with the exception of Spain during the 2010-2014 period, when this is lower than in Sweden. Thus, this fact would not completely support the hypothesis related to the economic performance. For the variable cheating on taxes, our expectation would only hold in the case of Poland since it has the highest values. For this variable, Spain appears to be an exception since its levels of justification appear to be lower than expected. The expectation on the variation over time of levels of justification of cheating on taxes is not confirmed either: Poland before the crisis, for instance, shows higher levels of justification.

Scores for the variable accepting a bribe show lower levels of justification compared with claiming government benefits or cheating on taxes in all countries and periods. It shows a complete reverse pattern, with Sweden showing the highest levels of justification of bribes and Poland showing the lowest. In the case of justification of accepting a bribe, we see how our expectation related to the variations of justification in relation to variations of economic level of the country as an
attempt to capture the effect of economic performance on justification of fraudulent behaviour is not confirmed.

Table 3: One-way anova variable attitudes towards fraud 2004-2009 and 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable: claiming government benefits</th>
<th>Country /Period</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 2010-2014</td>
<td>2,61</td>
<td>2,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,53</td>
<td>2,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,32</td>
<td>1,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2010-2014</td>
<td>2,26</td>
<td>1,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 2010-2014</td>
<td>2,16</td>
<td>1,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2005-2009</td>
<td>1,85</td>
<td>1,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 2005-2009</td>
<td>1,51</td>
<td>1,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 2010-2014</td>
<td>1,34</td>
<td>1,194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,01</td>
<td>1,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F=86,608; p-value = 0,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable: cheating on taxes</th>
<th>Country /Period</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,44</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 2010-2014</td>
<td>2,34</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,30</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,25</td>
<td>1,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2010-2014</td>
<td>2,15</td>
<td>2,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 2005-2009</td>
<td>2,06</td>
<td>1,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 2010-2014</td>
<td>1,90</td>
<td>1,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 2010-2014</td>
<td>1,73</td>
<td>1,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,11</td>
<td>1,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F=18,710; p-value = 0,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe</th>
<th>Country /Period</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2005-2009</td>
<td>1,97</td>
<td>1,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden 2010-2014</td>
<td>1,92</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain 2005-2009</td>
<td>1,82</td>
<td>1,724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Since relationships between the predictors and the justification of fraud are of interest, metric invariance is carried out through MGCFA for all countries. In order to evaluate the goodness of fit for the models, several measures are evaluated when MGCFA is carried out. The main measures are Root Mean Square Error Of Approximation (RMSEA) = 0.067 (90% confidence interval between 0.054 and 0.080), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = 0.047, Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.91, and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 0.95. Fit indices show acceptable values for measurement invariance of justification of fraud. Since invariance is acceptable, factor scores will be computed from the latent variable and used as dependent variable of justification of fraud in the OLS regression analyses.

For the explanatory analysis, we present the results of four OLS regressions, one for each country. In this way, it will be possible to determine which of the theoretical dimensions, rational or symbolic, and sociodemographic variables have an impact on justification of fraud.

Given that, according to the anova test, no expected pattern of variation across time is found in terms of justification of fraud, only the latter wave (2010-2014) is going to be analysed and presented in the regression analysis.

The first data shown in Table 4 are the results for Poland and Spain for the 2010-2014 wave. For the case of Poland, a number of variables responding to the symbolic or value theoretical approach show significant effects. This shows how the higher the level of life satisfaction people show, the lower their support for fraud, and the less importance people ascribe to being rich, the less they justify fraud. In addition, the more importance citizens give to democracy, the less they justify fraudulent behaviour. Also, the value of behaving properly is significant, showing how the less people believe they should behave properly, the more they justify fraud. By looking at more rational variables, we see that the self-assessment of economic situation in the scale of incomes provides significant effect, showing how those better off would tend to justify fraud less.

Table 4: Regression estimates for Poland and Spain 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Poland (2010-2014)</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Spain (2010-2014)</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S) Social Trust</td>
<td>0,050</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Life satisfaction</td>
<td>-0,178 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,068 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Control over life</td>
<td>-0,069 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,090 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Schwartz Rich</td>
<td>-0,117 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Schwartz beh. Proper</td>
<td>0,173 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,175 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Sat. Financial situation</td>
<td>0,073 *</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,253 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Left-right scale</td>
<td>-0,039</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,025</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Income more equal (scale)</td>
<td>0,041</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,058 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Gvt vs people responsibility</td>
<td>0,010</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) People rich expense others</td>
<td>-0,028</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Democracy: gov tax the rich</td>
<td>0,034</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,113 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Importance democracy</td>
<td>-0,372 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,369 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Gender</td>
<td>0,104 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Level of education</td>
<td>-0,028</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Employed</td>
<td>0,024</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Scale of income</td>
<td>-0,083 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,083 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Age</td>
<td>-0,218 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,183 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Trust parliament</td>
<td>0,147 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,123 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Trust civil service</td>
<td>0,015</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Trust government</td>
<td>0,038</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0,082 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0,361</td>
<td></td>
<td>0,397</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<0,001; **p<0,01; *p<0,05
(S)=Symbolic; (R)=Rational; (C) = Control

However, if we look at this dimension from a subjective view, a higher level of satisfaction with one’s personal situation would increase justification of fraud. Age is also significant, showing that the older people get, the less they justify fraud.

In the case of Spain we see how higher life satisfaction and feeling of control over life tend to reduce justification of fraud, a result also obtained when looking
into the importance of democracy. Similarly to Poland, those who do not identify with proper behaviour are likelier to justify fraud. Those who believe that we need larger income differences as opposed to income having to be made more equal tend to justify fraud less, and so do those who believe that it is an essential characteristic of democracy that government tax the rich and subsidise the poor. The same pattern we see for trust in institutions: higher trust reduces justification for fraud. Regarding the rational dimension, the higher people are in the scales of incomes, the less they justify fraud, but this seems to be the only rational variable to be significant. Similarly to Poland, the more satisfied people are with their financial situation, the more they would justify fraud, showing an interesting contrast between the effects of objective wealth and subjective wellbeing. Age is also significant and shows a negative impact on justification of fraud.

By looking at the data for Spain and Poland we see how the symbolic dimension is stronger both these cases. Income and satisfaction with financial situation seem to be the relevant rational variable to explain justification of fraud.

Table 5 shows the same regression models for the Netherlands and Sweden in the same period. In the case of the Netherlands, we observe how values such as importance of being rich and importance of behaving properly have the expected effect on justification of fraud, an outcome also obtained when looking into the importance of democracy. In the case of the Netherlands, institutional trust is also associated with a lower justification of fraud, with trust in the civil service becoming significant in this case.

Regarding the effect of rational theories, we observe how one’s position on the scale of income has as an effect a lower level of justification of fraud. Satisfaction with the financial situation has the same effect that we have observed in Spain and Poland, strengthening the relationship between a higher satisfaction with one’s economic situation and a higher level of fraud justification. Similarly to the cases of Poland and Spain, we see a particular pattern supported: there is a different effect between the objective economic situation and the value component, in this case satisfaction with one’s economic situation. The objective wealth impacts negatively on justification of fraudulent behaviour whereas higher level of satisfaction with one’s economic situation is associated with a higher level of justification of fraud. Also in the case of the Netherlands, age and gender have a significant impact. In the case of age, the same relationship as observed previously holds, older people tend to justify fraud less, and men would tend to justify fraud more than women.

In the case of Sweden, we observe how the attitudes towards democracy are the most salient ones in explaining justification of fraud. Apart from the negative effect of the value related to the importance of being rich, as we have previously observed in the other models, in the Swedish case those variables related to the importance of democracy and the values related to the characteristics of democracy are the significant ones. Importance of democracy has a negative effect, similarly to the previous models. In the case of the variable confronting governmental vs
people’s responsibility to provide for oneself, those who tend to believe in the individual’s responsibility would also tend to justify fraud less. In the case of the variable confronting the opinion that people can only get rich at the expense of others versus the opinion that wealth can grow in such a way that there is enough for everyone, those who support wealth growth would also tend to justify fraud less. Institutional trust, in this case trust in civil service, would also have a negative impact on justification of fraud. Age and education have also a significant negative effect, so that the older and the better educated tend to justify fraud to a lesser extent. In the case of Sweden, an interesting aspect setting it apart from the other cases studied is the fact that no variable classified under the rational theoretical approach is significant. This means that the attitudes towards fraud in Sweden do not rely on rational calculations of one’s situation but on values and symbolic judgements of what is desirable for the society.

Table 5: regression estimates for the Netherlands and Sweden 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Netherlands (2010-2014)</th>
<th>Sweden (2010-2014)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(S) Social Trust</td>
<td>-0,034</td>
<td>-0,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Life satisfaction</td>
<td>-0,065</td>
<td>-0,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Control over life</td>
<td>0,046</td>
<td>0,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Schwartz Rich</td>
<td>-0,219 ***</td>
<td>-0,113 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Schwartz beh. Proper</td>
<td>0,127 ***</td>
<td>0,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Sat. Financial situation</td>
<td>0,109 ***</td>
<td>-0,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Left-right scale</td>
<td>-0,031</td>
<td>0,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Income more equal (scale)</td>
<td>-0,007</td>
<td>0,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Gvt vs people responsibility</td>
<td>-0,029</td>
<td>-0,111 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) People rich expense others</td>
<td>-0,023</td>
<td>-0,069 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S) Democracy: gov tax the rich</td>
<td>0,058 *</td>
<td>0,055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Importance democracy</td>
<td>-0,114 ***</td>
<td>-0,172 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Gender</td>
<td>0,221 ***</td>
<td>0,071 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Level of education</td>
<td>-0,022</td>
<td>-0,200 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Employed</td>
<td>-0,041</td>
<td>0,006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R) Scale of income</td>
<td>-0,086 *</td>
<td>0,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Age</td>
<td>-0,092 *</td>
<td>-0,286 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S) Trust parliament</td>
<td>-0,045</td>
<td>-0,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(S) Trust civil service    -0.104    ***    -0.073    *
(S) Trust government    0.008    -0.057
\( R^2 \)    0.181    0.320

***p<0.001; **p<0.01; p<0.05
(S)=Symbolic; (R)=Rational; (C) = Control

With these analyses we show the effect of the two identified theoretical approaches on justification of fraud, in addition to control variables, to test how European societies show similarities across countries and how different theoretical approaches show more consistent and stronger effects than others, as specified in our hypotheses.

6 Conclusion

As we had formulated in our theoretical background and in our hypotheses, it was our expectation that, in line with the market anomie theory, the effect of worse economic performance in some countries and feelings of economic deprivation by some social groups would have as a consequence an increase of the levels of justification of fraud in some European societies. This first hypothesis has not been confirmed, according to our data and analyses. The results of the one-way anova comparing the means across countries and periods showed no systematic variation in support of our hypotheses.

Justification of fraud in Europe follows similar patterns, as we have observed in our analyses. Rational judgements of one’s personal situation and wealth are significant predictors for attitudes towards fraud, though in different directions: the objective assessment of wealth indicates that those better off support fraud less than those worse off, but if we observe this relationship from the perspective of personal satisfaction with wealth this relationship changes and we observe how those more satisfied with their income, whatever income it is, tend to justify fraud more. With regard to the second hypothesis, which claims that rational variables have an effect on justification of fraud, we can conclude that this hypothesis is confirmed, though only partially, as we see different patterns of relationship and not a clear direction of this association. This relationship can be identified in all countries observed with the exception of Sweden where no variables within the rational theoretical approach appear as significant.

From the symbolic or value theoretical perspective, we can observe that all four countries analysed follow a similar pattern of strong capacity of value dimension to explain and predict justification of fraud. With the exception of Poland, which shows a positive relationship, in all countries we observe how trust in the legislative institutions in Spain and trust in civil service in the Netherlands and in Sweden have a significant and negative impact on justification of fraud. Given these results we can conclude that our third hypothesis, which claims a negative
relationship between institutional trust and justification of trust, is confirmed in all countries with the exception of Poland, where this relationship does not hold.

Only Spain and Poland show a significant effect of life satisfaction on justification of fraud, in both cases a negative one. We can conclude from these analyses that there are no differences across those countries studied, corresponding to four different European regions, in terms of the effect of symbolic or value aspects on justification of fraud. We observe some differences, however, in the case of Sweden, with respect to the other countries, in the effect of the so-called rational variables. According to this evidence we can also conclude that fourth hypothesis, claiming a different pattern of relationship of rational and symbolic variables on attitudes towards fraud across countries is partially confirmed. In this case, symbolic variables show a consistent effect on justification towards fraud across countries, but in the case of the rational approach, it does not appear as significant in the case of Sweden, whereas it is significant and consistent in Spain, Poland and the Netherlands.

These results show, with some exceptions, as we have mentioned previously, that value judgements are a strong predictor for attitudes towards fraud. Rational assessment also presents strong support, as stated in the literature. These findings point to a certain level of common cultural aspects in European societies as these societies share some common grounding in their attitudes towards certain moral issues, such as fraudulent behaviour.

7 Bibliography


Towards a Creative Society: European versus American Approaches

Iryna Matsevich-Dukhan

1 Introduction

The chapter addresses interdisciplinary conceptions of creative society in the quest for a philosophically grounded theory, which aims at explaining significant processes and events pertaining to European reality as a whole in the present and near future. This quest ought to resonate with discourse analyses of policy writing processes and its products in the form of today’s European political programmes and relevant practices united under the category of creative Europe. The politically invented concept of creative Europe, plagued with difficulties regarding accuracy and reliability, will be subjected to critical analysis in this contribution.

The past twenty years have seen increasingly rapid advances in the interdisciplinary studies of the European creative reality. However, far too little attention has been drawn to the lack of relevant socio-philosophical theories that would be able to reveal and explain a new type of social reality behind emerging hybrids of economic and cultural sectors. This chapter seeks to place the Creative Europe pro-

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2 Andreas Reckwitz, Kreativität und soziale Praxis: Studien zur Sozial- und Gesellschaftstheorie (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016).
gramme (2014-2020) into the broader discourse of contemporary social theory. The illusive absence of socio-philosophical judgement in an emerging project of creative Europe may be confusing and gives cause for some mistrust.

2 The Invention of Creative Europe

The rapid expansion of the industries labelled as creative has challenged conventional approaches to European cultural policies. The restructuring of the European economy with the positioning of creative industries into its center directs politicians and researchers from a predominantly economic to a more cultural agenda. Responding to these creative challenges, the EU institutions have elaborated diverse programmes for building a conceptual bridge between the innovation economy (Europe 2020) and the creative society (Creative Europe 2014-2020). Despite much controversy, a shared intention is to describe the European social reality as a creative one. This section provides an outline of crucial steps in the development of the idea of creative Europe: from the creative industries in the 1990s through the cultural and creative sector in the 2000s to the creative society in the 2010s.

The concept of the creative industries emerged in the 1990s in the context of Australian and British cultural policies. Despite the fact that the term was coined in Australia, the first explicit use of creative industries may be found not earlier than the release of the British Creative Industries Mapping Document (1998). In the mid-1990s this concept was introduced to the public by the UK Government’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to signify a field of fruitful inter-

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3 “The Creative Europe programme (CE) – in operation since January 2014 – brings together the cultural and media programmes during the 2007-2013 programming period and is designed to support activities in the cultural and audiovisual sectors and to promote cross-sectoral synergies’ (Dossi 2016). Samuele Dossi, The Creative Europe Programme. European Implementation Assessment (Brussels: EPRS, 2016).


7 Peter Higgs, Stuart Cunningham, Janet Pagan, Australia’s Creative Economy: Definitions of the Segments and Sectors (Brisbane ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries & Innovation, 2007).

8 UK Government’s Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Creative Industries Mapping Document (London: DCMS, 1998). The creative industries are ‘those industries, which have their origin in
actions between art, science and business at the crossroads of economy and culture. The DCMS singled out thirteen sub-sectors of creative industries: ‘advertising; architecture; art & antiques market; crafts; design; designer fashion; film & video; interactive leisure software; music; performing arts; publishing; software & computer services; and television & radio.’

Shortly afterwards the concept entered the European agenda. A certain entanglement took place between the emergence of the sector of creative industries and the formation of the European space of creative capital. The latter came to be one of the main globally competitive carriers of contemporary Europe. In 2007 the Commission of the European Communities launched the European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World, aimed at promoting and fostering the creative industries in Europe.

On the way to the creative society the EU institutions have regularly employed both the British approach to the creative industries and Richard Florida’s approach to the creative ethos in urban space. Different explanations for the strong European interest during the early 2000s in the American theory and practice of the creative city and its creative class could be given at that point, but a highly cited one would be a rapid rise in popularity of Florida’s theory in both academic and political contexts all over the world. After the publication of The Rise of the Creative Class (2002) Florida was almost immediately proclaimed a “guru” of the creative society. His key argument will be briefly summarised and compared with Charles Landry’s one below.

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9 Ibid.
The theory of the creative class intends to explain the role and place of creative activities in present-day society, and in the economy in particular. Referring to Michael Porter’s cluster analysis, Florida raises the question why diverse businesses are grouped together in clusters. He claims that innovative companies tend to group and develop in the same location in the form of clusters in order to accumulate knowledge, skills and experience of the most creative persons, since a real source of power in clusters is talented individuals. These clusters are situated in the so-called creative centres, where high-tech and cultural industries settle down, businesses flourish and accumulate the highly educated creative class in diverse and vibrant urban places.

At that point one may raise a question concerning relationships between the European concepts of the creative industries and the creative city and the American concept of the creative class. It is necessary to underline that the USA in their socio-economic and cultural policies have never been focused on the creative industries per se, rather on different types of political reforms aimed at the revival of the creative community and its creative place in depressive regions: from The Creative Society programme of R. Reagan’s 1966 campaign (in opposition to The Great Society programme of Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964-1965 directed at reducing poverty and discouraging racial discrimination) through culture-led placemaking policies in the 1960-1990s towards creative placemaking policies in the 2000-2010s. The latter has been developing in a great amount of diverse subnational initiatives, especially within civil society, aimed at urban cultural revival, the transformation of communities into lively and resilient places with the arts at their core. This cultural policy has contributed to the promotion of the creative class strategy, which intends to attract investments for cultural infrastructures, to improve the quality of life in urban quarters by means of art activities and cultural entertainments. The American turn to creative city practices coincides in time with the publication of Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class (2002), which generalised achievements of new urban policies of the previous decades with their focus on human capital and social creativity. However, the very concept of the creative city was coined and developed in Europe by urbanists Francesco Bianchini and Charles Landry during the 1980s and 1990s. Though Florida did not refer to European urbanists in his magnum opus, it is impossible to ignore the role of the European discourse on the creative city in the formation and development of his theory.

At the same time, even when taking into account the role of Bianchini’s and Landry’s paradigm in the development of the European discourse on cultural poli-


16 The term ‘creative placemaking’ was coined by economist Ann Markusen and urban planner Anne Gadwa in 2010. See Ann Markusen and Anne Gadwa, The Creative Placemaking (Washington: National Endowment for the Arts, 2010).

17 Despite the fact that the concept ‘creative city’ was invented by Landry in the late 1980s and its manifesto was penned in 1995 by Landry and Bianchini, Florida did not refer in his 2002’s book The Rise of the Creative Class to their work. See also Landry’s Biography: http://charleslandry.com/about-charles-landry/biography/.
cies, it is hardly possible to ignore the influence of the 1960s’ American political and psychological discourse of creativity. The British creative turn in the 1990s may be considered a revival of the American political strategy with its pragmatic focus on creativity.\textsuperscript{18} The national and federal treasuries were hollowed out through ‘Thatcherite policies’ and the onset of ‘Reagonomics’ during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{19} The invention of the creative industries in the 1990s was shaped by state attempts to find alternative resources to support local small businesses, and especially the most economically vulnerable sector of culture in the light of its strong dependence on state funding, which was substantially reduced. Moreover, it implied the intention to rebrand state policies in terms of a new culture-led economy and urban entrepreneurialism, thereby inspire and foster economic growth of the country in the globalised world. The successful experience of the US placemaking tradition\textsuperscript{20} in a dialogue with the European one\textsuperscript{21} in the 1960-1980s was effectively employed in the 1990s’ UK as an instrument to adapt to the rapidly changing landscape of the global market and the new international division of labour.

Being sensitive enough to this productive dialogue between the US and UK approaches to creativity as an economic and political resource of urban revival in the 1990s’ depressive regions, it is possible to outline major perspectives of its further development. Without any attempt to distinguish clearly and sharply British and American approaches or diminish one’s originality and authenticity, this section turns to the overview of possible substantial influence of some of American theories and practices in the field of creative economy on European cultural policies in the early 2000s. Simultaneously, this analysis intends to overcome any one-sided accounts that emphasise predominantly a master narrative of American creative democracy in the European creative turn. It might be argued that crucial to the transformation of Europe into a so-called “place to create” becomes the authentic European style of life,\textsuperscript{22} which quite differs from the American one.

The European style of life has enabled common practices to develop across a range of different cultures. In this way the European creative space has to be ex-

\textsuperscript{18} Hans Joas, \textit{Die Entstehung der Werte} (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999).
\textsuperscript{19} Oli Mould, \textit{Urban Subversion and the Creative City} (New York: Routledge, 2015).
\textsuperscript{21} Italian architect Aldo Rossi, Luxembourghish architect Leon Krier, German architect Hans Kollhoff, Danish architect Jan Gehl and other representatives of the European urban discourse of public space.
explored with an appropriate social theory, which would be receptive to the challenges of the creative age and sensitive enough to nuances and overtones of the European ethos.\(^23\) Probably, this value aspect of analysis is one of the major fields for the demonstration of the necessity and possibility to differentiate European and American approaches to the creative society. Even when being influenced by Florida’s narrative of the creative class, one could attempt to outline an identifiable difference between European and American concepts of creative society, a clear divergence between two approaches to the same thematic field in theory and practice.

This section illustrates the relative divergence with a comparative analysis of Richard Florida’s and Charles Landry’s key statements and their employment by European scholars and experts in the field of the creative economy. Let us begin with the American invention of the creative class, most vividly demonstrated in terms of economic and sociological statistical validity by Florida’s works.

Florida aims at building a bridge between the concepts of creative economy (introduced by John Howkins in 2001)\(^24\) and creative society.\(^25\) This process is embodied in the concept of the creative class. Florida demonstrates that a particular type of creative individuals, who are able to create new ideas and capitalise on them, concentrate in the creative sector, i.e. in the field of the production of meaningful forms. All those who are able to produce and transform ideas into economic value belong to the so-called creative class. By differentiating creativity degrees Florida delineates subclasses around the super-active core of those who are able to produce innovations.

Building the theory of the creative class, Florida moves from the analysis of creative activities to their infrastructure, which reproduces the social structure of creativity. The latter is embodied in new technologies, forms of entrepreneurship, models of manufacturing, cultural environment, social networks of communication. Florida argues that neither venture capital, nor quantity or quality of innovations attract social, cultural and financial capital, but rather the creative social structure accumulates talents and their required resources.

The contemporary embodiment of the creative economy is, however, the Achilles’ heel of any democratic state. A vivid proof is Florida’s recent book, *The

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Towards a Creative Society

New Urban Crisis (2017),\textsuperscript{26} which confirms that those who do not fit in with the new elite will inevitably be isolated in cultural ghettos of megapolises.

Despite the fact that Florida is considered to be a world guru of the creative society, the European paradigm of cultural creativity in urban space has been substantially shaped by Charles Landry. In The Creative City (2001)\textsuperscript{27} he formulates key principles of cultural thinking in accordance with values of sustainable development. The British urbanist employs sociological categories for building a model of social organisation aimed at sustainable development. Landry underlines that in a society with an effective model of social organisation, creativity works as a method of exploitation and renewal of cultural resources. In such a way it functions as its own renewable material for the creation of basic cultural values. This focus on sustainability distinguishes Landry’s approach from Florida’s mostly economically driven one.

The Americanness of Florida’s approach is revealed in its emphasis on the economically situated everyday creativity of the individual. The Europeanness of Landry’s perspective may be delineated in his focus on cultural thinking, the cultural milieu and its sustainable development. The European interpretation of creativity is more culture-centred, whereas the American one is more rooted in the neoliberal discourse of market-driven creativity and its role in democracy building. At the same time, the current mutually beneficial dialogue between these approaches contributes to the further reassessment and broadening of the creativity concept beyond predominantly either cultural or economic fields. This dualism is partly overcome in today’s totality of creativity as a universal social phenomenon.

Florida’s and Landry’s conceptions may be considered representative examples of American and European theoretical approaches to the creative society in the twenty-first century. European researchers have tried to employ their concepts and apply them to the European reality.

One of the first attempts to estimate the development of European creativity by means of Florida’s Creativity Index\textsuperscript{28} (the framework for measuring technology, talent and tolerance) was fulfilled in 2004.\textsuperscript{29} However, Florida’s theory has recently been subjected to more scientifically grounded criticism within academia in the USA\textsuperscript{30} and in Europe.\textsuperscript{31} A relative divergence between the American and Europe-

\textsuperscript{27} Landry, The Creative City.
\textsuperscript{28} Florida, The Rise of the Creative Class.
\textsuperscript{29} Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli, Europe in the Creative Age (London: Demos, 2004).
\textsuperscript{31} Høgni Kalso Hansen, Bjørn Asheim and Jan Vang, “The European Creative Class and Regional Development: How Relevant is Florida’s Theory for Europe?,” Creative Economies, Creative Cities. The GeoJournal Library 98 (2009): 99-120; Ron Boschma and Michael Fritsch, “Creative Class and Regional
an experiences in fostering the development of the creative industries has gradually become quite noticeable.

The input of Charles Landry’s approach may be seen in attempts of European experts to map cultural capital in Europe. Landry’s *Creative Cities Index* is regularly employed in Europe and beyond.\textsuperscript{32} However, the very language and framework references of EU expert reports in the field of the cultural economy\textsuperscript{33} demonstrate that Florida’s economic and sociological instruments were more widespread and influential in European policy writing in the early 2000s. For example, it is possible to reveal Florida’s ideas and notions, as well as references to his texts, in the KEA European Affairs\textsuperscript{34} reports prepared for the EU institutions in the 2000s.

Florida’s approach to creative economy shapes the initial KEA analyses. *The Economy of Culture in Europe*\textsuperscript{35} is the first KEA study of the European creative and cultural industries prepared for the European Commission. Being aware of the UK creative industries model, introduced several years earlier by the British government, the KEA report briefly reviews the UK approach and turns to Florida’s concepts of the creative class and the creative sector, improving their definitions in accordance with categories of the Eurostat’s data. Comparing different national approaches to cultural policies, KEA experts introduce their own definitions of *cultural sector* and *creative sector* as a point of departure for the elaboration of the European approach to these sectors.

The term *cultural sector* within the KEA reports signifies the combination of ‘non-industrial sectors producing non-reproducible goods and services aimed at being consumed on the spot (a concert, an art fair, an exhibition)’ and ‘industrial sectors producing cultural products aimed at mass reproduction, mass-dissemination and exports (a book, a film, a sound recording).’\textsuperscript{36} The term *creative sector* covers ‘the remaining industries and activities that use culture as an added-value for the production of non-cultural products.’\textsuperscript{37} Combining these terms the KEA report coined the notion *cultural & creative sector* (CCS) to signify the economy
of culture. This notion is employed nowadays by the *Creative Europe* programme as a central one.\(^{38}\)

The term *cultural & creative sector* was coined as a toolkit for the collection of statistical data. However, it was not adopted by Eurostat, due to the lack of a robust definition of culture.\(^{39}\) Eurostat employed the pragmatic approach to the term of culture developed by the European Leadership Group (LEG).\(^{40}\)

In the quest of threads for convergence the EU institutions called for the elaboration of a European approach to this new sector. The term *creative Europe* was introduced already in the KEA 2006 report in interplay with the concept of the European creative economy.\(^{41}\) Its main task was to push Lisbon forward. However, the interpretation of the creative core was reduced at that time mainly to technological innovations. Culture was considered as a surplus next in line after technology, management and production. The theoretical framework of this study was substantially shaped by Florida’s ideas and notions (see next section).

The KEA 2009 report,\(^{42}\) however, demonstrated a turn to the mapping of the European economy in cultural terms. The term *creative economy* was left backstage. The report underlined the necessity to map its creative capital without reducing it to technological and innovative dimensions. The term ‘creative ecology’ was coined to signify the task of ‘the development of Europe through art and culture’.\(^{43}\)

The concepts of European culture and creativity in the KEA reports have gradually joined the discourse of sustainable development. An implicit reference may be glimpsed here to Charles Landry’s view of a culture-driven creative milieu through the lens of sustainability: ‘Sustainability shapes creative endeavour by stressing the need to test consequences and resilience in the face of external shocks.’\(^{44}\)

\(^{38}\) “Cultural and creative sectors” means all sectors whose activities are based on cultural values and/or artistic and other creative expressions, whether those activities are market- or non-market-oriented, whatever the type of structure that carries them out, and irrespective of how that structure is financed. Those activities include the development, the creation, the production, the dissemination and the preservation of goods and services which embody cultural, artistic or other creative expressions, as well as related functions such as education or management.’ (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Regulation (EU) No 1295/2013, Article 2).


\(^{40}\) In accordance with the LEG approach, the term covered the scope of ‘eight domains’: ‘artistic and monumental heritage, archives, libraries, books and press, visual arts, architecture, performing arts and audiovisual/multimedia’ (Ibid.). This classification became the foundation for the first comparable data relating to culture in Europe (Eurostat, 2007).

\(^{41}\) KEA, *The Economy of Culture in Europe.*


\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Charles Landry, *The Creative City*, 62.
The notion of culture-based creativity was coined by the KEA to signify a kind of human sensibility rooted in local responsibilities, rights and duties. Its specific nature may be embodied in creative places with their hubs and clusters, in the creative time of leisure-work diffuson through individual self-fulfillment, in intellectual property and flexible infrastructures of social communication. The focus on the term culture-based creativity refers to forms of creativity, localised in space and time, rooted in cultural heritage and shaped with particular responsibilities.

This turn to local places and attempts to map creative potential may be illustrated with the European conception of the creative city, launched and developed by Charles Landry (he supervised the European creative cities policies). The primary intention of new cultural policies was ‘to make Europe’s creativity visible’.

The next crucial step in the conceptual formation of European creative society was the Creative Europe programme (2014-2020). It was elaborated in accordance with the main objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy and its flagship initiatives. Key strands of this programme are culture, media and cross-sector.

The Creative Europe programme is intended to support the activities of ‘the European cultural and creative sectors,’ to strengthen their global competitiveness (in particular of the audiovisual sector), to foster innovation development, to advance business and management models, to promote European cultural heritage, diversity, sustainable development and transnational cooperation. Being partly open to the European Neighbourhood Policy countries, it demonstrates a present-day strategy for the European creative sector beyond EU borders.

A great amount of literature substantiates a general vision of the future of European creative economy and the role of creative capital in the sustainable development of European regions. In the quest of socio-philosophical theories, which could be used to ground the Creative Europe programme, it is noticeable that the discourse on information, knowledge, digital and innovative society still predominates in European policy writing, especially in the Europe 2020 Strategy. However, a new vector towards a creative society may partly be observed in the range of recent political manifestations and their media rhetoric. The next section seeks to

45 KEA, The Impact of Culture on Creativity.
46 Ibid.
47 For more information on the legal framework of the Creative Europe programme, see Dossi, The Creative Europe Programme.
delineate the theoretical framework to which the expert discourse of the Creative Europe programme refers.

3 In Quest of the Theoretical Groundwork for Creative Europe

The present-day set of programmes titled Creative Europe 2014-2020 implicitly refers to a broad framework of preparatory interdisciplinary research, which is reflected in the range of expert reports written for the EU institutions in the form of recommendations. From the 2000s to the present day, a gradually rising interest of EU policy experts in social theory has become more articulated within the Creative Europe programme framework of references and is quite apparent in preparatory expert reports, especially in the KEA expert research. I will focus on reports of the KEA European Affairs, which celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2019. It was established in 1999 as ‘the first independent consultancy in Brussels focusing solely on the representation of culture industries vis-à-vis the European Union.’ Since then, it has been developing research on the creative industries and providing policy advice to unlock the potential of European culture. The KEA is considered to be a pioneer in the field of expertise on the creative industries policy in Europe. Nowadays the KEA plays the role of key expert on the Creative Europe programme to the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the European Investment Fund.

In 2006, the KEA experts introduced the concept of Europe’s cultural & creative economy and elaborated it within the socio-economic research framework of the creative economy, substantially shaped by American and Australian approaches during the early 2000s. In quest of notions and instruments to describe a

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51 For more information on the mission of the KEA European Affairs, see http://www.keanet.eu.

52 Ibid.

53 KEA, The Economy of Culture in Europe.

new economy, economy of experience, sharing economy, creative economy, the KEA broadened its theoretical background without any attempt to substantiate it in a coherent way.

The bibliography of the KEA study, *The Impact of Culture on Creativity*, impresses with its broad interdisciplinary horizons and a special emphasis on philosophical groundwork. In addition to a sharpened interest in the creative industries’ discourse, the KEA also drew special attention to a broad range of (mostly continental) socio-philosophical and sociological works. It even employed Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* to hint at the implied roots of the whole classical aesthetic discourse. The bibliography is quite eclectic but does not answer the key question: which of these theories could describe and explain the nature of an emerging European creative reality as a whole?

In 2018, the KEA presented in the European Parliament its report *Creative Europe: Towards the Next Programme Generation*. The KEA experts estimated the results of the programme implementation and delivered recommendations for its next financial period (2020-2027). In comparison with previous research reports, it misses the previous theoretical perspectives grounded in social theory. The only philosophical text used to ground the expert research was H. Jenkins’ *Convergence Culture* (2016), introducing a new paradigm for understanding media change.

Despite the long list of representatives of diverse methodological schools cited in the first reports, these do not clarify which research works could shape the European approach to the emerging concept of creative society. A variety of theoretical concepts and sources much cited in expert reports indicate some temporary shifts in discourse without giving a theoretical and methodological groundwork for further verification of their main claims.

The emerging concept of creative Europe in policy documents has recently demonstrated the EU’s political vision of creative society and its role in our com-

55 KEA, *The Impact of Culture on Creativity*.
56 Ibid.
59 KEA, Research for CULT Committee.
mon future. A vast array of scientific articles has been written to formulate and support this view. The primary premises of the Creative Europe programme were formulated in the EU’s strategic documents with a great amount of references to American and Australian experts on the creative industries and creative economy.61 Their texts shape the concepts of cultural and creative industries, creative cluster, creative class and creative economy, and introduce methodological approaches to these socio-economic phenomena. European political reports on the creative industries refer to their concepts and definitions as instruments for the visualisation of the creative world, and its key actors. The rapid rise of references to the Australian and American middle range models of social and economic theories has recently been balanced with the emerging European approach to the cultural and creative sector.

Borrowing the vocabulary of philosophical, sociological and economic conceptions with fuzzy guidelines of their application in empirical social research, European scholars have tried to adapt both approaches to their own regional perspectives and evaluate the European potential in the creative age. The representative example of a dialogue between American and European approaches to the creative society is the productive scientific collaboration between American and Italian economists, Richard Florida and Irene Tinagli,62 which resulted in the research report Europe in the Creative Age (2004) and introduced Florida’s Euro-Creativity Index. For more than a decade, Florida has been working with the Swedish economist Charlotta Mellander63 on diverse research cases of European creative economy. The evident consequence of these attempts is the formation of the concept of European creative society, which partly shares with, but still differs quite substantially from the key claims of Florida’s original theory.64 The relevance of Florida’s initial theory for Europe was substantially questioned in the late 2000s.65

Meanwhile, German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz introduced a new version of the creative society theory with a clear intent to transcend the empirical level of


62 Florida and Tinagli, Europe in the Creative Age.


65 Hansen, Asheim and Vang, “The European Creative Class and Regional Development.”
above-mentioned research models. His comprehensive critical reflection on the cultural foundations of late modern society demonstrates an authentic attempt to understand the transformation of the European culture into the creative ethos which has been expanding and colonising the whole world since the late eighteenth century, reaching its new heights in late modernity. Taking into account key ideas of Richard Florida’s and Charles Landry’s conceptions, he distances his ideas from the rhetoric of their policy programmes and claims that the main task of his own research project is to trace the formation of a new social regime in the so-called age of creativity.

4 Reckwitz’s Practice Theory of the Creative Society

Andreas Reckwitz’s The Invention of Creativity (2012) begins with brief critical remarks about Florida’s programmatic text The Rise of the Creative Class (2002). The latter has established a kind of the global normative model of creativity, which implies that everybody ought to be creative. According to Reckwitz, the American sociologist promotes the creative imperative without providing enough arguments to support this imperative. The study that seems to be far from a neutral account may hardly establish theoretical foundations for further sound reasoning.

Turning to Landry’s model of the creative city, Reckwitz criticises its dependence on the political method of cultural planning, its intention to control and govern culture, to delineate the unwanted non-cultural and non-creative. Landry’s politicisation of civic creativity within programmes for the systematic self-culturalisation of the city has been subjected to both ecological and ethical criticism. Reckwitz highlights the rising tension between urban planning, its cultural control, and the individual’s freedom of expression in an endless diversity of urban experiences. Unfortunately, Landry has not provided policy makers with instruments to ease this tension.

In comparison with these politically applied models, the crucial achievement of Reckwitz’s highly abstract analysis of modern society is the demonstration of a radical shift in the system of social values towards the category of creativity, which signifies a new obligatory social order in the world. Moreover, the German sociologist has found a methodological instrument to reveal and explain this universal shift. He has interlocked social theory with detailed genealogical analysis of creativity and thereby has bridged the gap between a sociological theory of a particular modern society and social theory as a general theory of human practice.

Social theory directs theories of modern society to ‘a particular social-theoretical fundamental conceptuality’ of their subject matter. From this perspective, Reckwitz’s practice theory intends to direct diverse theories of modern society to the fundamental conceptuality of the creativity dispositif. The latter signifies a

66 Reckwitz, Kreativität und Soziale Praxis, 17.
specific mode of aestheticisation of social practices, which imposes on them a particular structure and thereby establishes its own social order of aesthetic modernity. The elevation of the content and role of everyday creativity, its radical expansion in all areas of today’s society, motivates a researcher to reconsider the subject matter of social theory and question traditional definitions of the social. However, he underlines that the social can in no way be reduced to the aesthetic. This hope directs him to the further elaboration of social theory in a form of the so-called practice theory.

Reckwitz’s theory aims at the comprehension of late modern society with the focus on culturalisation and aestheticisation of the social, going beyond the sociological analysis of formal rationalisation and functional differentiation of the social, but without any attempt to get rid of the social. He seeks to develop both social theory in general and a particular theory of modern society in the forms of the practice theory and an emerging theory of creative society. Within these theories he intends to demonstrate the conceptuality of both the social reality (soziale Realität) and the societal reality (gesellschaftliche Realität) in the creative age.

The analysis of the social demonstrates the antagonism between rationalisation and aestheticisation/culturalisation processes in the orientation towards the new, authentic, experimental self-transgression, affectivity, sensuousness, creativity and singularity (in opposition to formalism, scientism and effectivity of the past). He employs the concept of singularities to signify objects and subjects with the claim to the special. Social subjects and groups are replaced with singularities, which ought to participate in the late modern fight for attention.

In *The Invention of Creativity* (2012), *Creativity and Social Praxis* (2016) and *The Society of Singularities* (2017), Reckwitz tries to build the sociological model for explaining the development of the creativity dispositif, to introduce a certain critical reflectiveness about this phenomenon. He enquires into the cultural foundations and forms of its embodiment by answering the following questions: why does the opinion that ‘nothing determines today’s culture to the degree creativity does’ appear to be so influential and widespread? What is the present-day social orientation towards creativity? How have late modern subjects learnt to see and model themselves as creative?

Reckwitz presents historical and cultural research of creativity over the past two centuries. Comparing different stages in the development of a sharpened sense and awareness of one’s own individual creativity (Romanticism, counter-

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67 Ibid., 10.
70 Ibid., 13-18.
culture of the bourgeois society, late modernity), he concludes that the contemporary total aestheticisation begins in the 1960-1970s, and intensifies and expresses itself in new forms at the end of the 1990s in all spheres of society. To some extent the explosion of creativity in the twenty-first century is determined by the emergence of the creative industries sector, which has almost devoured arts, sciences, technologies and business.

Relative borderlines of the aesthetic public space have been gradually blurred. Any space may be considered as an aesthetic one if it produces and multiplies fresh emotions. Their endless repetitive multiplication leads to senseless hopes in the quest of an empty newness resulting in ‘the weariness of the self’. Everybody ought to play an original role in the performance of self-realisation, which produces as a by-product psychological stress and results in the ‘total burnout’ of personality in all spheres of social life.

Though Florida and Landry have replaced the differentiated reality of economic and cultural fields of social action with the totality of creative experience, Reckwitz argues for the possibility to preserve the social (tightly bound up with the category of the moral). The weakening of the creativity dispositif might be fulfilled with the spread of alternative forms of aestheticisation, such as ecological self-limitation of creative action, profane creativity liberated from heightening and the tranquilisation art of everyday repetition. At that point, the German sociologist turns to the ancient Chinese and Japanese experience of moderate emotion.

The twenty-first century has witnessed the increasing interest in the creativity dispositif and various ways of its embodiment in social, political, cultural and economic practices. They may be criticised from within for ‘the compulsion to creative heightening; the discrepancy between creative achievement and creative success; the scattering of attention; and aesthetic overstretching’. These problems are determined by the very structure of the creativity dispositif as a network of practices and discourses in the ‘social regime of novelty’. To explain their specific character in today’s Europe, the following questions need further elaboration. What are the defining features of creative Europe that provide its distinctiveness? Which of social theories, if any, might constitute a conceptual reference framework for the Creative Europe programme? What is the creative age of Europe and of what does its creative capital consist? However, these particular European questions go beyond the scope of Reckwitz’s research, since his study is an attempt to outline the universal mode of late modern social practices. The Europeannes of

72 Aestheticisation is ‘a process focused on the production and uptake of new aesthetic events’; ‘designates a force shaping society and postulates of this force that it is expanding and increasing in complexity’ (Reckwitz 2017). Andreas Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity. Modern Society and the Culture of the New. Trans. Steven Black (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017), 9-10.
74 Andreas Reckwitz, The Invention of Creativity, 222.
75 Ibid., 9.
Reckwitz’s approach may be implied neither in the very subject-matter of his research nor in its further possible application to the Creative Europe programme, but rather in the very European socio-philosophical methodological tradition to which he constantly refers and in which he feels himself being present and deeply rooted.76

In this section I have tackled quite abstract problems of Reckwitz’s social theory with the intention to illustrate a possible mission of the grand theory of creative society, which would both support and criticise the vividly manifested project of Creative Europe. This signification may be skeptically considered as a political metaphor or a construct, which needs further elaboration in order to be transformed into a scientific concept. At the same time, we may face a widespread opinion that the variety of political programmes embraced under the title Creative Europe has already accumulated and quite effectively employed key ideas and notions of a well-established theory of the creative class in sociology and economics. Since the early 2000s, the latter has been working as a medium for European attempts to reassess and visualise cultural capital in terms of economic theory. However, it has recently been subjected to much more radical criticism within academia and political expertise, which motivates scholars to look for alternative social theories. Among them Reckwitz’s practice theory of society in the creative age is one of those few contemporary social theories which manifest the European tradition of critical social thought. Responding to the challenges of present-day social practices in the so-called creative Europe and beyond, his theory raises some political concern about the taming of the creativity dispositif by thematising late modern over-aestheticisation processes as political issues within ecological self-containment strategies.

5 Conclusion

The difference between American and European approaches to creative society may be partly outlined in a comparative analysis of Florida’s theory of the creative class and Landry’s theory of the creative city. The latter focuses on the European creative urban space as an integrated cultural whole in diverse localised forms and methods of its development by means of cultural geography. The American sociologist directs us to the individual potential of every representative of the creative class enquiring into its nature, its sources in daily-life and principles of development through the lens of economic geography, whereas the British urbanist draws our primary attention to the individual’s cultural environment with its advanced infrastructure as the background for the articulation of authentic individual action. In the European case the creativity of human action is considered substantially as a product of the unique civic ecosystem reproduced by the cultural milieu. Landry’s

76 Ibid., viii-ix.
primary interest in ‘civic creativity’ and his focus on sustainable development of the culture-driven creative milieu becomes one of the key characteristics of the European approach to economically profitable urban creativity. These divergent views are crucially determined by different philosophical worldviews of social theorists.

The revival of the American voice in the European social sciences of the 2000s was expressed in more empirically grounded “practice theories” with more clarity and simplicity. This turn may be marked as the beginning of a relative Americanisation of contemporary social thought from the perspective of neopragmatism and its further relative Europeanisation from the perspective of practice theory. It is not a coincidence that these trends seem to be tightly connected with the formation of a theory of creative society. Following American pragmatism, which focuses on the creative nature of the individual’s action and intends to understand any human action primarily as a creative one, it is necessary to raise the question of whether it is possible to build a European approach to creative society beyond the (neo)pragmatic paradigm.

The birth of European creative policies in the late 1990s coincided with the birth of European practice theory, intriguing social scientists to reflect on a new generation of politically shaped creative practices and to retrospectively explain them by means of new interdisciplinary conceptions. Andreas Reckwitz is one of the first sociologists who reveals and fulfills in his grand theory the interdependence between European practice theory and an emerging European theory of creative society, i.e. between a particular modern social theory and a theory of a particular modern society. His theory generalises different interpretations of creativity ranging from the elitist romantic view of the early modern period through the mid-twentieth century American creative imperative and the 1990s’ British culturalisation of the neo-liberal perspective to the present-day eclectic combination of the European elitism and American democratism in a variety of (trans)national projects.

It becomes evident that each scientific school, as well as each political movement, constitutes its own discourse of creative society. Notwithstanding these attempts to demonstrate the plurality of approaches to the subject, Andreas Reckwitz’s social theory may contribute to the formation of a new scholarship terrain within the European tradition of social thought. On the whole, little notice has been taken in social philosophy and sociology of the ‘creative turn’ in the history of European society, which has lately become identifiable in the light of political programmes. Increasingly, the idea is gaining currency that the subject matter of contemporary European social theory ought to embrace the emerging creative reality as a whole with an intention to overcome any narrow functional differentiation of society into political, economic and cultural fields.

Without socio-philosophical foundations under an umbrella of the creative society theory, diverse conceptions of creative communities, cities and classes may gradually transform into social movements with the only point of reference being
to still existing remnants of the European common sense. Given the wide variety of inputs and sources, it is not easy to pin down exactly what is meant by a theory of creative society. Andreas Reckwitz is one of those sociologists in the twenty-first century who has tried to offer a kind of grand social theory which reveals key characteristics of late modern creative society, at least in an ideal-typical form. But in general, it is still considered to be a theory that is only emerging, though it has already shown significant development in recent years.

Finally, the emerging theory of creative society could refresh social theory by adding new subjects and methods of research. Though it is not safe to predict that it will find a legitimate place in the history of social theory, it would be quite safe to say that it could enrich the field of contemporary social theory in the coming years. Being aware of the risk social thought is running, today’s inventors of social concepts have to retrace again and again various configurations of the creative space. Meanwhile, the paradoxical political conception of European creative society without strong methodological grounding, which nowadays articulates itself rather as an etiquette of a certain *je ne sais quoi*, runs the risk of being misunderstood.

### Bibliography


Part Two

Reflecting upon the MA programme Euroculture over the Last Twenty Years
Euroculture: A Response to an Identified Need

Robert Wagenaar

1 Introduction

Conditional for starting a new degree programme is societal need, according to the European Union supported project Tuning Educational Structures in Europe (2000-2008), which was developed by the academic world in response to the Bologna Process (1999-present). Societal need was not the immediate trigger of what would become the Euroculture Master programme. That was the establishment of the SOCRATES programme in 1994 (1995-1999), which was a follow-up to the ERASMUS student and staff mobility programme, launched in 1987. It contained a new Action, focusing on curriculum development promoting the idea of the European dimension to higher education and educational innovation, underpinning EU cooperation and mobility. The programme introduced an Action, which made possible the funding of European joint-programmes – integrated programmes that should be set-up by higher education institutions from at least three European Union (EU) countries. The European Union had just been established as a follow-up of the European Economic Community (EEC). Its establishment

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1 Julia González and Robert Wagenaar (eds), Tuning Educational Structures in Europe. Final Report Phase One (Bilbao and Groningen, 2003). See also the Tuning Europe website: http://www.unideusto.org/tuningeu/.
was based on the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force on 1 November 1993. In 1995 the Union welcomed three new members: Austria, Finland and Sweden.

It was Uppsala University in Sweden that saw opportunities for taking new initiatives in the field of higher education. In March 1995 it set up five interdisciplinary task forces ‘in order to prepare for the Institutional Contract of the Socrates Programme’. One of them proposed a European Studies Programme. Foreseen was a ‘truly integral approach, interdisciplinary and transnational in involving the expertise of partner universities in different countries’. The auctores intellectuales of the original programme outline were Julia González, head of the International Relations Office of the University of Deusto, Bilbao, Spain and Elisabeth Hammer-Sandberg, the Institutional Socrates Coordinator of Uppsala University, Sweden. The proposed programme included a two-semester programme based on five academic fields of study: linguistics, political science, theology, legal studies (European law) and cultural history. The programme was to be problem-based, with a common first semester for all partner institutions. Students would take the first semester at their home institution and move for the second semester to a partner institution. The programme would finish with an Intensive Programme, bringing together all students registered for the programme.

The draft proposal, distributed during the Uppsala Network’s general meeting that took place in Jena at the end of September 1995, offers some basic ideas of the angle of the suggested programme. The overarching theme was to be “Europe – unity and disruption”, with the following sub-themes: “language and nationalism”, “models of organising and implementing democracy”, “past and present European thinking”, “role of religion in European identity” and “continental law versus common law (integrating the legal systems of Europe)”. The second semester was reserved for specialisation and in-depth studies based on the expertise/specialisation of each partner institution.

Uppsala University succeeded in attracting the interest of two French and two German universities, one Dutch and one Italian university besides the Spanish partner, the University of Deusto. They were invited to Sweden to discuss the concepts underpinning the planned programme in more detail and to prepare an actual application in the framework of the EU SOCRATES Programme. The years 1996 and 1997 were used to fine-tune the ideas and to come up with an original name. In the process, the two French universities lost interest. The universities that would eventually sign up to the programme and an application to the Europe-

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
an Commission SOCRATES Action were Freiburg, Göttingen, Deusto-Bilbao, Udine and Groningen. Initiator Uppsala would act as the formal coordinator. This paper offers insight into the implicit and explicit motivations for setting up and developing a challenging interdisciplinary and transnational degree specialisation in the field of European studies, using the financial opportunities of the SOCRATES programme and its successors. Over time, the programme became more articulated in its aims and objectives, conceptual foundation and content.

2 Defining Something Special

To explain the programme, it is necessary to introduce the socio-political context of the 1990s from which it has arisen. In 1991 the Yugoslav Wars broke out which were to last for a decade. The plural of “war” is used here, because these should be seen as a combination of separate, partly consecutive and overlapping rebellions, ethnic conflicts and independence wars. They brought very clearly to light the issue of multiculturalism/ethnic pluralism, (multi-)language, religious and border issues. It showed how thin the layer of civilisation and civilised behaviour can be. The wars were preceded by the fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989), which had already led to a discussion about the challenges linked to identity formation processes and the related articulations of us/them binaries. In particular, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia led to a stream of refugees and asylum seekers in European countries. In 1992 it reached its first peak. The 1990s are also the decade of high (youth) unemployment, reaching its peak in 1995. In 1997 the European Commission published a Communication entitled “Towards a Europe of Knowledge”. It made the argument that an open and dynamic European educational area should be developed based on three dimensions: the development of knowledge in a Lifelong Learning context, the enhancement of citizenship related to mutual understanding of the cultural diversities of Europe as well as the principles of solidarity, and the acquisition of the most useful set of competences required.

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for employability and taking into account the evaluation of job profiles. The basic ideas formulated by the Uppsala Task Force were well aligned with this.

The challenges resulting from the multi-cultural society were leading in the discussion to develop the Uppsala initiative. As said, a number of meetings and conferences were organised, starting in Sweden. At those meetings, the programme was fine-tuned and after intense discussion and reflection a name was agreed upon that best reflected its theme and purpose: Euroculture. This was to be understood as political culture. The connecting concept could be linked to and strengthened by the input of the involved disciplines. For the term political culture a range of definitions have been defined of which these are a few: ‘historically-based, widely-shared beliefs, feelings, and values about the nature of political systems, which can serve as a link between citizens and government’,13 ‘the shared values and beliefs of a group or society regarding political relationships and public policy’,14 ‘widely shared beliefs, values, and norms that define the relationship between citizens and government, and citizens to one another’15 and, finally, a ‘set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system’.16 One can easily see the overlap in these various conceptualisations. It is widely acknowledged that every country has its own political culture based on traditions and experiences. By linking the concept of political culture to the multi-cultural dimension, the programme distinguished itself from traditional European studies courses. On its own, this followed emerging academic discussions at the intersection of culture and politics. Already in 1988 Stephen Chilton, in his paper “Defining Political Culture”, identified related and underpinning elements and concepts to the political culture term: ‘cognition, symbolism, Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, morality, cross cultural studies, reasoning, cultural conflict, social structures, civics and testability’.

Although the name Euroculture was, and still is, original, it was not unique. Already in 1988, a short article was published entitled “Bientôt L’Euroculture la politique française pour une Communauté culturelle européenne” in the *Bulletin des

Bibliothèques de France. In 1996, Charles Arthur Willard stated in his book Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge. A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy, that Euroculture – by linking the term to federalism – is arguably the newest variation on the melting pot. He argued that alongside the evolution of federalism there is the cosmopolitan blend of style and attitude, which is called Euroculture. In his view not a label always used in a positive way:

‘Some malign it as a synonym for Americanisation – over-empathic objections, of course of Europeans (meaning the champions of Euroculture). Still Euroculture is a melting pot of sorts. Like its American counterpart it is smorgasbord of lifestyle enclaves, art, architecture, clothing styles and travel patterns. It is a point of view expressed at cocktail parties: a cosmopolitanism, transnationalism, a tolerant pluralism. It is a bit more sophisticated than taking the pledge to become an American. It assumes that people can manage multiple identities – that, for example, one need not be any the less Dutch as one becomes European’. 

The Willard quote shows that the term Euroculture was quickly circulated across various academic discussions and that it carried a particular set of connotations. For the initiators of the Euroculture programme the term was not related to federalism, but much more to the endless richness of different social and political cultures and norms and values of and in Europe. In this context, it is interesting to note that already in 1966, a youth travel agency named itself EUROCULTURE. International Cultural Services, specialising in school trips from the UK to France. In 2016 the company celebrated its 50th anniversary.

The Euroculture degree programme actually started in the academic year 1998-1999. Final preparations were made at a meeting in Göttingen, which took place in March 1998. The six universities mentioned above decided to go ahead and to try to implement the programme. At that meeting the decision was also taken to involve more universities by expanding the network. The agenda of this meeting is of interest, because of the topics covered: application forms, student- and staff exchange, structure of the first semester, thesis requirements, grading systems, credit allocation, number of teaching hours, costs and length of the intensive programme, oral examinations, awarding of diplomas, information material and website and evaluation of the programme. Most of these items have kept returning on the agendas of what would become the Steering and later Management Committee of the Euroculture programme.

20 Euroculture School trips, http://www.euroculture.co.uk/School_trip_offers.htm; see also: http://www.euroculture.co.uk.
21 Euroculture Conference in Göttingen (13-14 March 1998), Notes and Important Decisions, Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.
For the first edition, 26 students were enrolled, who also participated in the very-first Intensive Programme organised by the University of Freiburg in 1999. The evaluation by the first group of students showed there was room for improvement of the programme in particular regarding its interdisciplinarity. Furthermore, it was expressed that the main theme deserved a better presentation. The critical suggestions were not immediately turned into concrete action. For the period 1998-2004, the programme profile can be digested best from the topics of its Intensive Programmes, which can and should be perceived as the most interdisciplinary part of the programme. These were respectively: “The Cultural Impact of Migration in Europe” (Uppsala/Sigtuna – 1999/2000); “Cultural Constructions of Europe: European Identities in the 21st Century” (Groningen – 2000/2001); “Regionalism and Nationalism in an Integrating Europe” (Uppsala – 2001/2002); “European Transformations – Transformation of Europe” (Göttingen – 2002/2003) and “Images of Europe” (Ghent – 2003/2004).

Only in Autumn 2002 the document “Guidelines International Euroculture Network” was drawn up and agreed upon by the consortium of partners. Until then, the 1995 Uppsala Task Force document had been leading. The Guidelines document states as its purpose and goals that:

“[The Euroculture] network has been established as an answer to current changes in Europe: a resurgence of nationalism and old collective identities on the one hand; strong efforts in order to dissolve borders and create an economic and political union on the other hand. The post-modern paradox between globalisation and localisation is another characteristic of nowadays Europe. In this context, European universities face a special challenge and task to familiarise students with the history and actuality of European culture and to create opportunities for a more advanced education focusing upon aspects of special relevance to the contemporary European social and political context.”

Therefore, the aim of the Euroculture programme was to provide its students with a good comprehension of political, historical, religious, linguistic and other cultural aspects of European integration. According to its authors, those aspects had played and were playing an essential role in the European integration process. In the meantime, the Universities of Ghent (Belgium) and Strasbourg (France) had joined the programme. The Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland) would follow soon, as would the University of Olomouc (Czech Republic). Ghent, repre-

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23 An overview of Intensive Programmes is presented on the Euroculture consortium website: https://www.euroculteremaster.eu/programme-outline/intensive-programme


25 Ibid.
sent by Luc François, took over the coordination from Uppsala in the autumn of 2002. Furthermore, the University of Edinburgh became involved, but only for a short period and it never offered the programme. The programme in general proved successful in attracting financial support, not only from the European Commission to run the programme and its Intensive Programmes, but also from the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) / German Academic Exchange Service. Nevertheless, from the very start there were challenges regarding the organisation of the programme and the alignment of content and procedures. Also, the communication between partners proved to be a returning issue. The actual delivery of a transnational and interdisciplinary programme was (and still is) very challenging, with every country and institution having its own rules, regulations and practices. These proved not always easy to combine and/or to bridge.

3 Moving Forward

At the beginning of 2004 the European Commission established a new type of post-graduate programme: the ERASMUS Mundus Master of Excellence. The Action had to result in hundreds of attractive and high-level degree programmes to allow for competition with the US Fulbright Programme. It was meant to attract the very best students in the world to enrol for a study in the EU. For this purpose, very generous scholarships were made available for students and staff. The grant also involved a basic financial support for running a transnational Master course. These were good reasons for the Euroculture consortium to prepare an application, although its members were aware that the competition for funding would be stiff: finding the financial means for the relatively costly transnational programme was perceived as a continuous concern.

In April 2005 an extra meeting was organised in Cologne to discuss the state of affairs of the programme, after two unsuccessful attempts to be selected for the prestigious Erasmus Mundus EU Action. The meeting was attended by one representative per partner. In addition, the two coordinators of the project Tuning

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27 This can be illustrated by the Report of a special Integration Group Meeting, which took place in Göttingen on 25-26 May 2000. It discussed these practicalities and came up for suggestions for improvement. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.

28 The Erasmus Mundus programme was prepared by a task force established by the European Commission, chaired by Commission officer Angelika Verli, and of which Julia González and Luc François were members.

29 Although the Euroculture application of 2004 was not successful it was included in a list of ‘Unsuccessful High Quality Courses’ by the Erasmus Mundus Committee who advised to submit an application again. Luc François, e-mail to the representatives of the Euroculture consortium, 21 February 2005.
Educational Structures in Europe, Julia González and Robert Wagenaar, were invited to the meeting. Tuning had been launched in 2000 as a bottom-up higher education initiative with the aim to develop strategies and means to implement the political objectives of the Bologna Process. These were – and are – the international recognition of credit points and diplomas, the implementation of a consistent three cycle structure (Bachelor, Master, Doctorate) and the creation of a quality culture and quality assurance system.

The Tuning project did not only come up with a methodology for reforming degree programmes, it also developed reference points for a range of subject areas to define necessary components of a high-level and relevant degree programme. Since 2003 the project included European studies as one of the nine disciplines covered. Therefore, the Tuning expertise was highly relevant and gave the Euroculture programme a new impetus, which in practice implied a new start. The Cologne meeting meant a re-thinking of the Euroculture programme concept, length and structure as part of a new attempt to obtain Erasmus Mundus status. It was also decided that Groningen would submit the new application and – if successful – would take over the coordination of the network. So far, the programme had been a two-semester one. At the Management Committee meeting in February 2005 it had been decided to extend the programme to a minimum of 90 ECTS credits, which would enable the programme to better meet the ambitious learning outcomes. The extension to 90 ECTS credits was confirmed at the Cologne meeting, because it would enhance the chances for being selected as an Erasmus Mundus programme. This decision had implications, because Ghent, Strasbourg and Udine were not able to offer a Master programme of this length due to national legal constraints. This implied that these universities could not be included in the project proposal.

In Cologne it was also decided to apply the Tuning model as its backbone to further boost the chances for success. Furthermore, it was concluded that preparing a successful application to the Erasmus Mundus programme would not only require a new structure, but also that the Euroculture “concept” be made more explicit. It was one of the Göttingen academics, Habbo Knoch, who developed some initial thinking in this respect. Knoch ascertained that the existing programme focussed on the importance of cultural concepts and practices in the many fields of transnational contacts within and beyond Europe by highlighting manifestations of cultural self-understanding. This being an important element of transnational social and political developments. He noticed a growing impact and

30 Wagenaar, Reform! TUNING the Modernisation Process of Higher Education in Europe.
32 The Tuning project published its Reference Points for the Design and Delivery of Degree Programmes in European Studies (Bilbao, 2008).
33 Steering Group Meeting Udine, mid-February 2005. At that meeting it was also decided not to prepare another application for the Erasmus Mundus programme. This decision was overturned in March 2005.
awareness of cultural dispositions, conflicts and exchange as a result of EU enlargement and globalisation. This situation required high awareness and sensitivity of the relevance of values, identity concepts or perceptions among informed professionals, such as diplomats, bureaucrats, officials, journalists and cultural consultants. As a consequence, the Euroculture Master programme trains its students to obtain cultural-reflexive competences, which are based on a thorough and problem-oriented understanding of cultural issues. The overall objective is to offer students insight into these matters and provide them with competences (knowledge, insights and skills) to deal with them.\(^{34}\)

Knoch reminded the partners that from its launch Euroculture was used as ‘a concept to reflect in a multidisciplinary way on the many different expressions and manifestations of self-understandings of societies, social groups and individuals of, about and within Europe’. He identified as core questions:

‘Whether, to what extent and in which forms does a common and unique European culture exist and how is it related to other regional or non-European concepts? How is Europe and how are cultural transformations perceived within Europe and from the outside? What is the impact of political and social processes on European culture(s) and culture(s) in Europe as well as vice versa?’\(^{35}\)

To discuss these questions in a meaningful way, knowledge of historical perspectives, political issues, social relations, legal issues and religious elements were thought conditional.\(^{36}\)

His contribution was important input for the successful 2005 application. Consequently, Euroculture became a three-semester programme. The price to pay for this success was that the University of Ghent – that never actually offered the programme – left the consortium and Udine and Strasbourg became associated partners. Groningen, as the contract partner for the European Commission of what had now become an “Erasmus Mundus Programme of Excellence”, took over – as agreed earlier – the coordination of the consortium. To align-with the aim of the Erasmus Mundus Action, the Master programme was entitled “Euroculture: Europe in the Wider World”.\(^{37}\) It presented itself as ‘a unique, multilingual, interdisciplinary and inter-university project’, with focus on cultural and social developments: its inheritance as well as its standards, values and citizenship. It claimed correctly that the Euroculture programme stood out from many other European Regional Studies programmes.\(^{38}\)

\(^{34}\) Habbo Knoch, Discussion Note. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.

\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Euroculture EMMC project application 2006 prepared by Robert Wagenaar as main author in the context of the EU SOCRATES II Programme. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.
To give substance to its concept and at the same time enhance its structure, the revised programme was built on four key components: (1) “Core Fields of European Culture”, (2) “Eurocompetences”, (3) “Intensive Programme” and (4) “Research”. The first component was based on the four interrelated concepts of “mobility”, “transfer”, “intervention” and “cooperation”, which were perceived as leading for the rest of the programme. Progression of learning in the programme was expressed by labelling the semesters in succeeding order: “acquisition”, “deepening and applying” and “exercising” generic and subject specific competences. This was terminology taken from the Tuning project. The competences to acquire were expressed in learning outcomes (statements), indicating the level of competence to achieve. The components were transferred and expressed into modules/units of 5 ECTS credits or a multiple of this number. However, the most outstanding features were the underlying basic philosophy of moving from a multi-disciplinary towards a real interdisciplinary approach, the option of a research-oriented track preparing for a third cycle degree (extra research seminars) and a job market-oriented track containing a vocational education and training component (work placement). Students had to choose between these options and within the available mobility model, allowing student to choose between two partner universities for their studies to be awarded a double degree after successfully meeting the examination requirements.\(^{39}\) Recent research presented elsewhere in this publication shows these are unique features still today.

4 Expansion

The programme presented above was in place for five consecutive editions, with the last cohort starting in 2010. In that year, the consortium applied again for Erasmus Mundus funding. In the meantime, a new factor had come into play. In 2008 the consortium applied successfully for additional funding to allow up to 20 EU/EEA students enrolled in the programme to study for half a semester outside Europe. As partners for this additional global mobility programme Indiana University - IUPUI (Indianapolis, USA), Osaka University (Japan), Savitribai Phule Pune University (India), and National Autonomous University of Mexico - UNAM (Mexico) – covering different continents and different expertise – were invited. It allowed students to study Europe and EU relations with a particular world region from the perspective of the non-European countries involved. Evaluating the programme in the years up to the re-application in 2011, it was concluded that a further extension of its length, from three to four semesters, would be desirable. This had a number of advantages. It allowed the Erasmus Mundus consortium to be extended to Strasbourg and Udine – the two partners that were for legislative reasons unable to offer a three-semester programme – and to add the four non-

\(^{39}\) Ibid.
European universities as full partners. Furthermore, the extension made it possible to strengthen the theoretical and methodological as well as the research components of the programme.

Although the project application was perceived by the consortium partners as a good one, it was not selected for funding. However, it was evaluated well enough to keep the so-called “Erasmus Mundus Brand Name”. In 2010, Euroculture participated in the Erasmus Mundus Quality Assurance Project (EMQA), meant to identify good practices for an Erasmus Mundus Handbook of Excellence. At the time, the outcome of the selection process was not yet known. As part of the visit, staff of the contractor for implementing the project, the Research and Consulting firm ECORYS made site visits to Groningen and Krakow in the summer of 2010. The findings are well summarised in an e-mail of the project leader Michael Blakemore: ‘We learned a lot more about excellence from a very impressive course’. At a brainstorm session organised by the Directorate General for Education and Culture (DG EAC) about the new programmes for higher education, at the end of the year, Blakemore expressed his opinion in public when he stated he found it unbelievable that an excellent programme such as Euroculture had not been selected for funding. At the same meeting, it was noted that the distribution of selected degree programmes over the different academic sectors was very unbalanced, with both humanities and social sciences heavily underrepresented. This confirmed a similar observation made already in 2006 by some higher education experts and shared with David Coyne, the director for higher education of the Directorate General for Education and Culture at the time. Present data show the situation has not improved.

In February 2011 the consortium applied again, now strengthened by the positive evaluation of ECORYS and the remarks of Michael Blakemore made at the meeting. The text of the 2011 project application is a good reflection of how the discourse about Europe and the European integration process had developed over time. It is also a good showcase of the outcomes of the intense internal discussions of the consortium about the direction to take. In the application text, the programme was boldly presented as ‘a world class four-semester, fully integrated, innovative, multilingual, interdisciplinary and transnational Master of Arts pro-

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40 Michael Blakemore, e-mail to author, 10 July 2010.
41 The author of this paper attended this strategy meeting on invitation of the DG EAC. The meeting took place in Brussels on 6 December 2010.
42 In a letter to the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA), dated 15 September 2010, the programme director of the Euroculture EMMC pointed out that in the 2010 round of proposals no programme had been selected for funding from the Humanities. In its response, dated 11 November 2010, the EACEA was not able to rebut this observation. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.
gramme’. It was stipulated that the programme offered ‘students the opportunity to develop high level expertise and competence on trans-, inter- and multiculturality, current political governance, national versus transnational identity and evolving social-political processes regarding Europe and the European integration process’. Due to its international dimension, the programme allowed for transnational cross-over comparisons of relevant concepts and their understanding in different regions in the world. As a result it would take ‘students beyond the parochialism of traditional disciplinary traditions, while bringing them into contact also with policy makers and cultural and community leaders’. By combining thorough knowledge, theoretical concepts and practical training, the programme claimed to equip students with a unique set of tools to act successfully in society. Because of its set-up the degree programme was expected to fill a niche not covered by any other programme.

The application text stipulated that participation in the programme would result in a better understanding of present-day political, economic, and financial crises, reflected in the disparate layers of European society as well as the contested and disputed decision-making processes regarding multiculturalism and civil society, collective identity and tendencies of separatism, which have given way to populism and Islamophobia. A clear link was made to the non-European partners by stating that these issues are ‘not limited to Europe only. In other regions and countries, political leaders have expressed comparable concerns regarding the social cohesion of their society. One could think, for example, of Australia, the “Americas” and very recently the Arabic world, which shows that issues with global significance are currently at stake.’

As one of the outcomes of the banking and mortgage crisis that started in the USA and spread to Europe in 2008, the European integration project came under pressure. The EU was unable to respond successfully to the challenges the crisis presented. The response was austerity. In the public mind the image of the EU became related to migrants coming from outside the EU, Islamophobia and the enlargement in 2007, which resulted in an increase of intra-European migration from Eastern to Western European countries. The application text of 2011 reflects the state of affairs as observed by the Consortium: ‘Fear of the other and for the future – cultivated no longer only by populists but now also by mainstream political parties and politicians – has deepened the feeling that the integration process has failed’. It was noticed that this had not only an impact on the multicultural socie-

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44 Euroculture EMMC project application 2011 prepared by Robert Wagenaar as its main author in the context of the EU Lifelong Learning Programme. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
ty – which had been declared a failure by prominent political leaders such as Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron anyway – but also on the political, economic, social and cultural cooperation forming the backbone of the European Union: ‘In most countries the vast majority of citizens seem to have lost interest and understanding for the objectives and outcomes of the integration process and at the same time a large part of society does not feel represented by its traditional politicians, both at a national and at a European level’. The general public has perceived the EU as overly technocratic. It was also stated in the application that in recent years, the notion of national identity had been brought back into the discourse (e.g. Sarkozy). As a result, in many member states the national versus the International/European perspective had become a cleavage within.

5 Responding to a Changing Context

The described situation underpinned the continuous necessity for the Euroculture programme to offer an approach to understand (recent) developments best by focussing on citizens and culture, instead of structures and models of the integration process. In its outline, the programme explained that it combined relevant theories, approaches and methods in social, political, historical and cultural sciences, which allow for paying special attention to the challenges linked to the break-up of previous political loyalties and (collective) identities and the constitution of new ones. It also highlighted regional, national and supranational dimensions of European democratic development: mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and transculturality. It stipulated that Euroculture was taking culture not as a set of particular values of skills but as the fabric of social and political life, following an anthropological interpretation of and approach to the concept.

This explanation of the meaning of culture was thought necessary to take stock of the fact that since the fall of the Berlin Wall (at the latest) many thinkers claim that culture has replaced politics as the main factor of public discussion. Whatever one might think of the controversial theses of, among others, Samuel Huntington or Francis Fukuyama, they have to be addressed through the ongoing processes of European integration. The idea that besides the economy, culture now constitutes the main field of tension among people, not merely influences the public opinion, but does possess a performative dimension, in so far as in many cases unspecified cultural issues are immediately put forward by the media as a kind of generic explanation of social problems. If not properly assessed, this situation, instead of contributing to European integration by favouring the emergence of a new, multicultural civil society, might prove detrimental to the goals of the European project.

49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
For the first time the programme defined a mission, which was expressed in a profile. This profile is based on the notion of progressive levels of learning. It starts with stipulating the need for a deep understanding of European identity, civil society, the ongoing European unification process in itself, its cultural and social dynamics and the consequences for its citizens and the wider world. As a next step, students should have the ability to identify and problematise what Europe and the EU represent for its citizens and for the wider world. Finally, Euroculture graduates should be empowered to analyse and interpret current issues regarding the handling of multicultural society issues into feasible solutions and to transfer these insights to relevant audiences.51

In line with the Tuning methodology, the profile was translated into a clear set of operational competences/learning outcomes and – as the above shows – underpinned by a needs analysis. A needs analysis that confirmed the societal need for the kind of expertise developed in the programme. The programme made explicit that it intended to form experts with an excellent understanding of and ability to come up with answers to crucial social and political issues addressed above.52

The 2011 application received a high score and resulted in a new grant agreement covering again basic costs and scholarships for selected students and visiting staff for five editions of the programme, covering the cohorts 2012-2014 until 2016-2018. During those years, the programme as outlined in the application was implemented, now with a total of 8 EU partners offering a degree and 4 non-European partners contributing to the programme for a semester for up to 20 students per EU partner. During these years a start was made to turn the programme from a transnational joint programme into an integrated joint degree programme which should result in one degree certificate signed by the two degree awarding universities. This proved a real challenge due to national legislation and institutional rules, not insufficiently tailored to the political wish to arrive at joint degrees as expressed in the framework of the Bologna Process.

The growing unrest in the European Union resulting from the financial crisis, became related to a growing setback of globalisation and neo-liberal policies which was associated with the EU. This had a negative effect on student interest in the Euroculture programme, and in European studies programmes in general. The European Union as an academic topic of studies proved no longer attractive. The enrolment, which for years had been around 90, decreased to 56 for the cohort 2013-2015. It forced the programme to rethink its image, including its name, and to put more effort into marketing and publicity. As a result of intensive discussions, it was decided to replace the additive to Euroculture “Europe in the Wider World” by “Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context”. Supported by a more assertive publicity campaign and a renewed consortium website the enrol-

52 Euroculture EMMC project application 2011. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.
moment number was brought up to around 100 students in a short period. This was a
good basis to prepare a new application in 2017 for what was now named the
Erasmus Mundus Joint Master Degree (EMJMD) programme. Taking the internal
discussions of 2013-14 as a point of departure, in the new application the pro-
grame distanced itself further from the institutional dimensions of the European
integration process. It did not give up its original foundation: ‘Euroculture studies
the origins and impact of social, cultural and religious dispositions, conflicts and
exchange in and on today’s multi-cultural societies in Europe. Instead of focusing
on European institutions and structures, it takes the citizen perspective as point of
departure’.53

However, the changing socio-political context resulted in a completely differ-
ent perspective. While Europeanisation was once interpreted as leading to more
unity – “an ever closer union” – it was observed that instead “multiple Europes”
had come into existence, which gave way to a diffracted Europe.

The new aim of the Master programme was ‘to understand how these different
perspectives on Europe and the EU have developed and what they imply for the
social stability and societal integration’.54 It was stipulated that the ‘central theme of
multiple Europes is hotly debated, concerning both national and international
policy making’.55 This implied that the conditions under which Europe is studied
had been experiencing rapid changes in a very short period of time. It was noticed
that the playing field was overhauled as a result of a now seriously contested Eu-
ropean integration process, the rise of populism in Europe and beyond, the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, the refugee crisis, drawbacks of globalisation
and xenophobia. In particular two events that took place in 2016 attested to the
influence of these developments: the result of the referendum on “Brexit” in the
UK, and the election of D.J. Trump as president of the United States. They
showed that the narrative and rhetoric (facts are no longer taken for granted, but
can be challenged and replaced by “alternative facts”) had changed fundamentally
as had the means of communication (e.g. the role of Facebook, use of algorithms
for news selection, use of tweets for strategic policymaking).56

As a result, this situation had led to a shifting perspective in public opinion,
from integration and solidarity to the polarisation of differences in Europe. It was
noted that the resilience and self-confidence of European welfare societies had
been undermined, with large groups feeling excluded, threatening social stability
and democracy resulting from an immersed policy of neo-liberalism and globalisa-
tion:

53 Euroculture EMJMD Project Application 2017, Prepared in the Context of the ERASMUS+ KA2
Call. Euroculture Archive, University of Groningen.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
‘The narratives and rhetoric in public debate have turned rather negative, leading to lack of trust and radicalisation, helped by distorted social media and fake news. The political elite is challenged by large groups in society. In response, strategies have to be found and developed to bridge a “cosmopolitised” (educated) elite perceived as the establishment on the one hand and a group of citizens that feels its problems are not being recognised and taken care of on the other hand.’

Euroculture defined as its new ambitious objective the study of and contribution to society to analyse and understand this situation, to be able to come up with new initiatives and contributions for finding solutions for this highly complicated situation. This implied a reformulated response to an identified need that had changed in a very short period of time. It convinced the evaluators of the European Commission and resulted in the awarding of the Erasmus Mundus status for the third time in 2017 for three cohorts of students starting one year later.

6 Conclusion

The Euroculture programme was established as a Swedish initiative and as a result of the opportunity offered by the SOCRATES Programme of the EU launched in 1994 to define new transnational degree programmes. For Sweden, a country that had just become a member of the European Union, offering a programme in European studies was an obvious choice. However, it was understood at the same time that such a programme should stand out by way of its mobility scheme and its topic. Although the programme was not very well defined in the first years of its existence, it was understood that it should cover a current topic and should be founded on a modern learning and teaching approach. In hindsight, the choice for the original comprehensive theme of the new programme is a remarkable one: “Europe – unity and disruption”. Although not used in practice it covers rather well 20 years of history of Europe as well as the Euroculture programme. Forced by circumstances in terms of political, economic and social developments as well as funding arrangements – the introduction of the Erasmus Mundus programmes in 2004 – the Euroculture transnational team underpinned its theme with a clear concept. Over time this concept became more articulated and precise.

As has been outlined, the Erasmus Mundus project applications that were prepared to obtain both status and financial support, are an excellent representation of the process of thought in the consortium over time. It reflects 20 years of coping with the challenges of multi-cultural societies resulting from migration from outside Europe due to conflicts and for economic reasons as well as from Eastern to Western European countries after the enlargement of the EU. These developments show clearly that the Euroculture programme - from its very start - re-
sponded to an identified and evolving need, and has continued to do so. The ex-
tension of the programme in content and length from 60 to 90 to 120 ECTS cred-
its is an excellent reflection that it has coped successfully with the growing com-
plexity of its theme. Recent developments, which have resulted in shaking the 
sustainability of societies make the societal need for degree programmes such as 
Euroculture even more relevant and necessary than could have been imagined at 
the time the original initiative was taken.

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The Idea of Europe… Teaching Cultural History for Almost Twenty Years

Janny de Jong and Ine Megens

1 Introduction

“Cultural History” is one of the introductory course modules in the first semester of the Euroculture programme in Groningen. The course dates from the programme’s beginning in 1999, and for most of those twenty years we have been teaching it together, although others have been involved as lecturers, guest lecturers or excursion leaders.

In this contribution we present a short overview of the continuity and the revisions in the content of the course. On the one hand, these developments reflect changes in how the political culture and atmosphere altered in the European Union (EU) and in Europe in general, on the other hand, the specific expertise of the lecturers clearly had an impact as well.

We are both historians, but have different specialisations. While Ine Megens studies contemporary history with a strong focus on peace and security issues, NATO and the relations between Europe and the United States, Janny de Jong has a background in modern history, political culture, colonial and world history and the relations between Europe and East Asia from the 19th century onwards. We share interests in how the past is dealt with: in memory and commemoration, and in debates on national and European identity. In other words, our expertise complements each other but also has clear overlaps.

We are convinced that knowledge of the past plays a crucial role in the present: it influences and even guides contemporary judgments and decisions. Ex-
plaining the present in terms of the past increases the understanding of current problems in society as well as the sensitivity that memories play a crucial role in shaping the past. What we try and have tried to do in this course module during these last two decades is showing that the past has to be understood in its own terms, while interpretations of this historical context can differ. To do so we have stressed the crucial importance of the employment of a critical reading of scholarly literature and primary sources, in any form.

Critical reading, questioning facts, testimonies, and the reliability of sources requires a critical mindset. This can at first be daunting: our students come from a wide range of countries and regions with different academic cultures. Some stress problem solving and critical thinking, others put more emphasis on acquiring and assessing knowledge. The same holds true for expertise and training in writing proper research papers: some of our students have had very limited experience in that respect, and have mostly written rather short argumentative essays confined to description, instead of a critical analysis.

This article presents how we have dealt with this didactic challenge, and how the position of the course has changed within the overall Euroculture programme. What triggered these changes? First, however, we discuss the starting points and substantive development of the course. How has the course developed during these two decades? What is our understanding of cultural history?

2 The Start: “The History of the Idea of Europe”

In 1999 the title of the course was “The History of the Idea of Europe”. The first course manual states the following aim:

‘to discuss the making of a “European identity” from a historical, cultural and political perspective and context. This course is not about the history of Europe, then, but about the idea of Europe in history and some 20th century attempts to make this idea into a reality.’

Since then we have stuck to this principle. “Cultural History: Domains of European Identity”, as the course was called since 2006, presents and discusses how Europe has been conceptualised both in the past as in the present. The new title reflected more accurately the content of the course module. Furthermore, it avoided any possible misunderstanding that the course was uncritically promoting the “idea” of Europe in the sense that historians and other writers in the 1950s and 1960s had often done when they discussed the ideal of European integration.

The fact that Euroculture from the start attached importance to ideas and perceptions is related to its interpretation of European studies. Its focus on culture, and on the consequences of the European integration process for the European

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citizens make it different from other programmes in this field that concentrate either on European institutions or on social and economic structures.

The relevance of ideas and perceptions resonated in the first course manual of 1999: ‘Several ideas, which have often been formed in the past, are at the root of present-day ideas about what Europe is, who belong to it and why European unity is being pursued.’ This does not imply that we only paid attention to the so-called great thinkers and political elites, though, far from it. Cultural history may resemble intellectual history, or the history of ideas, but is much broader than that. In fact, as cultural historian Peter Burke has shown, it has since the 1970s developed into such a broad field that the border between, for instance, social history and cultural history is not easy to draw. Cultural approaches and themes have been adopted in many domains in the history discipline.

We also use a broad definition of cultural history, investigating ideas, ideologies but also political and social aspirations, taking into account the larger context in which the different ideas and values originated. Also our definition of Europe was, and is, comprehensive, problematising for instance the position of Russia in Europe in the past. For this introductory course we reason from a long timespan, presenting transnational contacts, similarities and differences in Europe’s cultural history. The invention of the printing press, for instance, was a major contribution to the development of the Republic of Letters, a community of scholars in the late 17th and 18th century. We also lecture about major events, such as the French Revolution, which had an impact all over Europe, and about historical developments that contributed to values and ideas such as democracy and human rights. Religion obviously also has a place in the course: we teach about the role of the Roman Catholic church and Eastern Orthodoxy, but also about the influence of Islam and how people in Europe perceived themselves first and foremost as Christians in the Middle Ages.

Though political issues and European integration are taken on board, we do not dwell on the institutional history of European integration. In Groningen there are two separate course modules in place that cover this topic: one that focuses on the political “construction”, the other on the legal “construction” of the EU and Europe. Apart from that, we always took great care not to present European integration as the only possible, logical outcome of processes in the past. European integration can only partially be explained by looking at past events. It was also not as unique as often presumed.

Our critical attitude concerning a finalist take on the history of the events that led to the European Union is visible in an early lecture in this course module, on what Ine Megens called Euro-nationalism: the publications of authors who made the

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2 Ibid.
history of Europe subservient to their ideal of European integration. She criticised the writings of historians such as Dennis Hay and Jean-Baptise Duroselle. In their works from the 1950s and 1960s, Europe was presented as the cradle of civilisation and (western) European integration as the inevitable outcome of a historical process. Their historical analysis is often accompanied by a call to return to Christian values. Hendrik Brugmans, who was the first Rector of the Collège d’Europe in Bruges that was established in 1949, and an ardent supporter of the European Movement, went even further. His books include a passionate plea for a new future for a federal Europe, based on a common civilisation, in which religious (Christian) values play an important role. In the intriguing brochure *Does a European Conception of History Exist*, he argues that the national element should be understood from its European context instead of the other way round. Not one example could be given of important events in any national history that could be understood on its own, leaving aside the bigger European context. In this brochure he states that when – at the start of the Collège d’Europe – it was decided to include history as part of the curriculum, the idea had not been to “serve” European integration, but only to create a better understanding of the history of Europe. Yet, this amounted to much the same thing in the end.

This example illustrates that historiography needs to be understood in the context of the time when it was produced. Therefore historiography from later dates was introduced in the course as well, not only on European integration, also on the issue of modernisation and globalisation, and the analysis of colonial and imperial history. The question how to avoid eurocentrism is one of the key issues in world and global history – a discussion in which Janny de Jong is involved.

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8 Ibid., 3.


Another relevant issue that was discussed was the development of the term political culture, defined as attitudes, beliefs and values underpinning a particular political system.\textsuperscript{11} We showed how the development of the concept was a relatively recent phenomenon, starting with the classic study of American political scientists Almond and Verba, analysed subsequent interpretations and discussed how the concept might be useful to indicate changes in attitudes, beliefs and values in Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

The main textbook that accompanies the course, Peter Rietbergen’s \textit{Europe: A Cultural History}, has been used all these years.\textsuperscript{13} Rietbergen’s book was published in 1998 and has been revised twice since then. As Rietbergen himself puts forward, his idea was to combine two approaches in cultural history: both the history of ideas and ideologies, and what this meant in practice. This broad approach makes it attractive, yet as will be discussed, it is not in all respects ideal.

Why this book was written in the first place is an interesting story. The request came from Toon Hagen who at that time was dean of the Faculty of Arts at Radboud University of Nijmegen where Rietbergen was employed, and one of the 24 members of an international committee in Brussels that wanted to develop a book on “our” European history. However, because of a controversy regarding Rietbergen’s criticism of the term holocaust – he considered the term inappropriate because it means ‘sacrifice to the gods’ – Rietbergen decided to withdraw the manuscript. The British publisher Routledge subsequently accepted it.\textsuperscript{14}

It is relevant to note that the leading idea behind this book was indeed triggered by a European project to promote the idea of Europe. That is, however, not why we opted for it. In our opinion, the book provides a neat and concise overview of the cultural, political and societal developments in Europe, and it is also easy to read. One of the students once labelled it as “armchair reading” but students also argue that it is difficult to distinguish what is really important. We agree. Indeed, the book could present the overall argument better.

\textsuperscript{11} This definition is used by Wynn Grant, ‘Political Culture’ in \textit{The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics}, ed. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, 3rd ed (Oxford University Press, 2009).
\textsuperscript{13} Peter Rietbergen, \textit{Europe: A Cultural History}, Third, revised and augmented edition (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), xxxviii.
The biggest problem for our course module, however, are the chapters on the twentieth and twenty-first century. That part is too short to fit our aim with the course. More important is that Rietbergen seems to narrow down his interpretation of cultural history here, and does not discuss the relevance of European integration for societal and cultural matters. Therefore, we added additional literature. That was especially necessary after 2006, because the overall structure of the Euroculture programme then changed as well.

3 2006 – Now: “Cultural History: Domains of a European Identity”

In 2006 Euroculture itself turned from a 60 into a 90 ECTS programme when it became an Erasmus Mundus Master Course Programme, a status that it has possessed since then (it was renewed in 2012 and 2017). In 2011 it was decided to add 30 ECTS more to the programme, to offer our students more time to write a thesis in the 4th semester and also to include training in writing a research- or project-based (funding) application. Students could then build on the 3rd semester experience and enhance their future job prospects. This was a wise decision; since then the vast majority of the students finish the programme within the scheduled time frame.

As a consequence of the extension of the programme the course in cultural history became a 10 ECTS module. First of all, time was really too short to teach European cultural history in just 7 weeks, while basic knowledge about European history of a great many students was very limited at best. In addition, this module was partly restructured in order to function as an introduction to the Euroculture
Master programme as a whole, and to offer training in research and writing a research-based paper. Because writing a substantial thesis of in total 30 ECTS (research portfolio and thesis) concludes the master, it was considered of great importance that the students would be trained in conducting research and writing a substantial academic paper already in the first semester of the programme. The course module since then starts with a series of lectures, introducing main developments in European cultural history. These lectures refer back to and build upon the textbook of Peter Rietbergen. The second part consists of group assignments and is concluded with an individual research paper that students have to present in class, which is peer-reviewed by fellow students, and assessed by the lecturers.

We decided not to add another textbook on twentieth century history next to Peter Rietbergen’s book. Instead we introduced books like Gerard Delanty’s Inventing Europe and Delanty and Chris Rumford’s Rethinking Europe, exploring a social constructivist theory of Europeanisation as a response to processes of globalisation. In Imagining Europe. Myth, Memory, and Identity, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand look into theoretical approaches to identity, distinguishing between political myths and narratives. Although these books were interesting in themselves, they in the end do not offer a suitable and comprehensive framework for the course. In our opinion, their focus on identity construction does not fully suit our aim, because there is no link to actual historical developments. Therefore, we started using additional literature, connected to current themes in the contemporary history of Europe.

In due course, guiding and supervising the individual research papers has gained more weight. Because the course module initially counted 5 ECTS, the term paper students had to write could only be rather limited in scope and size. Gradually the term paper grew in size: from a rather small assignment of 1500-2000 words, to 2500 words, and from 2014 onwards it was an academic paper of 6000 words based on 700-1000 pages of scholarly literature.

Throughout the semester, the student is guided through the various steps in developing and writing an academic paper, from brainstorming about the topic, a paper proposal, discussing the introduction, to presenting and peer-reviewing a draft paper. This is done in collaboration with another course module, Eurocompetence I. For the final version of the paper, the student can benefit from feedback in class from both fellow students and lecturers.

The topics of the research paper need to be related to the construction of Europe from a historical perspective. In the beginning we were rather generous and accepted also topics from early modern history on, for instance, the Grand Tour.


However, also because the thesis guidelines of Euroculture state that the thesis
needs to focus on a ‘clearly defined problem located within a contemporary con-
text’,\textsuperscript{17} we now focus on the last two centuries. All individual papers must fit within
one of the four specific themes in current history we highlight each year. This
resulted in a better-structured course module.

Since 2006 we introduced current themes, embedded in a historical context,
with additional scholarly literature. Focusing on these subjects offered not only the
opportunity to highlight a variety of topics and new issues that occur in the EU
and in Europe at large, but also proved to be a more adequate way to reflect on
different theoretical models that can be used to explain the topic under discussion.
Due to the nature of these subjects, most of the scholarly publications used to
introduce them originate from sociology, international relations, linguistics, politi-
cal science and European studies.

Figure 2: Title pages of some research papers in 2016-2017

Over the years some themes, such as “Memory and Commemoration” or “Mi-
gration and Minorities” have remained in place, others have been altered or replaced,
dependent on the expertise of the lecturer, or on current debates. When Joop
Koopmans joined the course in 2016 to replace Janny de Jong, the focus of the
theme of minorities was changed by adding language policy to it, while the theme
on “Europe in a Globalising World” disappeared, because that in particular was
De Jong’s expertise. It shows that the content of the course has always been rather
flexible: reflecting on current issues and debates and at the same time making
changes and adjustments if necessary.

\textsuperscript{17} Euroculture Consortium, “Euroculture Thesis Guidelines.”
Students start exploring the themes by reading and discussing in small groups the literature linked to it, and then present the findings to their fellow students in class. These small peer groups also provide the opportunity to talk about initial ideas for a research paper. In general, the students come up with suggestions for papers about relevant and interesting subjects. These topics often result from their interest in contemporary issues but are also inspired by (guest) lecturers who address lesser-known problems or present a different perspective on a topical issue. We require that the students add a historical dimension to the topic chosen: incorporating the background of an issue, studying the development of policies over time or presenting a long-term view on the matter at hand. A few examples of the subject-matter of the papers are: the Romani minority, Basque nationalism, the EU and the crisis in the Ukraine, Ostalgie in contemporary Germany, the Russian minority in Latvia, cultural pessimism in the early twentieth century, the security dimension in the EU’s common asylum policy, the neutrality path of Sweden. Sometimes the topics relate to the student’s nationality, but more often the papers reflect the different disciplinary backgrounds of the students. While students with a bachelor diploma in international relations are often more interested in security, policy and legal dimensions, students that have been trained in history, cultural and literary studies are inclined to select topics related to heritage, commemoration and cultural identity. However, guest lectures, group presentations and debates in class, and peer-reviews make sure that everyone is brought into contact with these different perspectives, and take them into account. This is a first step to the interdisciplinarity that forms the backbone of the programme as a whole.

4 Content and Context: Continuity and Changes

When Euroculture started two decades ago, the main driver was to offer a European studies programme that would cover urgent issues in European society and politics such as growing tensions resulting from identity and multi-cultural challenges. We felt an interdisciplinary approach was needed to analyse these important current developments, and we also wanted to focus on European citizens themselves, instead of primarily on EU and national institutions.

The urgency to analyse and discuss these matters has not diminished, to the contrary. What has changed is the size of the EU itself of course, with the enlargement from 15 to 28 member states by 2013. After decades of enlargement and extension of its powers the EU has been facing severe crises especially since 2007. After the Brexit referendum of 2016, for the first time in its history the prospect of a member state leaving the Union became real. Nowadays, Euroscepticism and populism are relevant topics to analyse and debate, always within a historical context. Another topic related to current developments would be the growing rift within Europe between North and South, East and West. Many recent surveys indicate that there are substantial differences within the EU about relevant issues
such as integration. A special Eurobarometer report, for instance, on “Integration in the EU”, published in 2018, shows a large gap in the responses that were given to the question if one would feel comfortable or uncomfortable with having an immigrant as a friend between Sweden and The Netherlands (87% and 85%), and Bulgaria and Hungary (13% and 10%). This is consistent with the findings of the Pew Research Center, published in October 2018, that concluded that there are vast differences between Western Europeans on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europeans on the other with regard to public attitudes towards minorities, immigrants and social issues such as gay marriage.  

What is very clear in this overview of two decades of teaching “Cultural History” is that some of the changes that we have made were related to personal expertise of the lecturers, but that the main idea of the course has been kept in place. We teach how Europe was conceived in the past and critically discuss the importance of this historical context for our understanding of “democracy” or “Christianity” which are often presented as typically “European”. In the same way we analyse how, for instance, colonialism influenced, and was a consequence of, the sense of superiority in Western Europe. Our comprehensive European approach leaves ample room for the recognition of differences within Europe, but we always start from the overall European level.

In the House of European History in Brussels we recognised and welcomed a similar approach to European history. Since the museum opened in May 2017, we have been taking our students there during the excursion to Brussels that is part of the Euroculture programme in Groningen. Presenting the European narrative in an engaging and nuanced way, we think the curators did a good job. Starting with the myth of Europa and the bull, elements of European heritage are on display on the first floor. Moving up the stairs, the long nineteenth century (1789-1914) is presented on the second floor, with items on, for instance, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution and what this meant for workers, imperialism and its effects, while the remaining space is devoted to the twentieth century. Totalitarianism is contrasted with democracy here and there is much attention for the World Wars too. For the period after 1945 the exhibition presents the East-West divide while pointing out that these blocs were not homogenous. Alongside the displays,

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which show the improvement of living conditions in the 1950s and 1960s, the
milestones of the process of European integration are presented.

Visiting the House of European History, some of our students from Eastern
Europe argued their national histories were insufficiently represented. This ties in
with the harsh criticism from the Platform of European Memory and Conscience,
which claims that the museum does not present the criminal nature of Communist
rule in a satisfactory way, and therefore shows an ideological bias.20 We do not
endorse this criticism because in our opinion the museum does not downplay the
crimes committed under communism, which is a point also shared by Wolfgang
Kaiser, professor of European studies at the University of Portsmouth, who has
argued that the narrative which the museum presents has not reduced but
strengthened Eastern European perspectives on European history.21 Leen Beyers,
curator of the MAS museum in Antwerp, even claims assembling Western and
Eastern European histories was a priority in the development of the permanent
exhibition at the House of European History. She and other historians, however,
criticise the museum for a lack of attention to late imperialism, decolonisation and
the impact of immigration.22

These reactions from students and widely diverging opinions among col-
leagues made us once more realise how important it is to open up to different
perspectives on history, and at the same time how difficult that is. Our encour-
agement to students to take into account the historical context of a problem is
often an eye-opener to them, because our students usually start with an interest in
current issues. We also emphasise the need to develop their own argument on the
basis of a critical reading of literature and to substantiate their claims with evi-
dence. Therefore, we maintain that the course “Cultural History: Domains of Eu-
ropean Integration” is an appropriate introduction to the Euroculture programme
as a whole.

To conclude: we have seen how changes in Europe have had a bearing on our
own teaching but also that there is much continuity. What else can you expect
from historians and history.

21 Wolfgang Kaiser, “Limits of Cultural Engineering: Actors and Narratives in the European Parlia-
Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 130-131; Elizabeth Buettner “What – and who – is
‘European’ in the Postcolonial EU?,” BMGN – Low Countries Historical Review 133, no. 4 (2018): 140-
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Teaching European Studies in Times of Complexity: The Case of Euroculture

Marek Neuman and Senka Neuman Stanivuković

1 Introduction

In their recent introduction to the Journal of European Public Policy’s debate section, Rittberger and Blauberger pose the question of what the ‘manifold EU crises mean for the field of EU studies’\(^1\) – one of many questions in what seems to be rapidly developing EU-in-crisis scholarship.\(^2\) Against the background of the European

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Union (EU) being shook in its core over the last decade – be it by the Brexit vote, the Euro-zone crisis, the democratic crisis, the solidarity crisis, or the so-called refugee crisis – the field is engaging with a twofold question: what do these crises do to the discipline, and are the theories developed over the past seven decades to grasp European integration fit to account for current trends? In essence, then, the scholarship keeps asking itself if it can continue with ‘business as usual’ or if and how – in search of better answers to new questions – it has to open the discipline to new perspectives, which Manners and Whitman term ‘dissident voices’.4

Setting aside the lack of problematising the concept of crisis in the mushrooming EU-in-crisis scholarship,5 the discipline suffers from yet another shortcoming: the quest for increased plurality of approaches to European integration in the scholarship seems not to be translated into teaching European integration to the many interested pupils around the world. Teaching the European Union often falls into the trap of over-simplifying the historical narrative of European integration as a peace process, moving from a Europe of rival nation-states of the first half of the twentieth century to an ever-closer Union in a more or less linear way.6 From this perspective, the individual crises moments that the European Union experienced along the way are assessed as temporary disturbances on a clearly set out path and thus – in hindsight – brushed aside. Yet, such treatment of major historical occurrences does not pay due respects to their constitutive power of changing the course of European integration and as such is not able to add to our understanding of an increasingly complex integration process. Further, it ignores multiple diversities that define – but are also produced by – the European project. In essence, then, the dilemma the field of teaching EU studies experiences is the same as the scholarly field itself: if we can no longer perpetuate the mainstream narrative of a linear development to an ever-closer union, should we – also in our teaching – ask the more difficult questions and if yes, how?7

It is the aim of this contribution to provide a first attempt at answering how we can teach EU studies in times of increasing complexity. We do so by zooming in on our very own teaching within the course “Political Construction of Europe”, which is embedded in the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme Euroculture: Soci-
Teaching European Studies in Times of Complexity

ety, Politics and Culture in a Global Context taught, among others, at the University of Groningen. The programme’s recent twentieth anniversary provides a timely opportunity for mapping both the increasing complexity of topics that need to be addressed within an introductory course on the European integration project and the many didactic methods at our disposal, of which some lend themselves more to the task of teaching about an increasingly complex Europe than others.

This contribution proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the main challenges of teaching about an increasingly complex European Union. This is followed by an overview of the Euroculture programme, contextualising the “Political Construction of Europe” course within the larger curriculum. The following section draws on the previous two decades of the programme’s teaching to discuss, first, some of the pronounced developments within the European integration project and how these have entered the curriculum (asking what kind of knowledge do we produce?) and second, how these were addressed from a didactical point of view, recognising Euroculture’s strong research-driven character (asking how do we produce this knowledge?). Finally, in the concluding remarks, we – the lecturers of the course and authors of this contribution – put forward several possibilities to enhance the responsiveness of EU studies teaching to the increased complexity of European integration.

2 European Integration and Complexity

When faced with the task of summarising the seventy years of European integration in a textbook, most editors present a more or less similar narrative of the current European Union being the outcome of a continuous struggle between supporters of supranational approaches to European integration on the one hand (epitomised by the likes of Monnet, Delors) and of intergovernmental approaches to European integration on the other hand (most famously associated with the likes of de Gaulle or Thatcher). At its core, the process of European integration should be read as a peace project, which was meant to secure lasting peace on a continent pierced by several devastating wars; a narrative not least confirmed by the European Union receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. It should be read as a carefully crafted compromise between the interests of the individual EU member states and the European Union as a whole, renegotiated with each additional revision treaty that would authorise the delegation of yet additional competences to the supranational institutions of the EU. Furthermore, the European Union’s success and appeal in the wider world cannot be disputed, as witnessed by the many

European countries that in the past lined up – and to this day still continue to line up – to join its very structures. Moments of crises, then, are momentary hiccups that, while unpleasant, do not steer the European Union away from its path towards an ever-closer union. Somewhat surprisingly, in these textbooks, this narrative has not yet fallen victim to the most recent debates about the European Union’s future, which culminated with the 2016 Brexit referendum, spilling over into calls for Nexit, Grexit, or Frexit.

The empirical observations of Europe in the making have given rise to the first theoretical accounts of European integration, with the first large debate ensuing between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists. Over time, these theoretical accounts have been opened up to other influences, including the constructivist turn in International Relations, which, in response to more rationalist approaches to European integration, began to explain the more mundane elements of European integration by incorporating concepts such as identity, values, and norms. However, the mutual reaffirmation between empirical and theoretical accounts of European integration over the past seventy years resulted in European studies being largely encapsulated within the supranational/intergovernmental and rationalist/constructivist debates, thereby bracketing other, more critical, approaches. Yet, without opening the discipline to – among others – critical theory, anthropology, sociology, or historical materialist, poststructural, postcolonial and feminist voices, EU studies remains firmly in its own bubble. Closely associated with the bracketing of dissident voices from EU studies is the inability to conceive of dissident methodologies and methods, without which, however, the discipline may not be able to conceptualise the increasing complexity of the field.

This call for a more ‘inclusive academic field’ has been mirrored by a call for a more critical engagement with EU studies in the classroom. Students should be encouraged to go beyond the previously mentioned mainstream narrative by asking the more “difficult” questions. As Parker emphasises, such an approach is not to substitute the more mainstream approach to EU studies, centered around such questions as how the EU came into existence and what it now constitutes, but should rather be seen as complementary by also asking which EU is valuable and

11 Manners and Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible.”
13 Manners and Whitman, “Another Theory is Possible”: 10 (italics in original).
why a particular EU has emerged. Yet, as any experienced lecturer of European integration knows, such a call for greater pluralism of approaches is easily uttered, but much more difficult to answer when faced with the reality of a classroom, where the lecturer needs to balance the need for comprehensively presenting the study material and intellectually stimulating the students, all while ensuring that the entire classroom is able to follow the discussion.

3 The “Political Construction of Europe” as a Case in Point

The difficulty of striking a balance between an intellectually stimulating discussion of plural approaches to European integration and conveying the study material in such a way that each student is able to follow is not unknown to lecturers of the “Political Construction of Europe” course. More precisely, within this 5 ECTS module, this is even more aggravated due to the Master programme’s inherent diversity. Now in its twentieth year of existence, the Erasmus Mundus Master Programme Euroculture: Society, Politics and Culture in a Global Context builds on interdisciplinarity, mobility, and diversity, which it regards to be its main academic strongpoints. Students who have been admitted into the programme, and of whom no more than 25 may simultaneously begin at any one of the eight European partner universities, spend two years (120 ECTS) studying European studies from an interdisciplinary point of view, acquiring understanding of the political, legal, cultural, historical, religious, and economic foundations of a united Europe. During their first semester, students follow a consortium-wide curriculum studying the fundamentals of European integration and this is where they follow our “Political Construction of Europe” module. After the introductory first semester, they move to one of the other European partner universities for the second semester, where they receive theoretical and methodological training, next to following research seminars, which, in their content, vary across the participating universities. In their second year, students specialise either in developing their professional or research skills. For the first, they conduct a substantive internship (25 ECTS), whereas for the second, they follow additional research training at one of the European or non-European partner universities. The last, fourth, semester is spent writing their MA thesis.

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15 The eight European partner universities are the University of Deusto in Bilbao (Spain), the Georg-August-Universität in Göttingen (Germany), the Università degli studi in Udine (Italy), Uppsala Universitet in Uppsala (Sweden), Palacký University in Olomouc (Czech Republic), the Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland), Université de Strasbourg in Strasbourg (France), and the University of Groningen (the Netherlands).

16 The four non-European partner universities are Indiana University-Purdue University in Indianapolis (the USA), Osaka University in Osaka (Japan), Savitribai Phule Pune University in Pune (India), and Universidad Nacional Autonoma Mexico in Mexico City (Mexico).
Diversity is understood not only in national, geographic, and linguistic differences between the participating students, though this, too, is very pronounced within the programme. To illustrate this, the 25 students that have started with their MA programme in the academic year 2018/2019 in Groningen come from 14 different countries spanning Europe, the Americas, and Asia. Diversity within the Euroculture programme is also understood in disciplinary terms: the students that enrolled for the 2018/2019 academic year in Groningen possess undergraduate (and at times also graduate) degrees from such varied fields as International Relations, European Languages and Culture, Media Studies, Public Relations, Comparative Literature, Chinese Literature, Dutch Studies, Hungarian Studies, French Studies, American Studies and many other disciplines. It is predominantly this disciplinary diversity, coupled with very varying pre-existing knowledge about Europe and the European Union that makes teaching the course “Political Construction of Europe” a challenging, yet rewarding, task.

“Political Construction of Europe” is an introductory module that students follow in the first semester of their studies, simultaneously with the course “Cultural History”, and before moving on to taking “Legal Construction of Europe” and “Cultural Construction of Europe”. In its essence, the course is spread over seven weeks, whereby we introduce the students to a historical overview of European integration, the functioning of EU institutions, some of the main policy areas, and a debate on the plurality of theoretical approaches to our understanding of the European integration project. Any careful reader will by now have realised that covering all these topics within a course of seven weeks with a group where only the minority of students has any (let alone profound) understanding of Europe and European integration is not an easy task. Hence, we might even be forgiven if, for pragmatic considerations, we were to fall into the trap of narrating Europe along the mainstream line described above. Still, we try to challenge our students and introduce them to a plurality of approaches to the topic, often drawing on their own disciplinary backgrounds.

4 (Teaching) European Studies Twenty Years Ago and Today

European politics and society have become increasingly complex over the last twenty years. Making sense of these changes within the contours of European institutional integration has presented difficulties for both research and teaching within the discipline of European studies.17 This contribution certainly does not make the claim of presenting an exhaustive list of major events that have shaped the field of European studies over the last two decades. At the same time, Euroculture’s twentieth anniversary enables us to account for at least the three most noticeable developments in Europe and the European Union that ultimately also

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17 Ben Rosamond, “The Discursive Construction of EU Studies.”
needed to be accounted for in our classroom: EU enlargement, the rearrangement of the post-Cold War world order and the positioning of the EU within this, and the multiple crises of the European project. First, the European Union’s enlargement to the East – completed in 2004/2007 – has featured prominently in the field as it has had both internal and external consequences. Internally, it has changed (or at least has had the potential to shape) the institutional and policy framework of the Union, next to having had an impact on the European public’s opinion about integration and on the elusive European identity.\textsuperscript{18} Externally, it has propelled the European Union to develop its foreign policy priorities in areas that previously were of little interest to the Union. This point is closely linked to the second development, namely the reordering of the post-Cold War world order. As the early-felt euphoria of a victory of liberal democracy over other political systems\textsuperscript{19} soon gave in to a more weary assessment of an emerging multi-polar world with rather distinct political ideologies, the Union kept looking for its own position within the new world order.\textsuperscript{20} This has most recently been propelled by the US’s deviation from its post-WWII emphasis on multilateralism as the best way to solve conflicts under (not only) US President Trump.\textsuperscript{21} Third, the many crises of the European Union made inroads into not only virtually all EU policy areas, but also shaped both the individual member states’ and their publics’ value-judgement of participating in the European integration project.\textsuperscript{22} These three developments can also be seen as standing behind the many treaty revisions the Union completed recently; whether strengthening the EU’s institutional structure in anticipation of the 2004/2007 enlargement in the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, strengthening the EU’s external actoriness in the Treaty of Lisbon, or strengthening economic


\textsuperscript{21} Richard Youngs, “In the Trump Era, the EU Needs to Rethink its Approach to Liberal Order,” \textit{The Conversation}, 21 August 2018.

governance within the European Union through several intergovernmental agreements in the aftermath of the Euro-zone crisis or the redrawing of the Union’s immigration and asylum regime during the more recent refugee crisis.

In line with the previously argued mutual reaffirmation of the empirical and the theoretical, these developments had been reflected in theorising European integration and the EU’s role in the wider world. As such, the last two decades have been marked by continuing the discussion on the “nature of the beast,” including the reconceptualisation of the EU as a normative,23 ethical,24 transformative,25 and liberal power.26 Albeit still in the margins, the inclusion of social theory and anthropological research led to a shift away from studying EU institutions only towards studying the mundane, often intangible elements of European integration. In addition, although still in the margins, critical accounts of the European integration project have begun to emerge, conceptualising Europe as manifold and manywhere rather than a singular construct.27 Finally, due to empirically observed complexity of European integration and as a result of the public discourse on the multiple European crises, scholars have also begun to theorise the phenomenon of (European) dis-integration.28

The above-discussed developments within Europe and the European Union and their theorisation within European studies, while only scratching the surface of the changes the discipline underwent, also clearly indicates that both the European Union and European studies have become much more complex. The question that then remains is how we account for such increased complexity in our classroom if we reject perpetually repeating the mainstream narrative about European integration discussed earlier on in this contribution. Content-wise, the “Political Construction of Europe” module is divided into three sections, where the first one discusses the historical evolution of the EU, the second addresses the EU’s institutional structure and some of the most visible EU policies (the EU single market, the EMU, foreign policy, and EU enlargement), and the third picks up the

matter of theorising European integration. Throughout all three sections, we aim at debunking the myth of European integration being the result of a linear integration process starting with the Schumann plan and the corresponding narrative of Europe as a space of peace and prosperity. We do this by continuously asking the more difficult question in line with Parker’s call of *which Europe and for whom*? For a period of only seven weeks, our students come together once a week for a 3-hour long seminar session. Always co-teaching to draw on each other’s expertise during the class itself, we divide the session into a short lecture on the essential background knowledge to be able to discuss the topic on the basis of the assigned readings in the second part, while the final hour is dedicated to what we term the *Europe Café*, where students, in smaller groups, debate topical news of the past week, which they try to analyze through the lens of the assigned reading for that very week.

Hence, our teaching is (critical) question-driven, next to being discussion-driven. Each week is introduced by a question that goes beyond the mainstream narrative presented earlier in this contribution. We ask, for instance, how the evolution of the European Union can be understood from a multitude of perspectives; which purpose(s) the European institutional structure serve(s); what kind of a foreign policy does the European Union pursue; or what is a European crisis? During the ensuing discussion, we encourage an inclusive debate, drawing on the marked diversity – both geographic and disciplinary – present in the classroom. Consequently, the debated matters – be it the fragility of the Euro-zone, the conceptualisation of crisis and dis-integration, the timing of the individual EU enlargement rounds, or the founding treaties of the European Union – are assessed from a wide range of theoretical perspectives besides the mainstream European integration theories, such as sociological, cultural, or historical ones. What is more, as particularly the disciplinary diversity of the classroom varies from year to year, the discussions are not repetitive and open up new avenues to assess the European integration project from which all course participants, including the two lecturers, benefit.

Next to encouraging plurality of the discussions in class, we also employ a problem-based approach to teaching European integration in that students are divided into small groups and jointly work on proposing solutions to earlier-on identified, real-life problems the European Union faces, to be presented in the form of a policy paper. The added value of this exercise to the students’ learning experience is manifold: (i) students have to engage with real-life issues, (ii) students

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29 Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union.”
30 Currently, the course “Political Construction of Europe” is co-taught by the authors of this contribution. Whereas Marek Neuman, in his teaching and his research, focuses on the institutional elements of European integration and how these impact EU decision- and policy-making (particularly focusing on EU foreign policy), Senka NeumStanivuković, also both in her teaching and research, focuses on how to make sense of the European integration project from a theoretical point of view, particularly focusing on critical theory accounts.
learn the value of teamwork and gain experience in working in a multicultural
group, and (iii) students learn the value of multi- and inter-disciplinarity as a result
of working with peers with different disciplinary backgrounds.31

5 Concluding Remarks

The starting point for this contribution to the edited volume was the question of
how one can teach what is an increasingly complex field of European studies, whi-

le, at the same time, respond to the call by Manners, Whitman and Parker for a
more critical attitude towards both the scholarly field as such, as well as to how
this translates into the classroom. More specifically, then, the aim of this paper was
to assess whether the way in which the module “Political Construction of Euro-

pe”, embedded in the Erasmus Mundus master programme Euroculture: Society,
Politics and Culture in a Global Context, is structured and taught could be seen as
an example of how to tackle the above-mentioned challenge.

Euroculture’s recent twentieth anniversary provides fertile ground for as-

sessing some of the major empirical developments and theoretical considerations
within the European integration project and allows us to conclude that European
studies has become a very complex field. Yet, this complexity seems not to be
mirrored in a more inclusive approach to understanding what is happening on the
ground as the discipline remains relatively immune to theoretical considerations
originating in other – oftentimes closely related and intertwined – disciplines. As
Garton Ash and Gilbert show, this mainstream and simplified narrative of Europe

becoming an ever-closer union has been successfully translated into the many curricula
across the globe that attempt to teach European integration to their pupils.32 With-
in “Political Construction of Europe”, we adopt an approach that sets out to ques-
tion these myths. We do so by relying on question- and discussion-driven ap-
proaches to teaching, asking the ‘more complicated questions’,33 next to making
use of problem-solving teaching, trying to find solutions to ever more complex
real-life challenges facing the European Union.

Yet, the decisive factor that allows us to break the disciplinary boundaries of
European studies in class is the diversity present within the Euroculture pro-
gramme in the classroom. Here, we emphasise not only the importance of geo-
ographical and linguistic diversity, but also disciplinary diversity that allows for al-
most a spontaneous transcending of seemingly rigid disciplinary boundaries, ther-
by leading to a more inclusive academic field.

31 For more general advantages of problem-based learning in European studies, please refer to Heidi
Maurer and Christine Neuhold, “Problem-Based Learning in European Studies,” in Teaching and
Learning the European Union: Traditional and Innovative Methods, ed. Stefania Baroncelli et al. (New York:
Springer, 2013), 446-455.
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33 Parker, “Teaching (Dissident) Theory in Crisis European Union.”
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The Politics of CARE. On the Future of (Euroculture) Classrooms

Luc Ampleman and Aeddan Shaw

1 Introduction

The history of Euroculture has been closely intertwined with a paradigm shift in tertiary education. Twenty years ago, with the traditional lecture still very much the norm, a largely monocultural, homogeneous student body and PowerPoint still in its infancy, the basic mechanics of teaching and learning in higher education remained largely unchanged since the shift from Latin to various national languages as the medium of instruction. A typical university lecture 20 years ago (although perhaps not the lecturer) had more in common with one delivered at least a hundred years before than with the present.1 Yet whilst the context for teaching and learning today is radically different, the teaching methods deployed have largely not kept pace with these changes. Despite the development of competence frameworks for teachers, as a European report on the matter shows, ‘the gap between theory and practice, between aims and results often turns out to be significant in the specific socio-cultural contexts of teachers’ professional activities.’2

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This chapter intends to bridge this gap by outlining an alternative paradigm for teacher competence frameworks based more suited to the needs of the “citizen scholars” of the twenty-first century. It begins by outlining the main changes that need to be addressed before moving onto to providing a recapitulation of Arvanitakis & Hornsby’s description of the citizen scholar. The third part presents an original contribution in the form of the CARE model for competences and the accompanying paradigm of the “citizen teacher.” Forged in the framework of the Euroculture programme, it is believed that the model and the notion of the citizen teacher are better suited for the rigours of the modern classroom and have potentially much broader applications to tertiary education in general.

2 The Twenty-First Century Classroom

The abovementioned tremendous changes that higher education has experienced in the last twenty years may be broadly ascribed to two main causes and a host of accompanying responses, consequences and results stemming from them. Broadly speaking, those two causes are globalisation and technological innovation and change. Globalisation has led, first and foremost, to the internationalisation of classrooms, with concomitant growth in the numbers of international students and increasingly varied forms of mobility. The most recent Eurostat figures from 2016 show that there are 1.6 million students from abroad enrolled in tertiary education programmes across the EU whilst twenty years ago, the number of such students was 827,000.3 This change has had considerable consequences for staff and students alike, with staff often being required to teach in a language which is not their first and students, as Nomikoudis and Star have noted, needing ‘to develop appropriate interdisciplinary cultural practices’4. Teaching and learning in international, multicultural, multilingual and diverse contexts is increasingly becoming the norm, yet is still relatively novel for the current generation of academic staff, who may have only experienced it to a limited extent as part of their own studies or not engaged in mobility programmes themselves. As a result, they may lack the requisite soft skills and experience needed to teach such groups, perhaps all the more so if their own society is not as diverse.

Internationalisation has gone hand in hand with the phenomenon known as the massification of education, sometimes more derogatorily as “McDonaldisation”. Whilst this has certainly opened up the doors of academia to groups which were previously excluded, including mature students, first generation immigrants

and those from disadvantaged backgrounds, but it has brought with it another series of challenges and opportunities to be tackled in turn. Larger group sizes, an overreliance on the lowest common denominator in terms of teaching methods (the lecture) and a shift away from a more personal, individual relationship with tutors to one based on impersonal, objective criteria. Other responses to the internationalisation and massification of tertiary education in Europe have been to increase standardisation across the EU, best evidenced by the adoption of the Bologna Process, the development of the European Qualifications Framework (hereafter, EQF) and the introduction of the ECTS system. Yet, whilst these innovations are to be lauded and welcomed, their implementation has been somewhat fraught, with some instructors perhaps feeling they have been charged with devising syllabi on a “paint by numbers” basis.

The other tremendous change is undeniably the technological developments of the last twenty years and the impact that they have had on teaching and learning. The rise of the internet has put a wealth of information at our fingertips, far more than any university library would have held and without the associated legwork to obtain it. At the same time, we are arguably at sea in this ocean of data, with a different set of skills required now in terms of how we approach and tackle sources than previously. This access to information also has consequences for lecturers: the authority and univocal nature of a traditional lecture(r) has been challenged by a student body which is able to check and challenge assertions made, often having access to material before the lecturer themselves in some circumstances.

There is a need for an alternative paradigm to what Caena terms the clinician-professional model, one that ‘codifies the bases of professional knowledge for practice, and claims to be based on research and the shared perspectives of experts and education professionals’\textsuperscript{5}. Our proposal is the product of a sustained, cooperative reflection which began while teaching a Euroculture course on European civilisation in tandem. This initially led us to reflect on the need for the improvement and adaptation of active learning techniques,\textsuperscript{6} and has led us to believe that the gap between theory and practice identified by Caena’s report lies in the choice of paradigm used to frame the competences for academic teachers. Inspired by the notion of the citizen scholar, we feel that there is a concomitant need for teacher-citizens. This proposal is far from definitive (and we are here all too aware of the scholar-citizen attribute of mistakability) but we hope it will serve as a contribution to the development of a citizen-teacher framework. We believe that this proposition can become a starting point for the discussion as to how the premises of the citizen

\textsuperscript{5} Francesca Caena, “Literature Review. Teachers’ Core Competences,” 2.

scholar might inform the classroom practices of lecturers (the citizen teacher).\textsuperscript{7} To do so, we introduce here an original proposal in the form of the CARE framework; one which has been informed by many of the best practices of the Euroculture programme. The CARE model is based on four key elements which are regarded as being indispensable in higher education in the years to come: competences, accompaniment, retention and engagement. Let us briefly explore the three main paradigms which have guided the development of higher education in the lifetime of Euroculture before, hopefully, we set out our own modest proposal for its future.

3 Three Classroom Paradigms

In recent decades, higher education institutions have been compelled to accommodate a number of other roles in terms of teaching as a result of the social and political changes outlined above. These have largely revolved around the traditional paradigm of the university as an ‘institution of knowledge transmission’, plus the rise of as an ‘incubator for industries’\textsuperscript{8} and now as a ‘Citizen Scholar clusters’. How do these models shape the classroom and impact upon the tasks of the educator? Let us compare the three paradigms and consider how they affect classroom praxis.

In the first paradigm, the classroom has always been the dominant feature, if not the only one, of higher education systems. The classroom is the place where learning takes place: as the clock announces the beginning of the class, the doors close and the floor becomes a place where the “instructor instructs”, the “lecturer lectures” and the “professor professes” while the “student studies”. In its most archetypal form, the knowledge-transmission regime suggests that the lecturer knows everything and their task is to pass it to relatively passive learners. The task is far from an easy one, since the instructor must be the best fact-checker and specialist in the room, ranging themselves against the might of Google and, in an echo of gladiatorial Rome, the power of student thumbs in more ways than one. Under this conventional and time-honoured model, the primary role of the educator is that of a \textit{passeur} that provides, answers questions and evaluates the retention of knowledge through testing. While several types of evaluation fit the knowledge-transmission regime, standard exams, short tests, essays and student presentations constitute the convenient method of evaluation.

\textsuperscript{7} Our choice of “teacher” over “lecturer”, “instructor” “pedagogue” or “educator” is etymological. Derived from the Old English \textit{tǣcan}, the term encompasses a greater range of meanings than the alternatives and without their often-negative connotations – a “lecturer” typically reads whilst the pedagogue is derived from the Greek word for the slave responsible for taking a student to school. Whilst this accompanying aspect is laudable, the other connotations are not as desirable.

The second paradigm has sought to transform the classroom into a factory for future competent and employable young (or perhaps even not so young) people. Here, the competence-based framework is king, since under its auspices that higher education professionals devote an important part of their energy in adapting the classroom content to the practicability and the scalability of future graduates. Students not only absorb knowledge and replicate it, but also learn to perform tasks. The role of lecturers has shifted to become toolbox providers, helping learners to leave each class with new tools and skills. The classroom is a staging post, which supports other elements such as internships, workshops, laboratories, fieldwork, tutoring sessions, etc. Educators work hard to develop activities that accompany students in understanding content and developing their proficiency skills. Active-learning techniques have gained a more important role and student evaluation might instead include more practical tasks, such as group assignments or problem-solving tasks, as a result.

In the final paradigm – higher education institutions as fosterers of citizen scholars – the classroom is transformed into an academy for citizens, a civic forum where students become better grounded and in touch with the best of (professional) practice, but also the current social, political, technical, cultural issues which are challenging both knowledge and practice in their local and global dimensions. Essentially, the two first paradigms can be subsumed into the third one, but with important differences. For example, unlike the first paradigm, highly-connected and hypermobile students also act as conduits for the sharing of knowledge and best practices. In contrast to the second paradigm, students are not only trained to be individually competitive and to function in the workplace, they also develop solidarity to improve future workplaces, as well as everyday life. Under the citizen scholar cluster, students are not only evaluated, but they also take a greater part in their own evaluation and the evaluation of their peers. The citizen scholar classroom does not exclude lecturing, but obviously has a strong preference for cooperative and active-learning activities. The classroom itself is not only a theoretical waiting room beside more practical and professional-oriented segments of a programme as for internship and tutoring activities, but an agora to engage with theories and social or professional practices.

4 Higher Education in the Age of the Citizen Scholar

Having seen how the teaching and learning paradigm has shifted to favour the new notion of the citizen scholar, let us explore this notion in a little more detail before turning to a consideration of the consequences for lecturers.

One of the primary (and most stressful) challenges for future students consists of dealing with the possibility of long-term unemployment or the risk of merely accumulating a series of short-term jobs without any real hope of attaining any
tangible form of stability after their studies. The robotisation and informatisation of decision making, even in spheres which previously called for highly (university) educated people, such as law, management and public governance, has recently gained sufficient exposure in the media and in the public discourse to prepare the new generation of students for the worst, or at least for the advent of a new paradigm in the future structure of their professional lives. In the face of these changes, and particularly from the field of the daily-life experience and practical proficiency, what can the classroom bring to the new citizen scholars?

In fact, many study programmess have adjusted their academic provision in response to this to include more offsite activities. Their curricula tend to include more compulsory internships, more hours dedicated to mentoring/tutoring periods related to academic writing or research or by offering more competence-based workshops and credited summer-school sessions where students can obtain useful, hands-on experience before fully joining civil society. In this context, the role of the classroom should now be seen as complementary rather than fundamental in terms of the preparation of graduates. As a result, how can the in-class lecturers connect students to the new education/post-education paradigm? How can they develop the competences of students instead of merely transmitting a knowledge base that students can simply access by themselves? Part of the response to this challenge may be found in the direction provided by the idea of “citizen scholarship”. Before discussing the roles of the classroom and instructors, the following paragraphs will attempt to outline the main ideas behind the concept of the citizen scholar, notably by referring to the works of Arvanitakis and Hornsby.

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11 In this respect, the Euroculture programme has been particularly successful, devoting an important part of its programme to an approach with more understanding of the social reality and prioritising the development of social skills. In particular, this refers to the practical training-base workshop-like courses, which allow students to concretely cut their teeth on academic writing (Eurocompetence I), group project management (Eurocompetence II) and professional/research grant applications (Eurocompetence III). The programme also comprises the Intensive Programme (IP), arranged as an academic conference that combines students paper delivery and evaluation, attendance of other practitioners and scholars talks, career day meetings and field activities. The third semester is devoted to a practical internship or the development of research proficiency within or outside Europe. The major part of the fourth semester dedicated to the writing of the MA thesis. All in all, more than half of the 120 credits of the Euroculture programme are de facto dedicated to what can be labelled as off-site or know-how tutoring activities. Even so, some of the time spent in the classroom still seems problematic for students who regard it as a waste of time.

12 Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151.
While the concept of citizen scholar is not entirely new and the term has enjoyed a relatively long lifespan in the literature, the concept has been subject to considerable development in the last 15 years, especially in the North American and Commonwealth Countries milieu in recent years. The concept has more recently allowed education researchers to identify and develop fertile practices for study programmes and teaching activities to deliver them.

Inspired and drawing on the work of Gramsci and Freire on education and pedagogy who argue for the necessity to (re)connect universities with the tangible challenges faced by society and to tackle the threat posed by social inequalities, research on the citizen scholar has led to the proposal of different formulations. To better understand the direction provided by the conception of the citizen scholar, three essential and linked points need to be introduced and summarised.

In first place, the call for the development of a new generation of citizen scholars is in accordance with the notion that students from higher education must develop a concrete array of cultural and social competences rather than just obtaining and retaining knowledge. This idea is in line with both the EQF and the contemporary issues faced by current and future students alike (high mobility, intercultural connections, rapid development of information technology, etc.).

Furthermore, as citizen scholars, students must also be prepared to engage with the imperative of the development of skills which are not only directed towards professional employability but above all towards the capacity to deal with the incessant uncertainty and insecurity of a world constantly changing not to say flipping. While Sims suggests that higher education curricula must move from

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14 See, for instance, the works by the other authors in the collective book already mentioned in this contribution, notably Arvanitakis and Hornsby, Universities, the Citizen Scholar and the Future of Higher Education and Tania D. Mitchell and Krista M. Soria, Educating for Citizenship and Social Justice. Practices for Community Engagement at Research Universities (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018). Also there are some study programmes dedicated to the Citizen Scholar approach, for instance at the Western University of Sydney: Massachusetts; The Center for civic engagement at the University of South Florida in St. Petersburg; Office of Citizen Scholar Development at the University of Virginia.


18 Hornsby and Arvanitakis insist of the importance to have a “global vision” to which they associate five key skills: interdisciplinarity; cross-cultural understanding; developing new literacies; internationalisation; inclusivity, Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 155.
‘industry needs and work-ready students’\textsuperscript{19} to competent active citizens ready to innovate while confronting current social issues, Hornsby and Arvanitakis outline the following mission for higher education: ‘[…] universities must inculcate a set of skills and cultural practices that prepare students for a turbulent and constantly changing world’ especially since ‘[t]he graduate is not only a potential employee, but seen as an active and engaged citizen who will help shape the various societies with which they interact.’\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, this interaction between citizen scholars (students, lecturers and institutions) will not occur without the mindfulfulness of social inequalities and the capacity to address them constructively. The third standing point around which the citizen scholars are mobilised is related to raising awareness of social justice. While agreeing that the concept of social justice itself is difficult to define and hard to reach a consensus on,\textsuperscript{21} undergraduates, graduate students and members of higher education institutions must be able to develop the requisite tools to understand and intervene to confront, fix, limit inequalities and ‘mobilize knowledge for the benefit of society’.\textsuperscript{22} Conversely, Hornsby and Arvanitakis are confident that the development of a new generation of citizen scholars can also contribute to a more balanced community since ‘pursuing university studies can play a role in addressing inequalities in society because graduates tend to be healthier and lead prosperous lives’.\textsuperscript{23}

To provide better guidelines about what set of skills can be developed and support students to be citizens scholars, Hornsby and Arvanitakis have identified 16 attributes that they have regrouped within four distinct ‘proficiency clusters’: 1) creativity and innovation; 2) resilience; 3) working across teams and across experiences; 4) design thinking.\textsuperscript{24}

Table 1 reproduces Hornsby and Arvanitakis’s proficiency clusters and attributes, together with their definitions. While they admit that these clusters are rather ‘fuzzy and overlapping’, their identification nevertheless offers an inspiring basis for the skills required of citizen scholars. Yet in order to foster them, there needs to be a corresponding shift from the clinical-professional paradigm of teacher competence to help practitioners adapt to the changing circumstances and needs of higher education. Our reflections have led us to identify four major roles related to four key dimensions of the citizen scholar classroom. The four foundations can be summarised under the acronym CARE, which stands for: Competences; Ac-

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{19} Sims, “Teaching Development Studies in Times of Change.”
\textsuperscript{20} Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151.
\textsuperscript{22} Hornsby and Arvanitakis, “The Citizen Scholar in Developing Global Perspectives”: 151.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 155.
\textsuperscript{24} Arvanitakis and Hornsby, “Are Universities Redundant?” 14-18.
\end{quote}
companiment, Retention, Engagement. Under the citizen scholar banner, the citizen-teacher must learn to become i) a developer of competences; ii) a scholarly accompanist; iii) an experience fosterer and iv) mobilisation agent. The section that follows is an attempt to expand on these roles by identifying the four tasks, which citizen-teachers should prepare their citizen scholars for and CARE about.

Table 1: Proficiency cluster and attribute to develop and accompany the citizen scholar (table adapted from Hornsby and Arvanitakis, 2016:14-18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proficiency cluster</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description / rationale / observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creativity and Innovation</td>
<td>Critical thinking</td>
<td>• often defined as clear and reasoned thinking, this concept also includes challenging perceptions and conceptions through the application of novel or different ideas;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Problem-solving</td>
<td>• oriented towards finding solutions to problems through innovative thinking;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflexivity</td>
<td>• a student reflects on the information provided and considers alternative ways to address;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>• a student is able to start the innovation and creativity process with minimal resources and rapidly develop, fail fast and learn from mistakes before moving ahead again;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Being process driven</td>
<td>• students focus more on the process associated with a problem as a means to consider ways of solving it rather than purely on the content of the problem;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Systems thinking</td>
<td>• students think about how different elements influence each other or are related by breaking down component parts of a system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience</td>
<td>Adaptable</td>
<td>• when a student is nimble and flexible, capable of adopting and anticipating change and innovation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mistakability / Perseverance</td>
<td>• learning from and taking advantage of mistakes and errors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interdisciplinarity</td>
<td>• an ability to think across disciplines in pursuit of more holistic problem-solving;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-</td>
<td>• an ability to appreciate that different cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working across teams and across experiences</td>
<td>may bring different ideas and thinking on how to advance understanding;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing new literacies</td>
<td>not just strong reading, writing and advocacy skills, but understanding literacy within the new and changing technological environment;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td>promoting the ability to work in different cultural contexts;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusivity</td>
<td>recognising that societies are diverse and with this comes different and unique ways of thinking that can be important in innovation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-centred thinking</td>
<td>placing people and their needs at the centre of our work;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>appreciating the importance of both functionality and beauty (Satell, 2014);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical leadership</td>
<td>building a frame of reference in which to reflect on moral and confronting challenges and understanding that leadership is a process not a hierarchy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 5 The Making of the New Citizen-Teacher and the ‘CARE’ Model

Primarily, since competences have become central to the European framework of higher education, they should also be the first dimension of not only the citizen scholar but also the citizen teacher – a model of an academic instructor shaped and informed by the same focus on competences. Whilst relatively much has been written on the citizen scholar, the model of the ideal academic instructor, which should complement and accompany them, has been relatively overlooked. We take as our definition of competence the elegant and efficient formulation of González & Wagenaar, namely ‘competences represent a dynamic combination of knowledge, understanding, skills, abilities and values. Fostering these competences is the object of educational programmes’.  

tences are of key importance and this involves establishing a portfolio of learning activities that ensure competences are integrated by students. Among these, one should mention some of Hornsby and Arvanitakis’s key citizen scholar attributes introduced in the previous sections, notably: critical thinking, problem-solving, reflexivity, systems thinking, entrepreneurship and being process-driven.

Yet an overreliance on competences alone, which we believe the clinical-professional paradigm leads to, removes something crucial from the role of the teacher. As Caena has noted, citing Smyth and Dow, one common charge against solely competence-based instruction is that ‘through an instrumentalist and prescriptive approach, [it can] lead to a situation where the work of teachers is reconfigured so they become the deliverers of knowledge, testers of student outcomes and pedagogical technicians’. With the massification of higher education and the drive for greater standardisation, an important aspect of the role of instructors has largely been lost and forgotten, something which we term accompaniment. The dimension of accompaniment exceeds the scope of a lecturer’s role being understood as presenting information, answering questions and being available for students during weekly meetings hours. Accompaniment also includes providing fruitful feedback on assignments, preparing reference letters for former students, or adapting certain specific pieces of coursework or group projects to the interests of students. The shift to accompanying is an illustrative one, with the idea of the citizen teacher as a scholarly accompanist reminiscent of their musical namesake, or as the Oxford Dictionary states: ‘A person who provides a musical accompaniment to another musician or to a singer’. This means that the citizen teacher is not always the lead performer, but a key actor making sure that her/his “star” students achieve their goals. Student accompaniment is usually regarded as extremely time-consuming and unrewarded in the view of lecturers under the pressure of other academic engagements such as the need to publish. Yet it is essential for the development of the kind of citizen scholars needed in society and need not be as time consuming as common knowledge would have it. For example, research suggests that peer-review techniques are just as effective as feedback provided by experienced lecturers when implemented well, providing students with more relevant, constructive criticism without overburdening lecturers. In accompanying students, citizen teachers must endorse three of the abovementioned attributes of the citizen scholar in particular: adaptability, inclusivity and people-centred thinking, in other words, the citizen teacher should play the role of a meta-citizen scholar.

The third dimension of retention does not correspond to the typical use of this term in education. While retention usually refers to knowledge remembered by

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26 Shaw and Ampleman, “Riders on the Storm.”
learners and apprentice, we believe that the idea of retention in the context of the citizen scholar paradigm involves the retention of experiences and possible information. This means that one role of the contemporary instructor is that of an “experience fosterer” and that this is twofold. First, the citizen teacher needs to make lessons memorable, by engaging learners in unique, fresh, dynamic and learner centred activities. It is obviously impossible for all students to remember every aspect of class sessions but it is always possible to strive to ensure that at least one student will remember a specific class in a particular way that connects her/him to their future citizen field of actions. Secondly, as an experience fosterer, the citizen teacher must also make sure that she/he is connected to the society at large. This requires not only updating knowledge on a topic but collecting current practices, collecting information about current mistakes and biases, bringing to class a portrait of the social situation on a specific matter. This also means tapping into the experiences of students on the same issues. Once again, retention does not correspond to specific knowledge but to making the experience memorable by bringing together potentially conflicting or complementary knowledge whose meaning requires negotiation between the classmates. This requires citizen teachers to have the capacity to animate the collecting and selection of information for discussion or problem solving, paying attention to four citizen scholar attributes in the process: interdisciplinarity, developing new literacies, the internationalisation of experiences as well as a sensibility for the aesthetics. Moreover, since the experiences and cultural background of other students may provide new insights or even correct the instructor’s point of view, they may develop two more attributes: cross-cultural understanding or cultural humility by engaging in the correction of her/his own mistakes. This is all the more important in the information age, where the prevalence and indeed dominance of technology may have unforeseen consequences. As Patricia Greenfield argues, ‘Although the visual capabilities of television, video games, and the Internet may develop impressive visual intelligence, the cost seems to be deep processing: mindful knowledge acquisition, inductive analysis, critical thinking, imagination, and reflection’.29 These are precisely the competences required by the citizen scholar.

Finally, the last dimension is that of engagement. If graduates need not only to be prepared for a career, but to jump into civil society, the classroom might also be an ideal place to mobilise students.

Table 2: The CARE model: four dimensions, the roles of the classroom citizen teacher and the attributes from the citizen scholar (*following Arvanitakis and Hornsby)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Competences</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Citizen scholar attributes</th>
<th>Euroculture examples of practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparing class programmes</td>
<td>Critical thinking</td>
<td>Combining continuous and summative assessment: some competences cannot be genuinely tested by traditional means. For example, instead of the traditional individual exam for European Civilisation(s), participants were examined in pairs. This enabled the assessment of both knowledge and their ability to work in small groups (other key competences called for problem solving, terminology negotiation, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducting learning activities to fit competences</td>
<td>Problem-solving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluating competences using different tools</td>
<td>Reflexivity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitrating peer-review activities</td>
<td>Entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Negotiating the criteria of assessment and course content as is the case with Eurocompetence III.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensuring inclusion in cooperative learning activities and discussion</td>
<td>Being process-driven</td>
<td>Euroculture students engaged in the “research track” during the third semester may be asked to organise their own final seminar. The focus is then not only placed on research/heuristic activities, but also on academic management and integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>And sometimes… lecturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompaniment</td>
<td>Retention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing individual feedback on assignments</td>
<td>Following local and global issues on the course topic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supplying advice and support to broaden horizons</td>
<td>Making contact with local stakeholders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparing references for students</td>
<td>Ensuring students contribute to the class content</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapting task to the interests of students</td>
<td>Create a memorable class atmosphere</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecting students with other actors in civil society</td>
<td>Interdisciplinary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People-centred</td>
<td>Developing new literacies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>Internationalisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusivity</td>
<td>Cross-cultural understanding</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetics</td>
<td>In European civilisation(s), asking each student to prepare one slide about an interesting fact about religion, then using the material to discuss the core civilizational dimensions of religious phenomena (similarities/differences, interdictions, community building, values, etc.).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making greater use of pair and group work than in traditional teaching. The Eurocivilisation(s) class has a student-centered focus, with an approximate ratio of 90% student-led activities vs 10% instructor based.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If the students accept the scholar-citizen premise of social justice or the need to tackle social inequities, then the engagement dimension is an invitation from the instructor to students to connect directly with social issues besides their desire to engage as future workers. Inversely, if students are receptive to the invitation made in the classroom, they should also participate in the course content and activities, meaning more than just delivering assignments. Students must make sure that they participate, that all students have a voice and can be heard, that they remember the competences acquired from the course, that their contribution is ethical and original. Engaging students and colleagues in the classroom requires four strong attributes from the educator: ethical leadership, mistakability/perseverance, but once again as for the accompaniment dimension a great sense of adaptability and inclusivity. Table 2 below provides an overview of the CARE model, with typical tasks accompanying the stage, attributes to be fostered and a brief example taken from the author’s experiences within the Euroculture programme.

### 6 Conclusion

Euroculture has witnessed tremendous changes in higher education over the space of the last twenty years, with the transition from a knowledge-based, teacher-centered and traditional instructional paradigm (the proverbial ‘chalk and talk’) to one
which is focused on fostering competences and preparing students for life and employment in a world. Drawing on Hornsby and Arvanitakis’ proficiency cluster model for students, we have attempted to derive a similar one for lecturers and education professionals which we call CARE and which has been informed by our work with Euroculture. To help foster citizen scholars, we need citizen teachers, educators who are able to foster competences, accompany students in their development, and ensure retention of material by means of memorable, involved teaching experiences and encouraging engagement in the world outside the university.

Needless to say, the classroom by itself is a complex issue, and this contribution could not discuss all of the relevant aspects such as student evaluation, teaching techniques, feedback, etc. Nevertheless, we believe that the CARE model constitutes a starting point for the implementation of the citizen-classroom. Whilst the development of the CARE model owes much to the authors’ experiences within the Euroculture programme, it is hoped that its application in tertiary education might be much broader. If higher education continues with the turn to the citizen scholar, it will have to reflect on the strategies required to ensure that the classroom meets the needs of the citizen scholar agenda and the need to train citizen teachers. For higher education institutions, this involves supporting their own scholars and guaranteeing that, besides their research and the pressure to publish, they have the time and support to develop their own teaching portfolios. This support may have different forms, such as teacher training, recognising the preparation time needed for classes, fostering tandem instruction in the classroom, alternating teaching semesters with those dedicated to research, or considering the evaluation of classroom performance in the same way as publications. For education policymakers and study programme designers who want to take the citizen scholar turn, this involves endowing institutions with a politics that ensures that they care about the classroom; in short it involves a politics of “care”.

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Teaching Beyond the Classroom: Towards a Sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative

Elizabeth M. Goering

1 Introduction

The natural sciences have long recognised the value of international, interdisciplinary research. In fact, the National Science Foundation reports that over 20% of all scientific publications are the result of international collaboration, with authors from multiple countries.¹ In recent years, the social sciences have also embraced the potential of international collaborative research. The American Psychological Association, for example, has developed a series of resources designed to promote and facilitate international collaborative research because it recognises that scholars ‘working with colleagues from other countries can accomplish more than those same people working apart’.² Even in the arts and humanities, which historically have ‘disciplinary traditions’ in which scholars tend to be ‘physically alone when at work’ the trend is towards interdisciplinary collaboration.³ Indeed, scholars across the academy acknowledge that there are significant advantages to international, interdisciplinary research because ‘cross-fertilisation of expertise allows partic-

² Committee on International Relations in Psychology, Engaging in International Collaborative Research, part of the series Going International: A Practical Guide for Psychologists (Washington DC: Office of International Affairs, 2014), 4-5.
pants to derive much more complex and novel outputs when they tackle research questions from a variety of methodological as well as theoretical standpoints.4

The twentieth anniversary of Euroculture offers a perfect opportunity for reflecting on the past and envisioning the future. I propose that, as we imagine what the Euroculture consortium could become over the next twenty years and beyond, we consider developing a Euroculture Research Collaborative and that we consider integrating it into the pedagogies through which we assist students in attaining the methodological and research-related learning outcomes of the programme. In the decade of my involvement with the Euroculture MA, the consortium’s approach to teaching research methods has undergone considerable transformation, including the adoption of a common syllabus for the required Research Seminar and experimentation with the use of technology to share the methodological expertise of individuals within the consortium with students on multiple campuses. A logical next step in our efforts to refine pedagogical strategies for equipping students with the methodological knowledge and competencies they need to become independent researchers is the creation of a Euroculture Research Collaborative. In this chapter, I will explain why that would be valuable, provide a communication-based model of what creating a successful collaboration entails, propose a model for creating a viable, sustainable research collaboration within Euroculture, and offer some recommendations about possible initial research projects.

2 The Case for a Euroculture Research Collaborative

With established organisational and communication systems in place that link scholars from a wide range of disciplinary and methodological perspectives across twelve different countries, the Euroculture consortium is uniquely situated to create an interdisciplinary, international research collaborative. Although the consortium has been successful in several research-related endeavours, including publishing research anthologies such as the Studies in Euroculture series, efforts to establish a Euroculture research group have not been completely successful for a variety of legitimate reasons. This is unfortunate because there is considerable value in the kind of transdisciplinary, multicultural, multi-methodological research the Euroculture consortium could do. The potential benefits of a Euroculture Research Collaborative range from the global to the local.

On a macro-level, the Euroculture consortium is in a unique position to conduct research that could help answer some of the biggest questions facing our world today. One of the established benefits of international collaborative research is that it ‘provides opportunities to generate knowledge, enhance the external validity of research completed elsewhere, extend the range of applicability of existing research, and develop mutually beneficial relationships that can contribute to solv-

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ing global problems.\(^5\) Part of the power of collaborative research lies in the fact that collaboration fosters creativity, which has been shown to aid problem solving and spur innovation.\(^6\) Within the Euroculture programme, working relationships already exist between scholars from different countries inside and outside Europe, a wide range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, and a variety of qualitative, quantitative, interpretive, critical, and historical methodologies. If leveraged properly, that rich combination of brainpower, knowledge, and skills has the potential to offer a diverse and global understanding of problems facing our world today and a wide repertoire of possible approaches to addressing those problems.

On a more micro-level, a Euroculture Research Collaborative would be potentially beneficial to students and faculty or staff. At a minimum, students would be able to witness international collaboration first-hand, and some students could participate more directly in research teams. Later in this chapter, I will spell out some of the opportunities for student involvement that could be built into the collaborative.

For Euroculture faculty and staff, a research collaborative could provide opportunities to enhance personal research objectives by integrating individuals into the power of a research collaborative. Past studies have established a positive relationship between productivity measures (i.e., number of publications) and collaboration.\(^7\) In addition, the citation impact factor of publications listing multiple authors, affiliations or countries tends to be greater than for single authored papers.\(^8\)

Another benefit of collaborative research to individual scholars is that interdisciplinary research tends to reach a wider audience than research that is limited to a particular discipline.\(^9\) Of course, the benefits of participating in the collaborative would vary from person to person, because the incentives and stakes associated with collaboration vary greatly depending on where the individual is in his/her career\(^10\) and on disciplinary norms.\(^11\) Nonetheless, the potential is there for individuals who might choose to participate in a Euroculture Research Collaborative to benefit in a variety of ways.

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11. Ibid., 231-232.
Finally, a research collaboration could have value to the consortium as a whole. The dissemination of scholarship with the Euroculture “brand” attached to it would increase the visibility and enhance the image of the programme. Another possible benefit to the consortium as a whole is that funders tend to view collaborative research proposals as being more competitive, which opens potential pathways to funding that might not be as readily available to individual researchers. In fact, the American Association for the Advancement of Science reports that as resources shrink, government, industry, and some private funders increasingly are promoting and supporting collaborative research projects.\(^\text{12}\)

Indeed, there are many compelling reasons to add a collaborative research arm to the Euroculture body, but not all collaborations are equally successful. The next section provides an overview of the characteristics of successful, sustainable research collaboratives.

### 3 Creating Successful and Sustainable Research Collaboratives

Although the evidence supporting collaborative international research is persuasive, not all collaborations work and not all collaborations survive. Creating a successful and sustainable international research collaborative requires the co-creation of structures and processes that make it possible for people from different institutions, disciplines, and nations to work together to share ideas, identify common problems/research questions, and synthesise perspectives, competencies, and resources in pursuit of their shared research goals.

#### 3.1 Successful Collaborative Structures

Keyton, Ford and Smith note that “collaborations are loosely coupled and nested systems that continually change.”\(^\text{13}\) Consequently, structure in successful collaborations is a combination of more stable “facilitating structures” and more fluid “emerging structures” that are co-created through interaction among collaborators at a particular moment in time. Building on the group communication research that demonstrates the difficulties groups can have in creating their own structures, Keyton et al. conclude that collaborations actually “work better with a facilitating structure, such that the parties can devote greater attention to the substance of their collaborative tasks.”\(^\text{14}\) The “facilitating structures” are the organisational frameworks in which the collaborative is embedded.


\(^{14}\) Ibid.: 380.
Additional structures that facilitate collaboration include ‘business plan protocols’ and the ‘enacted network.’ Protocols are documents that provide a structural framework for the shared work of the collaborative. The content of the protocol will vary depending on the nature and purpose of the collaborative, but the protocol typically articulates the long-term goals for the collaborative as a whole, provides a multi-phase time-line for tracking goal attainment, identifies resource requirements and commitments, and spells out agreed-upon standards for conducting and disseminating research. Structurally codifying standards for conducting and disseminating research can be particularly important in international research collaboratives. In their analysis of structural characteristics that can increase collaboration problems, Walsh and Maloney discovered that demographic diversity within the team can create challenges. Different disciplines have different methodological expectations. Different countries have different regulations governing research that involves human subjects. Individuals from diverse backgrounds may have varying understandings of how to resolve problems that arise or make different assumptions about “ownership” of research results and the appropriateness of discussing research with others outside the collaborative. Walsh and Maloney conclude that ‘when collaborations cross institutional spheres, [...] they are ripe for generating misunderstandings, conflicts, and delays.’ Discussing these issues ahead of time and embedding agreed-upon practice into protocol structures can minimise these potentially negative consequences of diversity in collaboratives.

The final collaboration structure, the “enacted network,” is the communication structure that emerges around a particular project. Keyton et al. observed that the “work” of collaboratives is actually carried out by teams that co-create their own structures within the framework of facilitating structures and protocols. One common challenge within enacted networks is “network instability,” which results from changing representation from stakeholder groups or absenteeism of team members. Network instability has the potential to erode relationships and increase network uncertainty. The overall success of the collaborative is predicated on the ability of the enacted network to co-create processes that facilitate effective collaboration because Keyton et al. posit that ‘high-quality network structure results in higher quality of information shared during collaboration’ and ‘contributes to high-quality collaborative process.’

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15 Ibid.: 386.
17 Ibid.: 714.
19 Ibid.: 392.
20 Ibid.: 390.
3.2 Successful Collaborative Processes

While structure is a prerequisite for effective collaboration, it does not guarantee collaborative success, because collaboration is not just a structure. In essence, it is an iterative, strategic process. Bozeman et al. interviewed 60 academic researchers from a variety of disciplines about their collaboration experiences and, in their analysis, identified ten themes associated with “bad” experiences and five with “good.”

All of the “good collaboration” themes – building trust, meeting commitments, communicating effectively, being productive, and having a “collaborator’s personality” – are related to process.

Similarly, many of the “bad collaboration factors” identified in the Bozeman et al. study are arguably more related to process than to structure. The “bad collaboration” themes include problems related to unmet expectations about the quality or timeliness of completed work, personality clashes, perceptions that individuals were acting in their own interest rather than in the interest of the group, or feeling exploited by more powerful group members. In addition, the respondents reported clashes rooted in different expectations arising from institutional norms or cultural/national differences and disputes over authorship or credit received for work completed. Although many of these factors are “process” questions, some of them could be minimised through the establishment of protocol structures as described in the previous section.

Although “high-quality collaborative process contributes to high-quality results,” it does not guarantee success. There are too many situational and resource factors that can affect the collaboration. Nonetheless, creating structures that set mutually-agreed-upon parameters for collaboration (e.g., how will Institutional Review Board approval be handled, who gets listed as author and in what order on any publications coming out of the collaborative, etc.) and coupling that with the co-creation of communication processes that promote trust, equality, and commitment can increase the viability of the collaborative.

From a communication perspective, another process that can enhance collaboration success is to make meta-communication normative within the team. Treise et al. report that a stumbling block for transdisciplinary research collaboratives is that norms within academic culture tend to make it taboo to openly discuss the ‘bumps and twists along the road that are inherent in those collaborations’ and ‘prevent open discussion of these challenges.’ If the enacted network within a collaboration can make meta-communication, or communicating about communicating, a norm for the group, it can break out of the constraints of larger cultural contexts such as these. Research confirms that if members of interdisciplinary research teams are patiently willing to explain their rules and priorities in ways that

22 Ibid.: 238.
make sense within the context of the research project, interdisciplinary research is able to add to the literature in ways that are not possible through monodisciplinary perspectives.25

4 A Model for a Sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative

Armed with an understanding of the structures and processes that undergird successful collaboration and convinced of the potential value in international, interdisciplinary collaboration, I will propose a model for what I think could be a viable and sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative. Before outlining my vision for the collaborative, it is worthwhile to take a retrospective look at a previous effort to foster research collaborations within the consortium. In 2011 at the Intensive Programme (IP) in Göttingen, a group of faculty made the decision to establish a “Euroculture Research Group.” After much discussion about possible foci for our research, the group opted to focus on issues related to trust. Efforts were made to find funding, but when those were unsuccessful, the “Euroculture Research Group” disappeared. This pattern is not uncommon, because one of the biggest challenges new collaboratives face is sustainability, which includes fostering and maintaining commitment from participants and stakeholder organisations. Two factors may help explain this group’s inability to thrive: 1) attempting to create a joint project that everyone could participate in from the start and 2) assuming we needed to find funding for the research project before beginning. Because we made the decision to identify a single project that everyone could work on, we ended up with a topic about which no one was truly passionate. The participants agreed that the topic was an important issue, and many could identify ways in which they could contribute to research on the topic through their expertise and perspectives, but the topic was not the primary research interest of most participants. This, coupled with the decision we made to seek funding before embarking on the research project, made it very difficult for the research group to persist when funding was not found.

The model I propose for developing a sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative begins by embedding it into existing structures. Then, instead of seeking to identify a mega-research project in which all interested parties can participate, the focus initially would be on making it easier for individual researchers to add international, multidisciplinary dimensions to the research they already do by collaborating with other people in Euroculture. This could be faculty at other institutions or students in the MA programme, which leads into the third aspect of this proposal: integrating aspects of the research collaborative into the Euroculture MA

curriculum. This approach eliminates the need to seek external funding before the collaborative can begin doing research, and, instead, allows funding to be sought on the basis of work produced through the collaboration. In the following paragraphs, I will elaborate on each of these recommendations.

4.1 Embedding the Collaborative into Existing Structures

The Euroculture consortium already has the “facilitating structures” that are a necessary foundation for a successful collaboration, and a Euroculture Research Collaborative could be embedded into those existing structures relatively easily. Current structures supporting digital communication within the consortium, such as mailing lists, the Euroculture website, Euroculture Blackboard, and The Euroculturer magazine, would provide a solid base for online interaction. Perhaps a Euroculture Research Collaborative “course” could be added to Euroculture’s electronic learning environment (Blackboard), and anyone in the consortium could opt into the course at will. In addition to these well-established structures for online communication, the consortium also has effective structures in place to facilitate face-to-face interaction. Regular Management Committee Meetings, the annual Intensive Programme, and faculty mobility mechanisms provide ample opportunity for collaborators to interact in person. Research shows that having structures that allow for both face-to-face and online communication is important to the success of a collaborative. Face-to-face meetings are useful in that they allow collaborators to recalibrate group norms, discuss concerns, and confirm commitment to the collaborative. On the other hand, digital communication is essential for ‘keeping collaborations on track.’ Because the Euroculture consortium has the structural frameworks in place that could support a Euroculture Research Collaborative, there is no need to recreate them. The collaborative could simply be embedded into those existing frameworks. Protocol structures specific to the collaborative would need to be written, but the facilitating structures that already exist facilitate the completion of that task. At the next Intensive Programme, for example, interested parties could meet to draft the Euroculture Research Collaborative protocol.

4.2 Building Collaboration around Current Research

The collaborative model I propose would create a central place, such as a course in Blackboard, a research collaborative listserv, or a website, where individual scholars could share their research ideas to see if other consortium members might be


interested in collaborating on that project. That collaboration could be scholar to scholar, or it could integrate students in ways that will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Not all members of the Euroculture Research Collaborative would be involved with every project. Instead, individuals would choose projects that align with their research interests and methodological/theoretical backgrounds. Within the collaborative, several different projects could be underway simultaneously, each carried out by its own “enacted network.”

Here is an example of how this might work. During the 2017-18 academic year, I had the opportunity to spend a sabbatical year at the Georg-August-Universität in Göttingen, Germany. During my time there, I collected data for a research project on communication in multicultural teams. The ability to work in culturally diverse teams is undeniably important. Surveys in the U.S.\(^{28}\) and Europe\(^{29}\) identify the ability to work in culturally diverse teams as one of the primary skills employers are looking for in new employees. Because Euroculture gives students so many opportunities to develop this skill, the programme is a perfect “laboratory” for an in-depth study of the communication that facilitates or hampers successful multicultural teams. I could have posted information about my project and invited other researchers in the consortium to collaborate on the project. The exact nature of the collaboration would have been worked out by the “enacted network” of individuals committing to this particular project. The collaboration could possibly have involved working together to formulate research questions, to design the research protocol, to collect data, to analyse data, or any combination of these stages in the research process. As mentioned previously, many channels already exist within Euroculture for sharing information, but having an institutionalised Euroculture Research Collaborative would formalise the use of these structures for collaboration. It would foster a collaborative mindset and systematise the use of communication structures, which would simplify and promote the practice of collaborative research within the consortium.

The assumption underlying this proposed model is that many individuals involved in the Euroculture consortium are doing interesting and engaging research that could be enhanced through collaboration. The Euroculture Research Collaborative would serve as a structure for bringing potential collaborators together.

4.3 Integrating the Collaborative into the Euroculture MA Curriculum

A third important element of this proposal for a Euroculture Research Collaborative is to integrate it into the curriculum of the Euroculture MA. Not only would this help with feasibility and sustainability, it also would provide students with


valuable opportunities to hone their research competencies and participate in international collaborative research. Research is already a key component of the Euroculture curriculum, so implementing this part of the proposal would essentially entail embedding the collaborative into existing structures such as the Methodology Seminar or the 3rd semester Research Track.

Here are some examples of how this might work. Collaborators in an “enacted network” could integrate parts of a Euroculture Research Collaborative project into the Methodology Seminar. Students could learn methods of data collection or data analysis by actually collecting and/or analysing data in support of a project designed by the collaborative. This practice of aligning learning objectives for specific courses with research projects is used routinely in the Department of Communication Studies at Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). For instance, learning to facilitate meetings and focus groups is a learning objective in a Group Communication course that is taught at the undergraduate level. Students in that class learn to facilitate focus groups and then conduct them as part of the Department’s strategy for collecting assessment data. In the Interviewing Principles and Practices class, students learn to conduct a variety of types of interviews, including research interviews. After learning the theory behind interviewing, select students are given the opportunity to practice doing research interviews as part of research projects being conducted by faculty or graduate students in the Department. Finally, students in the Department’s required Research Methods class learn to design and analyse surveys or conduct textual analyses and then hone their skills by using them to work with real data from ongoing research projects. In some cases, the research projects extend across years, with students in one semester participating in designing or pre-testing a survey and students in the next semester assisting with analysing the survey data. This model is mutually beneficial to students and researchers because it gives students valuable real-world research experience, and it provides researchers with trained “research assistants.”

Another logical Euroculture structure that could be linked to a research collaborative is the 3rd semester research track. Students could serve as research assistants on projects in which the research group is engaged. Finally, providing Euroculture alumni with access to the Euroculture Research Consortium site could open up opportunities to develop collaboration with institutions outside of the academy.

5 A Possible Research Agenda

Embedding research projects into existing structures and curricula would help create a viable and sustainable Euroculture Research Collaborative, but what could such a research group study? Although the design of this proposal speaks against trying to identify a single project or topic of inquiry that would appeal to the wide range of disciplines and methodologies represented in the consortium, it still might
be useful to identify some of the possible research projects a Euroculture Research Collaborative could explore.

Of course, as a Professor of Communication Studies, I am biased, but I want to recommend communication as one potentially rich focus for research within Euroculture. My initial encounter with the Euroculture consortium was in 2009 at the IP in Olomouc. As I sat in on my first management meetings, watched the interaction among students and tutors during the IP paper sessions, and observed a student protest action that took place that year, I found myself thinking that Euroculture would be a perfect laboratory for studying all sorts of communication topics. Euroculture certainly is a perfect case study for exploring international collaboration processes and crossvergence. Think about it. This programme brings twelve countries together, each with a different approach to higher education – different academic calendars, graduation dates, grading systems, degree granting practices, crediting systems, approaches to pedagogy, assessments, and economic models. Yet, the consortium has somehow managed to develop strategies for dealing with those differences, for enacting practices that meet the needs of the consortium while maintaining the national and institutional flavour of each university. Studying how that has been and is being accomplished as ongoing process could make useful contributions to scholarship on international collaborations.

Another topic that has been explored previously by individuals in the Euroculture consortium that could possibly be expanded collaboratively in interesting ways is the study of representations of the EU in press within and outside of Europe. At the 2009 IP, a scholar from Pune, Niteen Gupte, gave a presentation on coverage and representations of the EU in English language press in India. I remember wondering what I would find if I did a similar analysis of how Europe and the EU are represented in the media sources most commonly consumed by Americans. Because of the role media plays in shaping our understandings of reality, that is an interesting and important question – and it would fit very well with the collaborative research model proposed in this chapter. The consortium would make it relatively easy to access and analyse media representations in many countries in and outside Europe. In addition, the methods that would likely be involved are commonly taught in the Methodology Seminar and used by many students in their theses, so it might be logical to integrate this type of project into that class at some universities. Furthermore, conducting research like this within the framework of an international, multicultural collaborative definitely adds value to the existing scholarship in this area.

Sense-making, organisational change, and bona fide groups are just a handful of other communication-related research areas that would be particularly interesting to explore from an intercultural perspective, making the Euroculture programme, once again, a perfect laboratory for examining and better understanding these processes.

Of course, communication would not have to be (and should not be) the primary research focus of a Euroculture Research Collaborative. My intention in
sharing these possible research ideas is not to set an agenda for the collaborative but rather to encourage others to think about interesting questions that could be better answered by bringing together the transdisciplinary, multicultural, multi-methodological perspectives that are Euroculture. Those compelling research questions coupled with the structures described in this chapter could help us establish a vibrant, sustainable research collaborative that could help move the teaching of research methods in the Euroculture MA beyond the classroom.

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In 1998, the Master’s programme Euroculture started with the aim to offer, amid the many existing programmes that focused on European institutional developments, a European studies curriculum that puts the interplay of culture, society and politics in Europe at the heart of the curriculum. Among other topics, the programme focused on how Europe and European integration could be contextualised and what these concepts meant to European citizens. In June 2018, Euroculture celebrated its twentieth anniversary with a conference to discuss not only the changes within the MA Euroculture itself, but also to reflect upon the changes in the field of European studies over the last two decades writ large. This volume brings together the main findings of this conference.

Since its start, Euroculture has engaged with European studies by providing a space for cooperation between more mainstream-oriented research on the one hand and a variety of sociological, historiographical, post-structuralist, and post-colonial perspectives on Europe on the other. This has enabled Euroculture to contextualise the emergence and development of European institutions historically and in relation to broader socio-political and cultural processes. Its methodology, that treats theoretical and analytical work, classroom teaching and engaged practice as integral parts of critical inquiry, has significantly contributed to its ability to continuously enhance scholarly discussions.

The volume is divided into two parts, which are intrinsically linked. The first part contains reflections on the field of European studies and on concepts, analytical perspectives and methodologies that have emerged through interdisciplinary dialogues in Euroculture/European studies. The second part contains contributions that reflect upon the Euroculture programme itself, discussing both changes and continuities in the curriculum and didactic methods, outlining possible venues for further developing the educational and research programme that is firmly embedded in a network of partners that have been closely cooperating over a span of no less than two decades.